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626 OCTOBER TERM, 1971 
AL..e.XA-NDdl v. LCui~I~A Opinion of the Court 405 u.s. 
Charles Stephen Ralston argued the cause for peti-
tioner. With him on the brief were Jack Greenberg, 
James M. Nabrit III, Margrett Ford, and Charles Finley. 
Bertrand DeBlanc argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the brief were Jack P. F. Gremillion, At-
torney General of Louisiana, Harry H award, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Charles R. Sonnier. 
Birch Bayh filed a brief for the National Federation 
of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., as 
amicus curiae urging reversal. 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
After a jury trial in the District Court for the Fif-
teenth Judicial District of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, 
petitioner, a Negro, was convicted of rape and sentenced 
to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on 
appeal by the Louisiana Supreme Court/ and this Court 
granted certiorari. 2 Prior to trial, petitioner had moved 
to quash the indictment because (1) Negro citizens were 
included on the grand jury list and venire in only token 
numbers, and (2) female citizens were systematically 
excluded from the grand jury list, venire, and impaneled 
grand jury.8 Petitioner therefore argued that the indict-
ment against him was invalid because it was returned 
by a grand jury impaneled from a venire made up con-
1 255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891 (1970). Petitioner was indicted for 
aggravated rape, and a 12-member jury unanimously returned a 
verdict of "Guilty without Capital Punishment." 
8 Petitioner does not here challenge the composition of the petit 
jury that convicted him. The principles that apply to the system-
atic exclusion of potential jurors on the ground of race are es-
sentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries, however. 
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939). See generally Neal 
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). 
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IN THE 
~prtmt Oinurt nf tlyt ~nittb 'httts 
OCTOBER TERM, 1975 
NO. ____ _ 
CLAUDIO CASTANEDA, SHERIFF, Petitioner 
v. 
RODRIGO PARTIDA, Respondent 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Petitioner, Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff of Hidalgo 
County, Texas, prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued 
to review the judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversing the district court 
below, entered in the above entitled case on December 
11, 1975. 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion delivered by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, is reported at 524 F.2d 481 (1975), and is 
appended to this Petition as Appendix "A". The opinion 
delivered by the United States District Court for the 
2 
Southern District of Texas as reported at 384 F.Supp. 79 
( 197 4), which was reversed by the Court of Appeals, is 
attached as Appendix "B". 
Also attached as Appendix "C" is a copy of the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals. A copy of the order deny-
ing the Petition for Rehearing en Bane is attached hereto 
as Appendix "D". A copy of the Stay of Mandate is 
appended hereto as Appendix "E". 
JURISDICTION 
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit was entered on December 11, 197 5 
(See Appendix "A"). The jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court is invoked pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Whether or not the Petitioner rebutted the Re-
spondent's prima facie case of discrimination in grand 
jury selection. 
II. Whether or not the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is in conflict with 
several Supreme Court decisions. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
United States Constitution, Amendment Fourteen, Sec. 
1: 
" ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws". 
3 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Annotated, Article 
19.01 (Amended): 
"The district judge, at or during any term of court, 
shall appoint not less than three, nor more than five 
persons to perform the duties of jury commissioners, 
and shall cause the sheriff to notify them of their 
appointment, and when and where they are to appear. 
The district judge shall, in the order appointing such 
commissioners, designate whether such commissioners 
shall serve during the term at which selected or for 
the next succeeding term. Such commissioners shall 
receive as compensation for each day or part thereof 
they may serve the sum of Ten Dollars, and they 
shall possess the following qualifications: 
1. Be intelligent citizens of the county and able 
to read and write the English language; 
2. Be qualified jurors in the county; 
3. Have no suit in said court which requires in-
tervention of a jury; 
4. Be residents of different portions of the 
county; and 
5. The same person shall not act as jury corn-
missioner more than once in the same year." 
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.03: 
"When the appointees appear before the judge, 
he shall administer to them the following oath: 
'You do swear faithfully to discharge the duties re-
quired of you as jury commissioners; that you will 
not knowingly elect any man as juryman whom you 
believe to be unfit and not qualified; that you will 
not make known to any one the name of any jury-
man selected by you and reported to the court; that 
you will not, directly or indirectly, converse with 
any one selected by you as a juryman concerning 
4 
the merits of . any case to be tried at the next term 
of this court, until after said cause may be tried or 
continued, or the jury discharged'." 
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.06, (Amended): 
"The jury commissioners shall select not less than 
15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of 
different portions of the county to be summoned as 
grand jurors for the next term of court, or the term 
of court for which said commissioners were selected 
to serve, as directed in the order of the court select-
ing the commissioners." 
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.08, (Amended): 
"No person shall be selected or serve as a grand 
juror who does not possess the following qualifica-
tions: 
1. He must be a citizen of the state, and of the 
county in which he is to serve, and be qualified under 
the Constitution and laws to vote in said county, pro-
vided that his failure to pay a poll tax or register to 
vote shall not be held to disqualify him in this 
instance; 
2. He must be of sound mind and good moral 
character. 
3. He must be able to read and write; 
4. He must not have been convicted of any felony; 
5. He must not be under indictment or other legal 
accusation for theft or of any felony." 
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.21: 
"When as many as twelve persons summoned to 
serve as grand jurors are in attendance upon the 
Court, it shall proceed to test their qualifications as 
such." 
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Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.22: 
"Each person who is presented to serve as a grand 
juror shall, before being impaneled, be interrogated 
on oath by the court or under his direction, touching 
his qualifications." 
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.23 (Amended): 
"In trying the qualifications of any person to serve 
as a grand juror, he shall be asked: 
1. Are you a citizen of this state and county, and 
qualified to vote in this county, under the Constitu-
tion and laws of this state? 
2. Are you able to read and write? 
3. Have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
4. Are you under indictment or other legal ac-
cusation for theft or for any felony?" 
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.26: 
"When twelve qualified jurors are found to be 
present, the court shall proceed to impanel them as 
a grand jury, unless a challenge is made, which may 
be to the array or to any particular person presented 
to serve as a grand juror." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondent was indicted on March 17, 1972, for 
the offense of burglary of a private residence at night with 
intent to rape, contained in the first count of the indict-
ment, and burglary, in the second count of the indictment. 
Thereafter, on December 19, 1972, the Respondent was 
found guilty by a jury of burglary of a private residence 





A pre-sentence investigation was ordered, and on Feb-
ruary 16, 1973, the Court sentenced Respondent to serve 
eight ( 8) years in the Texas Department of Corrections. 
From such action, the Respondent appealed. The convic-
tion was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on 
March 6, 1974, in Partida v. The State, 506 S.W.2d 209. 
Thereafter, the Respondent filed an application for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas, claiming discrimination 
in the selection of the grand jury which indicted him. 
A hearing was held on his application. Judge Alamia of 
the 92nd District Court, the Court which impanelled the 
grand jury which indicted the Respondent, testified at the 
hearing concerning the manner of selecting grand jury 
commissioners and grand jury impanelling. At the request 
of the Court, the State filed a transcript of the proceedings 
wherein the grand jury which indicted the Respondent 
was selected and impanelled. Attached to the transcript 
of that proceeding was a list of the grand jurors originally 
selected by the grand jury commissioners which ultimately 
indicted the Respondent. This list indicates that 50 per-
cent of the names appearing thereon were Spanish. The 
record indicates that 3 of the 5 jury commissioners, 5 of 
the grand jurors who returned the indictment, 7 of the 
petit jurors, the judge presiding at the trial, and the sheriff 
who served notice on the grand jurors to appear had 
Spanish surnames. 
On October 26, 1974, the United States District Court 
denied the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
held: 
( 1 ) That the Respondent had not waived his right to 
object by failing to object at an earlier time; and 
7 
( 2) That the Respondent had established a bare prima 
facie case by proving a long continued disproportion in 
the composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County, 
but the Court held that it has been rebutted. 
Attention is directed to Appendix "B". Thereafter, the 
Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court of Appeals, in its 
opinion, attached as Appendix "A", found that Respond-
ent's prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury 
selection was not rebutted and ordered the case reversed 
and remanded. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I. Petitioner did effectively rebut Respondent's 
prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury 
selection. 
The Respondent employed the "rule of exclusion" to 
establish his prima facie case of grand jury discrimination. 
He produced evidence that the total population of Hidalgo 
County, Texas, in the year 1970 was 181,535 persons. 
Of that number, some 143,611, or approximately 79.2%, 
were persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname. 
Evidence was then introduced to show the composition 
of the grand jury "lists" (the 15-20 persons selected 
by the grand jury commissioners from whom a grand jury 
panel of 12 is selected) over a ten year period of time, 
showing a statistical disparity of some 40.02%. The 
Petitioner countered with sworn testimony of District 
Judge J. A. Alamia, a Mexican-American, who selected 
the grand jury commissioners, who selected the grand jury 
I ill 
8 
that indicted the Respondent. He testified that he had 
selected three out of five Mexican-Americans as grand 
jury commissioners. These five commissioners then se-
lected twenty persons for the grand jury "list". Of this 
number, 50% were Mexican-Americans. The sheriff who 
summoned them was Mexican-American. Judge Alamia 
denied that any sort of discrimination against Mexican-
Americans had entered into his selection of the grand jury 
commissioners. Mexican-Americans constitute a "govern-
ing majority" in Hidalgo County. The Texas system of 
selection of grand jurors allows the subjective element 
to enter into its jury selection process. Therefore, "If 
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is un-
likely they will discriminate against themselves. A broader 
range of variation should be tolerated here, because the 
Texas selection system allows the governing majority to 
favor their group when selecting grand jurors". See 
Partida v. Castaneda, 384 F.Supp. 79 (Appendix "B"). 
II. Under Supreme Court Rule 19, l(b ), a writ of 
certiorari may be granted when a court of appeals 
has decided a federal question in a way in conflict 
with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. In 
the instant case the Fifth Circuit has applied the 
equal protection clause of the federal constitution in 
a way not entirely consistent with several relevant 
Supreme Court decisions. 
In the Court of Appeals' opinion, it is stated that 
"Judge Alamia offered no explanation for the disparity. 
Indeed, he testified that he sought a balance of grand 
jury commissioners according to ethnic origin, race, sex 
and age, yet he did not instruct the commissioners to do 
the same." (Emphasis added.) It is the Petitioner's 
9 
position that such instructions from Judge Alamia would 
be a violation of the principle that "jurymen should be 
selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifica-
tions, and not as members of a race". Cassels v. Texas, 
339 U.S. 282. The Supreme Court has recently held in 
the case of Taylor v. Louisiana that "Our holding does 
not auger or authorize the fashioning of detailed jury 
selection codes by federal courts. The fair cross-section 
principle must have much leeway in application . . . 
Carter v. Jury Commission and other cases recognized 
broad discretion in the States in this respect. We do not 
depart from the principles enunciated in Carter." (See 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692.) The instant case is 
similar to that of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, where 
the Court held that "Here the commissioners denied that 
racial consideration entered into their selection of either 
their contacts in the community or the names of prospec-
tive jurors . . . Undoubtedly the selection of prospective 
jurors was somewhat haphazard and little effort was made 
to ensure that all groups in the community were fully 
represented. But an imperfect system is not equivalent to 
purposeful discrimination based on race. We do not think 
that the burden of proof was carried by petitioner in this 
case." 
If the Court of Appeals is to require that Texas District 
Court Judges are to instruct grand jury commissioners 
to seek out racial and sexual quotas in filling the grand 
jury list, then it would be meaningless to retain such a 
system. In effect, the Court of Appeals' decision, by im-
plication, has spelled the doom for the statutory scheme for 
selection of grand jurors as enacted by the elected repre-






For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for Certiorari 
should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OSCAR B. MciNNIS 
Criminal District Attorney 
Hidalgo County, Texas 
THOMAS PARKER BEERY 
Assistant Criminal District Attorney 
Hidalgo County, Texas 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Room 303 
Hidalgo County Courthouse 
Edinburg, Texas 78539 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, THOMAS PARKER BEERY, a member of the Bar 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, do hereby 
certify that two ( 2) copies of the foregoing Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari have been served on Respondent by 
depositing same with the United States Postal Service, 
Certified Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
David G. Hall, Law Offices of Texas Rural Legal Aid; 
Inc., 103 E. Third, Weslaco, Texas 78596, on this the 
__ day of April, 197 6. 
THOMAS PARKER BEERY 
Assistant Criminal District Attorney 






Claudio CASTANEDA, Sheriff, 
Respondent -Appellee. 
No. 74-3966. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Dec. 11, 1975. 
Habeas corpus relief was denied a state prisoner by 
the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas at Brownsville, Reynaldo G. Garza, J., 384 F. 
Supp. 79, on the ground that, although petitioner had 
established a prima facie case of discrimination against 
Mexican-Americans in the grand jury selection process, 
such prima facie case ha~ been rebutted. The prisoner 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held 
that the prisoner's prima facie case of discrimination was 
not rebutted by testimony of the state district judge who 
selected the grand jury commissioners in view of such 
judge's testimony that, although he sought balance of 
grand jury commissioners according to ethnic origin, race, 
and age, he did not instruct the commissioners to do the 
same and in view of his admission that the selection 
process had not resulted in ethnically represented panels. 
Proof that Mexican-Americans had governing majority 
status in the county likewise did not rebut the prima facie 
case. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
12 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas. 
Before GODBOLD, DYER and MORGAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
DYER, Circuit Judge: 
Partida seeks habeas corpus relief contending that he 
was denied due process and equal protection of law be-
cause the grand jury of Hidalgo County, Texas, which 
indicted him, was unconstitutionally underrepresented by 
Mexican-Americans. The district courtheld that Partida 
haaestablisheda prima facie case of discrimination against 
Mexican-Americans in the grand jury selection process, 
but that it had been rebutted. Finding that the county's1 
evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case, 
we reverse. 
Partida was indicted on March 17, 1972, and was found 
guilty of the charge against him. On motion for a new 
trial, Partida presented his Mexican-American exclusion 
claim for the first time. His motion was denied and he 
appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Al-
though his challenge to the grand jury was untimely2 aDd, 
----........... --- .._.... ,....., ,__._.. ---
1. The writ was directed to the Sheriff of Hildago County who 
was holding Partida. 
1
2. Vernon's Ann. C. Cr. P. art. 19.27, provides in pertinent part: 
"Before the grand jury has been impaneled, any person may 
challenge the array of jurors or any person presented as a grand 
juror. In no other way shall objections to the qualifications and 
legality of the grand jury be heard." 
Art. 27.03 provides: 
" [A] motion to set aside an indictment . . . may be based on 
the following: 
... That the grand jury was illegally impaneled; provided, how-
ever, in order to raise such question on motion to set aside the 
indictment, the defendant must show that he did not have an 
opportunity to challenge the array at the time the grand jury 
was impaneled." Cf. F. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (2) and (f). 
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therefore, apparently waived, 3 the Texas court iggored 
th.sU fact an.sL.uroceede["Jo .reject Partida's grand jyry 
contention. Partida v. State of Texas, Tex. Cr. App., -1974, 506 S.W.2d 209. Thereafter, his petition for the 
writ was filed, dismissed, and this appeal taken. 
[1] Initially, respondent asks us to deny petitioner 
federal habeas corpus relief because he waived his chal-
lenge to the composition of the grand jury. However, the j 
waiver argument was made to the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals which nevertheless chose to consider the merits 
of the claim. Under these circumstances, habeas relief may 
lie and the district court was correct in reaching the merits. 
Warden v. Hayden, 1967, 387 U.S. 294, 297, fn. 3, 87 
S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782; Irvin v. Dowd, 1959, 359 
U.S. 394, 406, 79 S.Ct. 825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900; Hale v. 
Henderson, 6 Cir. 1973, 485 F.2d 266, 269. 
[2, 3] Every criminal defendant is entitled to be in-
dicted and tried by grand and petit juries whose members 
have been selected in a non-discriminatory manner. Jury 
discrimination, however, is nt an easy matter of proof. 
The "rule of exclusion" is usually utilized. According to 
this rule, a prima facie case of discrimination is established 
by showing a disparity between ( 1 ) the percentage which 
the ethnic or racial group constitutes of the persons from 
whom a jury list is drawn and ( 2) the percentage which 
that group constitutes of the jury list compiled. Once a 
defendant establishes his prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the State to offer a satisfactory explanation--wiiy 
the disparity exists. Muniz v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 
697, 700. 
3. Wilson v. Estelle, 5 Cir. 1974, 504 F.2d 562, 563; Tyson 11. 








71. 2.. P/o ~. ~. 
zf~~ ekl 
~~~~__,..A ~ ~ ~ r. ~'?-a 
1. ~/q_ ;e..-¥-C~..h ~ 1\1/A-s artid{ Jliect on the rule of exclusion to establish his 
prima facie case. First, he demonstrated that Mexican-
Americans constituted a separately identifiable ethnic 
group in Hidalgo County, Texas. Then, he introduced 
evidence that in 1970, the total population of Hidalgo 
County was 181,535 persons of which 143,611, or approx-
imately 79.2%, were persons of Spanish language or 
Spanish ~arne. 4 Next, petitioner presented evidence 
showing the composition of the grand jury Ii§.ts5 over a 
period of ten years prior to and including the term of 
court in which the indictment against him was returned. 
Of the 870 persons selected for grand jury duty, only 
39.0% were Mexican-Americans. In the two and one-half 
year period previous to tli"e indictment, 45.5% of the 
panelists were persons of Mexican descent. 
[ 4] As these figures show, the disparity between Mexi-
can-Americans in the population and those on the grand 
jury was significant: over the full ten year period, it was 
40.2%; for the shorter two and one-half year period, it was 
33.7%.6 This dis ari ear establishes a rima facie case. 
Black v. Curb, 5 Cir. 1972, 464 F.2d 165; o son v. 
Smith, 5 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 1075; Preston v. Mande-
ville, 5 Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 1392; Muniz v. Beto, supra. 
4. The figures were obtained from the 1970 Census of Population 
conducted by the United States Census Bureau, Department of Com-
merce. Since there was no contrary showing, we accept petitioner's 
assertion that the terms "Spanish surname" and "Spanish language" 
as used in the census reports are synonymous with persons of Mexican 
descent in Hidalgo County. 
5. The grand jury "list" refers to the 15-20 persons selected by 
the jury commissioners from whom a grand jury panel of 12 is 
selected. See fn. 7. 
6. The grand jury list prepared in the term Partida was indicted 
was 50o/o Mexican-American while the panel itself was 40o/o. The 
disparities were 29.2% and 39.2% respectively. 
15 
Respondent then had the burden to rebut petitioner's 
statistical presentation. It is at this juncture that we dis-
agree with the district court. 
[5] Respondent's rebuttal evidence was limited to the 
testimony of -~at~ District J udg_e Alamia, who selected 
the grand jury commissioners, who selected the grand jury 
who indicted petitioner.7 Judge Alamia offered no explana-
tion for the disparity. Indeed, he testified that he sought 
a balance of grand jury commissioners according to ethnic 
origin, race, sex and age, yet did not instruct the com-
missioners to do the same. In addition, he admitted that 
the grand jury selection process has not resulted in 
ethnically-representative grand jury panels. 
[6] In addition to Judge Alamia's testimony, the district 
court based its decision on the "g_overning majorit~" st&s 
of Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo County. 8 He reasoned 
that Mexican-Americans in such a position w9uld not pur-
posefully and intentionally discriminate against themselves. 
7. This bit of verbal gymnastics exemplifies the organization of 
the Texas grand jury system. A state district judge appoints not less 
than three nor more than five jury commissioners, who must be 
residents of different portions of the county and must not have served 
previously in the same year. Art. 19.01. They, in turn, select not less 
than 15 nor more than 20 persons "from the citizens of different 
portions of the county" as grand jurors. Art. 19 .06, who, among 
other things, must be able to read and write and must be of sound 
mind and good moral character. Art. 19.08. The 15-20 persons are 
"tested," Art. 19.21, and they are "interrogated," Art. 19.22, by being 
asked prescribed questions, Art. 19.23. Then 12 of them are impaneled 
by the district judge as the grand jury. Art. 19.26. 
8. "Here, 80% of the population is Mexican-American, the ma-
jority of the voting population is Mexican-American, the majority of 
the elected officials are Mexican-American, the majority of the judges 
and jury commissioners are also Mexican-American, and Mexican-
Americans in significant percentages have served on every grand jury 











Therefore, the discriminatory intent presumed by peti-
tioner's prima facie case was overcome. We cannot agree. 
' 
The fact of governing majority status may mollify the 
pri.!!Ja 7-ad~ase, but it does not nullify it. This may be 
done only by proof to explain the disparity. Without it, 
petitioner must prevail. 
[7] While the Texas system of selecting grand jurors 
is constitutional, Smith v. Texas, 1940, 311 U.S. 128, 61 
S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84; Brooks v. Beta, 5 Cir. 1966, 366 
F.2d 1, the unbridled discretion afforded the jury commis-
sioners to prep.ire the grand ]ury list requires close scrutiny 
ortii'e disparities and the proof offered to explain them. 
Here, the disparities are too great and the proof offered 
too paltry. 
The district court's judgment is reversed and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.9 
Reversed and remanded. 
9. We do not suggest that proportional representation or some 
percentage approximating it is required to survive constitutional at-
tack. Cf. Swain 11. Alabama, 1965, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09, 85 S.Ct. 
824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759. The unexplained disparities here are simply too 
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GARZA, District Judge. 
After exhausting all available state remedies, the 
Petitioner, Rodrigo Partida, filed this Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus with the United States District Court, 
Southern District of Texas, naming Claudio Castaneda, 
the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, as Respondent. 
Petitioner alleges he has been denied due process and 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, because Mexican-Americans 
were significantly under-represented on the state grand 
jury that indicted him, as a result of a long continued 
system of underrepresentation in the particular jurisdiction 
where he was tried. The District Attorney for Hidalgo 
County filed the answer for the Respondent which asserts 
that the Petitioner has waived his right to claim racial 
discrimination because Petitioner failed to raise his claim 
prior to trial. It is further asserted that the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals was correct in holding Petitioner 
failed to establish his claim that he had been denied his 
constitutional rights because of a long continued racial 
underrepresentation on the state grand juries in Hidalgo 
County. Two issues are presented for decision by this 
Court. The first issue is whether this Court should hold 
Petitioner waived his right ~o object to the composition 
of the grand jury that indicted him, where the state 
courts have ignored any waiver provision and considered 
Petitioner's claim on the merits. The .second issue is 
whether the Petitioner has proven his claim of a long-
continued racial underrepresentation in the particular 
jurisdiction where he was tried and is entitled to relief. 
The Petitioner, Rodrigo Partida, was indicted on March 
17, 1972, for the offense of burglary of a private residence 
19 
at night with intent to commit rape; on December 19, 
1972, the Petitioner was found guilty by a jury and 
sentenced to serve not less than five nor more than eight 
years in the Texas Department of Corrections. The Pe-
titioner filed a Motion for a New Trial and for the first 
time raised the issue of the unconstitutional composition 
of the grand jury that indicted him. Petitioner attempted 
to prove systematic racial discrimination in the selection 
of the grand jurors in Hidalgo County by placing in 
evidence data from the U.S. Census of 1970, which shows 
that the Mexican-American population of Hidalgo Coun-
ty, as indicated by Mexican-American surnames, was 
79.2% of the total population. He further showed that 
the grand juries for the ten year period from 1962 to 
1972, when he was indicted, were composed of 39% 
Mexican-American surnamed jurors. These figures illu-
strate the existence of a 40.2% disparity between the 
percentage Petitioner's ethnic group constituted of the 
total population, and the percentage which his ethnic 
group constituted of the jury lists actually compiled. 
Petitioner's Motion for New Trial was overruled and he 
appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
highest state appellate court on criminal matters. The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the untimely 
presented point of error and held that the Petitioner had 
failed to carry his burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of jury discrimination and therefore, affirmed his 
conviction. Partida v. State of Texas, 506 S.W.2d 209 
(Tex. Cr. App. 1974 ). The Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that even though Petitioner did show a sub-
stantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on 
the grand jury, he failed to show: 
" ... that the females who served on grand juries 





to husbands with Anglo-American surnames. He did 
not show how many persons with Mexican-American 
surnames or of Mexican-American descent were 
summoned for grand jury duty and were excused 
for age, health or other legal reasons. . . How many 
of those listed in the census figures with Mexican-
American names were not citizens of the state, but 
were so-called 'wet-backs' from the south side of 
the Rio Grande; how many were migrant workers 
and not residents of Hidalgo County; how many were 
illiterate and could not read and write; how many 
were not of sound mind and good moral character; 
how many had been convicted of a felony or were 
under indictment or legal accusation for theft or 
a felony; none of these facts appear in the record. 
Their absence renders the disparity of the per-
centages of little force or effect." 
As further evidence of the lack of -E.!!!J?Oseful discrimi~­
tion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that -the record showed that the Judge who presided at the 
trial and summoned the jury commissioners had a Mexi-
can-American surname; that .!£ree of the five jury com-
missioners that he summoned had Mexican-American 
surnames; that ten of the twenty members of the grand 
ju"'fYarray had Mexican-American surnames; that five of 
the twelve grand jurors that indicted Petitioner had 
Mexican-American surnames, probably because four of 
the original members of the array who were Mexican-
Americans could not be located; that the foreman who 
signed the grand jury indictment had a Mexican-Ameri-
can surname; that seven of the twelve petit jurors that 
found Petitioner guilty had Mexican-American surnames. 
After Petitioner's appeal had been denied, he filed his 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. Peti-
21 
tioner alleges he has been denied due process of law and 
equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, because of the ethnic under-
representation in the state grand jury which indicted him, 
which defect constitutes a denial of a fundamental right 
and may be raised for the first time in a Motion for New 
Trial; that he did not knowingly and intentionally waive 
his right to challenge the composition of the grand jury 
because his court appointed counsel did not inform him 
that such right existed; that he was an indigent at the 
time of his indictment and was unrepresented by counsel 
at this "critical stage", which, according to the Texas 
statutory and court fashioned rules, is the stage when 
Petitioner must challenge the array or be barred from 
asserting his challenge; that the Texas statutes do not 
provide for his particular constitutional challenge and, 
therefore, he could not have waived it, since it did not 
exist; that the highest state appellate court on criminal 
matters considered the constitutional challenge and, there-
fore, he could not have waived it, since it did not exist; 
that the highest state appellate court on criminal matters 
considered the constitutional challenge and, therefore, 
ignored the waiver provisions, if any existed; that the 
highest criminal appellate court in the state applied the 
wrong burden of proof and completely misunderstood 
the requisites of a constitutional attack based on ethnic 
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. The 
state answers that the Petitioner did waive his challenge 
to the ethnic composition of the grand jury and he did 
not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 
[1,2] Since the waiver issue is potentially dispositive 
of the entire case, it will be considered first. Rule 12 (b) 
( 2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
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" ... objections based on defects in the institution 
of the prosecution or in the indictment . . . may be 
raised only by motion before trial . . . failure . . . 
constitutes a waiver . . . but the court for cause 
shown may grant relief from the waiver." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
In Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 93 S.Ct. 1577, 
36 L.Ed.2d 216 (1973), this rule was held to apply to 
both procedural and constitutional defects in the institution 
of prosecutions which do not affect the Court's jurisdic-
tion. The policy reasons for the rule, as so clearly stated 
by the Davis Court, are: 
"If its time limits are followed, inquiry into an 
alleged defect may be concluded and, if necessary, 
cured before the court, the witnesses and the parties 
have gone to the burden and expense of a trial. If 
defendants were allowed to flout its time limitations, 
on the other hand, there would be little incentive to 
comply with its terms when a successful attack might 
simply result in a new indictment prior to trial. Strong 
tactical considerations would militate in favor of 
delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an 
acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did 
not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an 
otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecu-
tion might well be difficult." 
( 
Davis clearly establishes the rule that once an objection 
to the institution of the prosecution is waived, it cannot 
later be resurrected, either in direct criminal proceedings 
or in federal habeas corpus, unless cause is shown. If 
cause is shown, then a new trial will be granted so that 
an indictment can be returned by a properly constituted 









the prosecution will be allowed to present its entire case 
through the testimony given at the previous trial, if it 
is shown that its witnesses are unavailable. Under this 
procedure, the state will only lose the enhancement of 
credibility that the actual presence of witnesses will lend 
to their testimony. Several factors should be considered 
in determining whether there is sufficient cause to grant 
relief from any waiver suffered by the complainant. 
[3] In determining if cause exists, the Court should 
consider whether the case against the Petitioner is a strong 
one or weak one, if the case is a weak one, then it is 
probable a properly composed grand jury would have 
found that probable cause did not exist and would not 
have bound the defendant over for trial; whether the facts 
concerning the selection of the grand jury were notorious 
and available to the Petitioner in the exercise of due dili-
gence before trial, if the facts were known it increases the 
likelihood of a tacit but intentional waiver or intentional 
tactical decision; considerations of credibility require an 
examination of how much the state will lose because 
certain key witnesses are no longer available; judicial 
economy requires examination of the seriousness of clog-
ging dockets by empaneling new grand and petit juries 
to re-indict and re-try the defendant; whether upsetting 
prior convictions will effect enhancement laws; whether 
any actual prejudice resulted to the defendant from the 
discriminatory selection of the grand jury, for example, 
were the two white accomplices set free but the black man 
bound over for trial. Davis v. United States, supra 
(strength of evidence of guilt-facts of selection notori-
ous-loss of credibility on retrial); Newman v. Henderson, 
496 F.2d 896, 898 (CA 5 1974) (actual prejudice). 




excuse Petitioner from his failure to timely assert his claim 
in the trial court. Morris v. Sullivan, 497 F.2d 544 (CA 
5 1974 ). 
Factually the law announced in Davis can be limited 
to a Motion to Vacate brought pursuant to § 2255, but the 
Fifth Circuit has chosen not to circumscribe the Davis 
holding and has held that it applies to state prisoners 
bringing habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254. Hairston v. 
Cox, 361 F.Supp. 1180 (W.D.Va.1973); Morris v. Sul-
livan, supra; Newman v. Henderson, supra; Jones v. Hen-
derson, 494 F.2d 47 (CA 5 1974); Rivera v. Wainwright, 
488 F.2d 275 (CA 5 1974); Marlin v. Florida, 489 F.2d 
702 (CA 5 1974 ). 
[ 4-8] Pre-Davis, the rule in this Circuit was that a 
jury discrimination claim barred by a state procedural 
timeliness rule, like the Texas rule, could be presented 
for the first time in federal habeas corpus unless the 
state proved deliberate bypass or knowing waiver. Post-
Davis, this Circuit has consistently held that the Davis 
rule is applicable to state grand jury claims and it is the 
responsibility of the petitioner to show facts and circum-
stances justifying relief from the waiver. Morris v. Sulli-
van, supra. In Morris, it was held that a state's court-
fashioned procedural waiver rule should be given the same 
effect as Rule 12(b)(2). In Valadez v. State, 408 S.W.2d 
109 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that if the defendant did not timely assert 
his objection to the grand jury, he would be held to have 
waived his claim. Ever since Hendandez v. Texas, 347 
U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954 ), it has been 
held that a Texas grand jury can be attacked for purpose-
ful exclusion of Mexican-Americans. The case of Muniz 
v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697 (CA 5, 1970), cited by Petitioner, 
~~"- 5/LI-
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can be distinguished because at the time Petitioner was 
there indicted, Hernandez had not been decided and Texas 
did not recognize this constitutional claim as a ground 
for challenge. It now seems apparent that under established 
Texas law, a defendant can object to a grand jury because 
of purposeful exclusion of Mexican-Americans, and this 
objection can be waived if the defendant fails to timely 
assert it. It is now equally clear that the federal courts 
will give the same effect to the state waiver rule as it 
will give to Rule 12(b)(2), Fed.R.Crim.P., waiver rule. 
The standard for the application of this rule was expressed 
in Rivera v. Wainwright, supra: 
"If this waiver meets federal constitutional stand-
ards then the petitioner would be precluded from 
asserting his present claim in this federal habeas 
corpus proceeding." 
Similarly, if the state law does not provide for a procedure 
to give relief from the waiver, the federal courts will en-
graft a "cause shown" exception on the state rule and 
make an independent determination of whether such 
cause exists. Newman v. Henderson, supra. The rationale 
for this holding is evident; a state prisoner should not 
stand in a better position than a federal prisoner who 
would be held to have waived his objection under Rule 
12(b )(2). Newman v. Henderson, supra. 
[9, 10] This Court, however, does not feel that Davis JA 
is dispositive of the factual situation present in this case. Vf 
Here, the highest state court on criminal matters has 
chosen to ignore its own waiver provisions and consider 
the merits of Petitioner's constitutional claim. Where the 
state courts have ignored their own waiver provisions and 




court is not constrained from also considering the merits 
of the constitutional claim, even though it may have been 
waived under the federal rules. In this situation it is well 
settled that the federal courts will also reach the merits 
in the absence of an intentional waiver or deliberate 
bypass. Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266, 269 (CA 6 
1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129, 84 S.Ct. 
1152, 12 L.Ed.2d 190 ( 1964); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 297 n. 3, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 
(1967); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406, 79 S.Ct. 
825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 486, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953); Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 247, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 
1066 ( 1937); Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 
9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Having held 
that Petitioner did not waive his right to present his claim 
of discriminatory jury selection, it is not necessary to 
determine at what stage the Texas court-made waiver pro-
vision is effective or whether any such provision would 
make that state a "critical stage" at which the defendant 
must be represented by counsel. 
This Court turns next to a consideration of Petitioner's 
claim that he has been .. 1eJ!ied equal J?rotec_!ion of the 
~ ' laws because of the long-contmued systematic uii.derrepre-
sentation of Mexican-Americans on the grand jury panels 
in Hidalgo County. 
[ 11] The standard that has evolved under the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution 
during the ninety years since Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879), is that an indictment 
returned against a member of a "distinct group" cannot 
stand if members of this "distinct group" have been sys-
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t~matically and intentionally discriminated against in the 
selection of the grand jury. As eloquently expressed by 
Chief Justice Warren in Hernandez v. Texas, supra: 
"Throughout our history differences in race and 
color have defined easily identifiable groups which 
have at times required the aid of the courts in secur-
ing equal treatment under the laws. But community 
prejudices are not static, and from time to time other 
differences from the community norm may define 
other groups which need the same protection. Whe-
ther such a group exists within a community is a 
question of fact. When the existence of a distinct 
class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that 
the laws, as WDitten or as applied, single out that class 
for different treatment not based on some reasonable 
classifioation, the guarantees of the Constitution have 
been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not 
directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-
class theory'-that is, based upon differences between 
'white' and 'Negro'." (Emphasis supplied.) 
A conviction based upon such a constitutionally defective 
indictment will also be set aside regardless of strong evi-
dence of guilt or lack of objection to the composition of 
the petit jury that finds the defendant guilty. Pierre v. 
State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 
757 (1939); Hill v. State of Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 
S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559 (1942); Labat v. Bennett, 
365 F.2d 698 (5 Cir. 1966). This does not mean, how-
ever, that the accused will be set free, since the state may 
choose to re-indict and re-try him after the constitutional 
error has been corrected. Hill v. Texas, supra; Patton v. · 
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 469, 68 S.Ct. 184, 92 L.Ed. 
76 (1947); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 247, 85 
S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Whitus v. Georgia, 
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385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 
(1967). 
L12] The person claiming the s stematio and intention-
al_ discrimination in the selection of the grand jury as the 
burden of providing a prima facie case, but once it is 
proven, tthe burden shifts to the state and it will be held 
responsible for any factual vacuum. Avery v. Georgia, 
345 U.S. 559, 562, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1224 (1953). 
Patton v. Mississiprpi, supra; Muniz v. Beto, supra. The 
reason for this rule is: 
"It is designed to operate in jury cases so that once 
the defendant has made a showing of total exclusion, 
the burden of going foPWard with the eVIdence' is 
rplaced upon the State, the party in the better posi-
tion to develop the facts as to how the exclusion 
came about. The defendant is a party to one pro-
ceeding only, and his access to relevant evidence is 
obviously limited. The State is a party to all criminal 
cases and has greater access to ~he evidence, if any, 
which would tend to negative the State's involvement 
in discriminatory jury selection." Swain v. Alabama, 
supra, at 240, 85 S.Ct. at 846. 
"Had there been evidence obtainable to contradict 
and disrprove the testimony offered by petitioner, it 
cannot be assumed that the State would have re-
~ 
fr.ained from introducing it." Pierre v. Louisiana, 
supra, at 362, 59 S.Ct. at 540. 
) 
[13] To establish a prima facie case of invidious dis-
crimination, the Petitioner must first show a discrimina-
tory result by proving a marked disparity between the 
percentage which the "distri.ct group" constitutes among 
the potentially eligible jurors and the percentages which 





compiled by the jury commissioners. Norris v. Alabama, 
294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935); 
Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 88 S.Ct. 4, 19 L.Ed.2d 
25 ( 1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 523, 
19 L.Ed.2d 634 ( 1967); Muniz v. Beto, supra; Singleton 
v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 671, 677 ( 1974); Gibson v. Blair, 
467 F.2d 842, 844 ( 1972). 
{ 
After proving a discriminatory result, the Petitioner 
must further rove this result was accompanied b some 
p~rticular discrimmatory ac or a1 ure to act; or accom-
panied by token inclUsion or total exclusion; or accom-
panied by a jury selection system containing a significant 
danger of abuse; or by proving that the discriminatory 
result was representative of the results obtained in a his-
tory of cases in the particular jurisdiction in which the 
trial occurred, this being strong circumstantial evidence 
of discriminatory jury selection. Singleton v. Estelle, 
supra; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 61 S.Ct. 164, 
85 L.Ed. 84 (1940) (failure to act-conscious ignor-
ance); Hill v. Texas, supra (failure to act-conscious ig-
norance); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630, 92 
S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (racial designation 
on questionnaire-significant danger of abuse); Avery v. 
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244 
(1953) (racial designation on jury cards-significant dan-
ger of abuse); Whitus v. Georgia, supra (racial designa-
tion on tax list-significant danger of abuse); Norris v. 
Alabama, supra, (total exclusion of Negroes from grand 
juries and petit juries); Brown v. Allen, supra (token 
inclusion of Negroes on grand and petit juries); Patton v. 
Mississiprpi, supra (history of discriminatory results); Mu-
niz v. Beto, supra (history of discriminatory results); 
Gibson v. Blair, supra (history of discriminatory results). 
~ -
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The "Rule of Exolusion" is an evidentiary rule to facil~-
/ tate the Petitioner in establishing his prima facie case of 
.-(' intentional discrimination f here ev,idence of intent is 
) -~ otherwise wanting. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (CA 5 
f~_/- 1966). Under this rule a prima facie case can be estab- ~ { 
V"' , lished, as done in the case before the Court, by showing 
/ a long-continued and unexplained disparity. 
A dispani~ great enough to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimin~ry jury selection will depend on the facts 
of each case, but an examination of a few recent cases will 
g1ve an indication of the outer perimeters. In Black v. 
Curb, 464 F.2d 165 (CA 5 1972), 69% of the total 
population was Negro, 60% were potentially eligible, yet 
only 35% of the potential jurors on the jury List were 
Negro, causing a 25% disparity. The Court indicated this 
discriminatory result flowed from the fact that the jury 
commissioners disqualified large numbers of Negroes be-
cause they were unknown to the jury commissioners. Fail-
ure of jury commissioners to inform themselves of the 
qualifications of members of minority groups has long 
,been held to be a form of discriminatory jury selection. 
It should be noted that NegroeS' constituted a majority of 
the population, but they were not a governing majority 
even though there was significant inclusion on both grand 
and petit juries. In Tyrner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359, 
90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2ct567 (M70), 60% of the total 
population was Negro, yet only 37% of the jurors on the 
jury list were Negro, causing a 23% disparity. The Court 
indicated that this discriminatory result flowed from the 
fact that the jury commissioners purged a great number 
of Negroes from the voter lists because they "lacked in-
tel:ligence" or "uprightness" and were, therefore, disquali-
,fied. While Negroes again constituted a majority, they 
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were not a governing majority and were significantly un-
derrepresented man ~government of the county. In 
Pullum v. Greene, 396 F.2d 251 (CA 5 1968), 55.5% 
of the total population was Negro, yet only 17.9% of the 
jury list were Negro, causing a 37.6% diSiparity. The 
Court indicated that this discriminatory result flowed from 
the fact that the selection system contained an inherent 
danger of abuse, since the jury lists were drawn from 
segregated t~lists and there was evidence that the jury 
commissioners failed to familiarize themselves with the 
community, especially with the previously excluded minority 
group. In this county in Georgia, there was a long history of 
total exclusion of Negroes from the jury lists and they clearly 
were a non-governing majority. Salary v. Wilson, 415 F.2d 
467 ( CA 5 1969), is another case cited by Petitioner 
where Negroes were a majority of the population. There, 
Negroes constituted 55% of the total population, yet only 
12.9% of the jurors on the jury list were Negro. The Court 
indicated that this discriminatory result flowed from the 
fact the jury commissioners failed to familiarize themselves 
with the Negro population, which again was a non-gov-
erning majority. Even though Negroes constituted a ma-
jority of the population and were significantly included in 
the grand jury lists, they were still underrepresented on 
the grand jury list, and it was held they had established 
their prima facie case. In all of these cases, the excluded 
group was not a governing majority, and the Court found 
some evidence that discrimination had occurred besides 
circumstantially through evidence of a long continued dis-
padty. The Court found either total exclusion, token in-
clusion, some discriminatory 'act, failure of jury commis-
sioners to inform themselves of qualified members of the 
community, or found some defect in the selection system. 
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In S~ain v. Alabama, supra, 26% of the potentially eli-
gible population w""as Negro, yet only 10%-15% of the 
jurors on the jury list were Negroes. The Court held: 
"We cannot say that purposeful discrimination 
based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by show-
ing that an identifiable group in a community is 
underrepresented by as much as 10%. (Citations 
omitted). Here the commissioners denied that racial 
considerations entered into their selections of either 
their contacts in the community or the names of 
prospective jurors. There is no evidence that the 
commissioners applied different standards of quali-
fications to the Negro community than they did to 
the white community. Nor was ·there any meaningful 
attempt to demonstrate that the same proportion of 
Negroes qualified under the standards being adminis-
tered by the commissioners. It is not clear from the 
record that the commissioners even knew how many 
Negroes were in their respective areas, or on the 
jury roll or on the venires drawn from the jury box. 
The overall percentage disparity has been small, and 
reflects no studied attempt to include or exclude a 
specified number of Negroes. Undoubtedly the selec-
tion of prospective jurors was somewhat haphazard 
and little effort was made to ensure that aY groups 
in the community were fully represented. But an im-
perfect system is not equivalent to purposeful dis-
crimination based on race. We do not think that the 
burden of proof was carried by petitioner in this 
case." 
In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 
839 (1950), 15.5% of the total population was Negro, 
yet only 6.7% of the jurors on the jury list were Negro. 






When this disproportion was considered with the evidence 
of the failure of the jury commissioners to famaliarize 
themselves with qualified members of the excluded group, 
it was held sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 
[14, 15] These cases are illustrative because they show ) 
that tpe percentage disparity required to establish a prima 
facie case will vary accordmg to a great immber . of 
f~rs. For example, a greater percentage of dispropor-
tioiils permissible when Petitioner bases his disproportion 
on t2Jal population instead of eligible o ulation. The 
reason is that it will presumed that a substantial num-
ber of the distinct group are eligible, but it will not be 
presumed that all members of the group are eligible. It 
would seem that a greater percentage of deviation is 
permitted where there is no evidence of a discliminatory 
act or failure to act, token inclusion, total exclusion, 
inherently dangerous jury selection system, or a long his-
tory of discriminatory results. The reason this should be 
is that the Court must presume that some defect in the 
system caused the discriminatory result, but where a de-
fect is shown, then it is only necessary to presume the 
"nexus" between the defect and the discriminatory result. 
The amount of inclusion is also to be considered, as well 
as whether the selection process used reflected a studied 
attempt at discrimination or was merely haphazard or 
inadvertent in its failure to ensure all groups in the com-
munity were fully represented and also whether the group 
excluded was a majority or governing majority. In deter-
mining whether a prima facie case of discriminatory jury 
select' established, the Court must examine 
th entire record a take into account all possible a-






"This Court has never announced mathematical 
standards for the demonstration of 'systematic' ex-
clusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized that a 
factual inquiry is necessary in eaoh case that takes 
into account all possible explanatory factors." (Em-
phasis supplied. ) _ 
[ 16] This Court is aware that the state has the burden 
of rebutting the P~ner's prima facie case once it has 
been established, but bias and prejudice are not easily 
inferred and he must present clear evidence of discrimi-
ii'atO[y jury selection. Mere art'egations alone are not 
enough. The Court cannot presume a case without some 
ev:idence that it, in fact, exists; therefore, the prima facie 
case must depend on the basic correctness of the percent-
ages aided by certain allowable presumptions; the Court 
is not bound b percentages which are on their fac · n-
correct. e state appe a e court mcorrec y p aced the -burden of proof on the Petitioner, but the basic accuracy 
of his percentages must be considered before this Court 
can determine if his prima facie case has been rebutted 
,-- by the evidence that the state has presented. The Peti-/ .J-1 tioner's disproportion in the present case is not as great 
1 '/
11 
as it seemed at first blush. 
'7 
He has compared the jury lists with the total population 
instead of with jury eligibles whicb. inflates the dispropor-
tion. While it can be presumed that a substantial portion 
of the total Mexican-American population is eligible, it 
must be remembered that tips area is unique in that it has 
a larger ineligible migrant and illegal alien population 
than other areas. From Petitioner's own evidence, it ap-
pears that the percentage of drop-outs before the fifth 
grade .is greater among the Hidalgo County Mexican-
American population than is the state-wide percentage 
35 
among the Mexican-American population. This further in-
dicates that the percentage variation between jury eligibles 
and total population may be greater in Hidalgo County 
area than in other areas of the state, because Hidalgo 
County would have a larger percentage of illiterates. Hunt 
v. United States, 400 F.2d 306 ( CA 5 1968); United 
States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (CA 5 1971). 
It is clear that in a rapidly changing area a dispropor-
tion can be inflated by including too many prior years 
when representation was even more disparate. ~he evi-
dence shows that the di~ro,g9rtion was on the .decrease 
in the two years prior to Petitioner's indictmen( and the 
grand jury array was composed of about 45.5% Mexican-
Americans, reducing the disparity to 33:7% instead of 
the alleged 39% disparity. Due to the rapid growth in 
this area, a percentage comparison should not be carried 
back t0_9 many years, because it will distort the dispropor-
tion. 
/ 
[ 17] It is true that some disproportion exists, but the 
Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed the doctrine that the Con-
stitution only requires a jury represent a fair cross section 
of the community; it does not require that the jury mirror 
the percentage composition of the community. Grech v. 
Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747 (CA 5 1974). This Court 
must, therefore, determine whether the disproportion is 
marked enough to indicate that discrimination has oc-
curred. As aptly stated in Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 
at 403, 65 S.Ct. 1276 at 1279, 89 L.Ed. 1692 (1945): 
"Our directions that indictments be quashed when 
Negroes, although numerous in the community, were 
excluded from grand jury lists have been based on 
the theory that their continual exclusion indicated 
~w-&L ~; 
~·~a.....4.~<<..<ff/l~  
/';{:! ~- 2 • 
, --z ~ ~~36-z;..,.~~~~~ 
discrimination and not on 
groups must be recognized." 
[18] The Fifth Circuit has held that when the su~ 
tive element enters into the selection process, the per-
centage variation allowable in Swain, supra, could be dis-
regarded and an even narrower range might be required. 
ompson v. Sheppard, 490 F.2d 830 (CA 5 1974). 
ee out of five jury commissioners in the present case .__ .._., ...., 
were Mexican-Anlencans":""' anC'rl:he Texas system allows 
the subjective element to enter into its jury selection pro-
cess; therefore, it would seem that a broader range of 
variation should be allowed where the "distinct group" 
allegedly underrepresented is Mexican..,American. If peogle 
in charge can choose whom the~ wan;_, it.._ is unlikely they 
will discriminate agai nst themselves/ A ... broa~r range of · ~ 
variation should be tolerated here, 'because the Texas se-
lection system allows the govern1ng majority to favor t heir 
group when-seiecting gralliffurors. - ..... 
[~itional guidelines set out by the 
_/ courts for proving racial discrimination in the selection 
~ 
of the grand jury, the ~etitioner has. established a bare 
l' prima facie case by proving a long continued disp~ 
u • ...)L:::A tion in the composition o grana JUnes in Hidalgo 
\L----
~~ C~~/but this Court holds that it has been rebutted. 
y [20rf ..)fhe Petitioner's. percentages appear somewhat n 
'-?I 
inaccurate and the circumstautial evidence of lag oLQ!§.-
criminatory intent is strong, yet thfs Court fs asked to 
presume that llie judge a"iid jury commisisoners intention-
ally discriminated against Mexican-Americans in their se-
lection for the grand jury. The Petitioner did show a long 
continued history of an alleged disproportion, but there is 
no evidence of tokenism, total exclusion, discriminatory -- --- - . ----





acts or failure to act or of an inherently dangerous se-
lecTIOn system. It cannot be argued that the jury commis-
sioners failed to inform themselves of the qualifications of 
Mexican-Americans, because the three Mexican-American 
commissioners were aware of the qualification of the mem-
bers of the Mexican-American community, indeed, the 
other members of the commission also must know these 
qualifications since they live and work in~a community . 
which is almost 80% Mexican-American' t cannot beg_ 
argued that the judge who selected the c mmissioners 
discriminated in his selection. The j~d,E who selected the J 
jury commissioners is a Mexican-Amencan, and he testi-
fied he based his selection primarily on geographic con-
siderations, trying to select one commissioner from each 
precinct in Hidalgo County. While it is clearly established 
law that the uncorroborated testimony of the judge or the 
jury commissioners as to their good intentions will not 
alone rebut a prima facie case, it is some evidence of 
lack of discriminatory intent. It is possible that the judge 
chose his commissioners from among the outstanding 
members of the community and that they then chose 
members of the array from people they knew who were 
probably on the same socio-economic level. Petitioner's 
evidence shows that Mexican-Americans are underrepre-
sented at the higher socio-economic level, and this social 
anomaly could result in an inadvertent disproportion in 
the grand jury. The jury commissioners, however, chose 
from the higher socio-economic level because of the natu-
ral tendency to prefer their friends and business associates, 
not because they were unaware of the racial composition 
of the community, and this is not an act of intentional 
discrimination. 
38 
The Court must also consider the demographic compo-
sition of the community. Percentages not tolerated in a 
more rarified atmosphere may be acceptable in other 
areas. The demographic composition of the community 
involved in the pr~enf caseis markedly different from 
that usually considered; therefore, those cases on which 
Petitioner relies are factually distinguishable from the 
present case. 
f: / Generally the ________ j;up" excluded in the cited 
cases was not a W erningjllajoriiY> as it is here. Here, 
80% of the population is Mexican-American, the majority 
of the voting population is Mexican-American, the major-
ill. of the elected offiQals are Mexican-American, the ma-
jority _2f the j.!!.dges and j urx commissioners areaiSo 
Mexican-American, and Mexican-Americans in significant 
percentages Iiave served on every grand jury in the last 
ten years. At the time of Petitioner's indictment, there 
were three district courts in Hidalgo County, and two of 
these had Mexican-American judges. The record in the 
present case reveals that the judge that appointed the 
jury commissioners is a Mexican-American, that 60% of 
the jury commissioners he appointed in the last two years 
are Mexican-Americans, that 45% of the grand jurors 
summoned by these commissioners are Mexican-Ameri-
cans, that 50% of the jurors summoned to serve on the 
array were Mexican-American, and the foreman that 
signed the indictment that indicted the Petitioner was a 
Mexican-American. Since four Mexican-American mem-
bers of the jury panel could not be served and one that 
had been served was absent, only 40% of the grand jury 
that indicted the Petitioner were Mexican-Americans, but 
this Court refuses to believe that Claudio Castaneda, the 
elected Mexican-American sheriff of a county where the 
I~ 
39 
majority of the voters are Mexican-American, would pur-
posefully refuse to serve four of the Mexican-American 
members of the jury panel with the intention of causing 
a disproportion on the grand jury that indicted the Peti-
tioner. Here, the Mexican-Americans are a governing ma-
jority, and it cannot be presumed they would purposefully " 
and intentionally discriminate against themselves., 
It is true that the Texas selection system is archaic and 
inefficient in a day that calls for well-oiled judicial ma-
chinery. Its potential for abuse is great and it should be 
replaced by a I?Ore expedient process, but it has been up-
held by the Supreme Court against repeated Constitutional 
attack, so its demise must depend upon legislative wisdom 
and not judicial decree. 
By Order of Dismissal entered this date, Petitioner 
Rodrigo Partida's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will 
be denied and this cause dismissed. 
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For The Fifth Circuit 
October Term, 197 5 
No. 74-3966 




OLAUDIO CASTANEDA, Sheriff, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas 
Before GODBOLD, DYER and MORGAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
JUDGMENT 
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of 
the record from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, and was argued by counsel; 
41 
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here 
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of 
the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is 
hereby, reversed; and that this cause be, and the same is 
hereby remanded to the said District Court in accordance 
with the opinion of this Court. 
December 11, 197 5 
Issued as Mandate: 
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APPENDIX "D" 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
Fifth Circuit 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
January 28, 1976 
Edward W. Wadsworth 
Clerk 
600 Camp Street 
New Orleans, La. 70130 
Telephone 504-589-6514 
TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD 
RE: No. 74-3966- Rodrigo Partida v. 
Claudio Castaneda 
Dear Counsel: 
This is to advise that an order has this day been entered 
denying the petition ( ) for rehearing, and no member 
of the panel nor Judge in regular active on the Court 
having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing 
en bane (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the petition ( ) for re-
hearing en bane has also been denied. 
See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for 
issuance and stay of the mandate. 
/smg 
Very truly yours, 
EDWARD W. WADSWORTH, 
Clerk 
by SUSAN M. GROVERS 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: Mr. David G. Hall 
Mr. Thomas P. Beery 
Mr. Oscar B. Mcinnis 
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CLAUDIO CASTANEDA, Sheriff, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
(Filed March 12, 197 6 
ON CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION 
of the appellee in the above numbered and entitled cause 
for a further stay of the mandate of this Court therein, 
to enable appellee to apply for and to obtain a writ of 
certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States. 
IT IS ORDERED that the issuance of the mandate of 
this Court in said cause be, and the same is further stayed 
to and including April 12, 1976, the stay to continue in 
force until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme 
Court, provided that within the period above mentioned 
there shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the cer-
tificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari 
petition has been filed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
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that the Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the filing of 
a copy of an order of the Supreme Court denying the writ, 
or upon the expiration of the stay granted herein, unless 
the above mentioned certificate shall be filed with the 
Clerk of this Court within that time. 
DAVID W. DYER 
United States Circuit Judge 
( \..._.· 
Preliminary Memo 
June 3, 1976 Conference 












1. SUMMARY: The question in this case is whether 
petr sheriff rebutted resp's case of prima facie discrim-
ination in grand jury selection. CA 5 held petr had not. 
2. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp was indicted 
for burglary with intent to rape and for burglary and 
convicted in state court. On appeal, he raised for the first , 
time the claim that Mexican-Americans had been improperly 
~ 
- 2 -
excluded from the grand jury; Texas Crim. App. reviewed 
that claim on the merits and affirmed. 
Resp' s habeas petition was denied by the DC (SD Texas) 
(Garza)o The DC and CA 5 agreed that resp's statistical 
evidence of exclusion obligated petr to rebut: roughly 80% 
of the total population of Hidalgo County is Mexican-American. 
Over the ten years prior to and including the year including 
the term of the grand jury which indicted resp, grand jury 
lists (the roster from which the grand jury panel is chosen) 
were but 39% Mexican-American, the panels themselves in the 
last 2.5 years having been but 45% Mexican-American. The DC 
held this rebutted in the testimony of the state district court 
judge . (a Mexican-American) who selected the grand jury com-
missioners, who selected the grand jury which indicted resp. 
No explanation for the statistical disparity was offered; the 
judge testified he sought to balance the composition of grand 
jury commissioners by ethnic origin, race, sex, and age, but 
did not instruct them to do so in selecting grand jury panels. 
Nonetheless, on the theory that Mexican-Americans were a 
-.. ........... 
"governing majority" in the county and would notp urpo?efully 
..... -----....---. 
and intentionally discriminate against themselves, the DC held 
the'discriminat~ent presumed 
1/ 
from the resp's prima facie 
case to have been overcome. - CA 5 disagreed and reversed: 
1/ 
1 
- The DC also thought the statistics were no~ too reliable 
~ beJ;ause based 0~ total, no adult population; t he ru -year-period 
/ was t 'tr6 ! ong, - since t h e area was changing; and there was a large 
ineligible migrant alien populati on in the county. 
~ ........ .., ... 
- 3 -
"The fact of governing majority status may mollify the 
prima facie case, but does not nullify it. This may be 
done only by proof to explain the disparity. Without it 
petitioner must prevaiL . . . The unexplained disparities 
here are simply too great and too long existent for the 
county system to escape unrectified." Petri. 16 & n. 9. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The sheriff touts the "governing 
majority" rationale of the DC. Petr also tries to fashion 
a claim that CA 5 impliedly called upon the state judge 
selecting jury commissioners to instruct them to balance the 
grand jury panels on various criteria, something petr regards 
as impermissible under this Court's decisions. [CA 5 did no 
such thing: in noting that the judge had tried to balance the 
grand jury commissioners, but did not instruct them to do the 
same for the panels, it could have been disapproving balancing 
the jury commissioners or approving what the judge had done and 
that he had gone no further in instructing the commissioners.] 
l Petr says CA 5's decision spells the end of the jury commissioner system in Texas. 
,. 
Resp says there is nothing to petr's claim: CA 5 properly 
ruled on a question of evidence. The finding of a prima facie - -case is well within the confines of such decision in previous 
If '\ 
cases. The only novel question of law is the governing majority 
status of Mexican-Americans, which resp says is not only without 
precedent, but also would be cumbersome and mischievous. It 





in government, etc., necessary to make such a test meaningful. 
[Moreover, this theory seems to harken back to a requirement 
of "actual prejudice" in the selection process, something this 
Court does not require.] Finally, resp says that though he would 
applaud the end of the jury commissioner system, it remains 
capable of producing fair results, if properly admitted. 
4. DISCUSSION: CA 5 has reached a correct result, 
consistent with this Court's decisions, although it is not clear 
what the court meant by "nullifying" a prima facie case. Petr 
offers nothing to demonstrate that the "governing majority" 
status of Mexican-Americans is such a recent development that it 
~regard of the past statistical evidence of . 
Mexican-American exclusion from grand jury lists and panels. 
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Burger. Ch. J .................. !. .......... .... ................. . 
NOT VOTING 
October 21, 1976 
No. 75-1552 Casteneda v. Partida 
Respondent, convicted of burglary and intent to commit 
rape, claims that the grand jury that indicted him was 
unconstitutionally constituted in that Mexican-Americans were 
unrepresented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
respondent's conviction, and he thereafter initiated this 
habeas corpus case. 
Respondent was indicted and tried in Hidalgo County, 
Texas, where - according to the 1970 census, about 80% of 
the population (total population, not merely adults) are 
Mexican-Americans. Respondent's evidence showed that, for 
the 10-year period preceding his indictment, the grand j~ry 
lists (or panels) included only 39% Mexican-Americans; and for 
the two-and-a half years preceding the indictment, 45.5%. 
Thus, the disparity between Mexican-Americans in the population 
and those on the grand jury panels was 40.2% for the 10-year, 
and 33.7% for the two-and-a-half-year period. 
Applying the "rule of exclusion" (i.e., a significant 
percentage of the ethnic or racial group is excluded from the 
jury list), both the DC and CAS found that respondent had made 
out a prima facie case. The DC concluded that petitioner, by 
the testimony of the judge who impaneled the grand jury and 
from facts of which judicial notice could be taken, had 
;, 
2. 
rebutted the prima facie case. CAS, taking a different view, 
reversed. 
I was quite content to leave this fact specific case 
with the courts below, as the relevant principles are well 
settled. But since it is here, my tentative view is that the 
opinion of the District Court is far more persuasive than that 
of CAS. The district judge (Garza) himself is a Mexican-American, 
who comes - as I recall - from this county. Some of the facts 
relied upon by him for concluding that the county (respondent) 
had rebutted the prima facie case based solely on statistics, 
are the following: 
The DC noted, first, that the statistics themselves require 
discounting. They are based on census population figures which 
include the "total population" instead of the eligible population: 
l 
He has compared the jury lists with the total 
population instead of with jury eligibles which 
inflates the disproportion. While it can be presumed 
that a substantial portion of the total Mexican-
American population is eligible, it must be remembered 
that this area is unique in that it has a larger 
ineligible migrant and illegal alien population than 
other areas. From Petitioner's own evidence, it 
appears that the percentage of drop-outs from the 
fifth grade is greater among the Hidalgo County 
Mexican-American population than is the state-wide 
percentage among the Mexica-American population. 
This further indicates that the percentage variation 
between jury eligibles and total population may be 
greater in Hidalgo County area than in other areas 
of the state, because Hidalgo County would have a 
larger percentage of illiterates. Hunt v. United 
States, 440 F.2d 306 (CAS 1968); UnrteO-states v. 
Hyde, 448 F.2d 81S (CAS 1971). 
It is clear that in a ~apidl¥ ~han~ing area a 
disproportion can be inflated 5y ~nc!ud~ng too many 
prior years when representation was even more disparate. 
The evidence shows that the disproportion was on the 
-
decrease in the two years prior to Petitioner's 
indictment, and the grand jury array was composed 
of about 45.5% Mexican-Americans, reducing the 
disparity to 33.7% instead of the alleged 39% 
disparity. Due to the rapid growth in this area, 
a percentage comparison should not be carried back 
too many years, because it will distort the 
disproportion. 
The District Court then emphasized the extent to which 
3. 
Mexican-Americans actually control the situation in the county, 
--- ~._a __ ,_,~-~- - ... 
contrasting that majority position with the minority position 
usually occupied by racial and ethnic groups: 
Three out of five jury commissioners in the present 
system allows the subjective element to enter into 
its jury selection process; therefore, it would seem 
that a broader range of variation should be allowed 
where the "distinct group" allegedly underrepresented 
is Mexican-American. If people in charge can choose 
whom they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate 
against themselves. 
rGenerally the "distinct group'' excluded in the cited 
cases was not a governing majority as it is here. Here, 
80% of the population is Mexican-American, the majority 
of the voting population is Mexican-American, the major-
i.!Y_ of the elected offisjals a~ Mexice.£1-Ameri~an, t~­
j~rity Ji_ thu~ges _ill.ld j~omm!ssion~rs _ar~ also 
Mexican-American, and Mexican-Amencans m s1gmficant 
percentages have_ served on every grand jury in the last 
ten years. At the time of Petitioner's indictment, there 
were three district courts in Hidalgo County, and two of 
these had Mexican-American judges. The record in the 
present case -reveals that the judge that appointed the 
jury commissioners is a Mexican-American, that 60% of 
the jury commissioners he appointed in the last two years 
are Mexican-Americans, that 45% of the grand jurors 
summoned by these commissioners are Mexican-Ameri-
cans, that 50% of the jurors summoned to serve on the 
array were Mexican-American, and the foreman that 
signed the indictment that indicted the Petitioner was a 
Mexican-American. Since four Mexican-American mem-
bers of the jury panel could not be served and one that 
had been served was absent, only 40% of the grand jury 
that indicted the Petitioner were Mexican-Americans, but 
this Court refuses to believe that Claudio Castaneda, the 
elected Mexican-American sheriff of a county where the 
·' 
111 ajority of the voters are Mexican-America.n, would ?ur-
osefully refuse to serve four of the Mex1can-Amencan p . . f . 
)embers of the jury panel with the mtentwn o causmg Jl • 
, disproportion on the grand jnry that indicted the Petl-
.t . . 
tioner. Here, the Mexican-Amencans are a governzng ma-
·ority, and it cannot be presumed they would pull(os~fully 
;nd intentionally discriminate against themselves. '\'C:1-(-J-
4. 
I have considered that Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 
625, written by Byron, is the case which most clearly 
enunciates the governing principles. It makes clear that 
"statistical improbability alone" is not sufficient; that 
a detailed "factual inquiry is necessary in each case that 
takes into account all possible explanatory factors"; and 
that the ultimate test is whether or not th~ state l 
"deliberately and systematically [denied] to members of 
[a minority race or group] the right to participate as jurors 
in the administration of justice." 
I perceive no evidence in this case of an intent, 
deliberately and systematically, to discriminate against the 
80% of the population composed of Mexican-Americans. While 
I would not subscribe a view that no such discrimination 
,..,.. .. ~ .l,.cc_.., • ~ 
is possible ~ the racial or ethnic group happens to be in 
" the majority, the size of the majority in this county and the 
clear evidence that the majority dominates the "politics" of 
the county, make this case quite unique among those previously 
before this Court. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
75-155~ CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA Cayf- .fo (/J- !)..- ( ~u~~~/;9/76 
~ ·' ~ 6.1 ~~ .A'-1- ~v 
~&1 C/~L ~1) ~1 144-V, 
f:rC. -~~~~~}~ 
~C/15'~~~~~~ 
~ of'J' J ~~b/~C(~(~ 
.¥, ~~)-~'~ 1-4 t p{l / - ~ ,, ' / ) 
f--;& ,_r ~ . - -; . ~ ~ ('/'1 'P8) 




'--' ~ ~~~)) ~~ 
~l-1-, 
G-/f ~ ~¥S:5'7o 
~~~(tJ)~~~ 
/2-~~ ~ ~~ .h-1-. 
~ 71. 2-/fo ~ c;:_jJ ~ 7 ~J-:~-, ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ L.--u_k4-· Py ~ ~ 
.. \ ~ - "-~~~~ 


















ThC' ('hid .Just.icc ~-.. ~ 
~ u...;..._ 2,~ 'f· tJ'f 111~1~~ 
~~../,., ',k.....,.Qj ~~·-c.~~.,.......~ 
~-" .... r;.,;;,. ~. 
tVA4-4t, ~ U...=t~ 
~Aru.,e/A ... v. ~ ~
~~~~-~~~ 
if t"IJ /~ 0 ~ 11,.,~--" ~ ................... ...,_..'"1""' 
~ "k... "J,;,4 ...... ~ ......... ~ 
~~~'{~$ .I . . 
tr•a.k-...,s~~ · 
Brrnnnn, !: })/ 6- ~ ~ 






Rehnquist, J. ~ 
~A !r J-..t ~ 4 *•t 
J4c....;f- !f<::. ·s- f-r'··~ J 
w~e.,. • .. .tr ~ 
CAr ~fA..:f c.T~ 
~ ~~ 
. J1 G , J z7 k af .4t •¥' n 111 ~ 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.i'u.prtutt <!Jllltri a£ t4t ~ttb .iSbttts 
._asftinght~ !l. <!J. 2llb''!$ 
November 29, 1976 
Re: 75-1552 Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff v. Rodrigo Partida 
Dear Lewis: 
Will you undertake a dissent in this case? 
Regards, 
M ~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
.•. 
ovember 30, 1976 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
uear \.hie£: 
I will be glad to undertake a dissent in this case. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
cc: Mr. Justice R.ebnquist 
be: Charlie 
The Chief has requested that we do the dissent. We 
can defer work on this until the Court opinion is circulated 
unless, meanwhile, you complete a first draft of Ingraham. 
L.F.P., Jr . 
:§ttprtmt <qourt of t!tt ~titd1 :§hrlts 
11Taslyinghrn. tJJ. <q. 2llgiJt..;t 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL February 7, 197 7 
Re: No. 7 5-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida 
Dear Harry: 




Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
,§u:prtltU Qfattrl 4tf tJrt 'Jllttitt~ ,§hrlt.« 
~a,s-Jrtnghttt, tfl. (!f. 2.0~)1,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
February 7, 1977 
Re : 75-1552 - Castaneda v . Partida 
Dear Harry : 
Please join me . 
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
.. 
CHAMB E RS O F 
~ttprtmt <.q(turt of tltt ~ltitt~ ~fates 
~asJrittghm, tB. <.q. 2!Jgt)l~ 
JusT icE w"' . J . BRENNA N . JR. February 8, 1977 




Mr. Justice Bl ackmun 
cc: The Conference 
February 8, ,.,. 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
Harry: 
In due time I will circulate a dissent. 
Sincerely, 
t, 





,ju:pl"ttttt ~ourt of tqt ~tb ,jtatts 
._as!p:nghm. ~. <!f. 2!J~Jl.~ 
/ CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
February 15, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida 
Dear Harry: 
I shall await the dissent in this case. I 
am doubtful about the constitutional basis for 
the fair cross section requirement as applied to 
grand juries. Taylor v. Louisiana rested on the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the grand jury 
clause has not been held binding on the States. Nor 
have prior cases rested on the fair cross section 
ground. In any event, I want to consider the case 
at greater length. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.:$ttprtntt <!fouri of tqt ~~ ~btftg 
:.lUlfringhtn, tJJ. ~· 20~'1-~ 
February 22, l977 
Re: 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I agree generally with Lewis Powell's dissent. 
In addition to the views he expresses, I see one other 
flaw in respondent's case. As I see it, respondent's 
process of establishing what the proposed opinion 
characterizes as a prima facie case of discrimination 
will not "wash". Our decisions suggest, and common 
sense demands, that only eligible population figures, 
not gross population statistics, must provide the 
relevant sta+ting point. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 ' (1972), for example, Byron's opinion 
looked to the "population of blacks in the eligible 
population .••• " Id., at 630 (Emphasis supplied). 
A total population figure in the Southwest would 
include vast numbers of illegal aliens and many others 
not eligible and hence not to be counted. 
Respondent offered no evidence whatever in this 
respect and therefore could not have established any 
meaningful case of discrimination, prima facie or 
otherwise. In contrast to respondent's "shotgun" 
approach, which it is proposed we accept without any 
analysis whatever, Census Bureau statistics demon-
strate that of the adults in Hidalgo County, 72%, 
not 79.1% as respondent implies, are Mexican-American. 
(More than 7% of respondent's would-be disparity happen 
to be children.) At the outset, therefore, respon-
dent's population figures are manifestly over-inclusive. 
But that is only the beginning. Respondent 
offered no statistical evidence with respect . to 
- 2 -
!I 
other basic qualifications for grand jury service. 
The Court's own statistics suggest that 22.9% of 
Spanish-surnamed persons over age 25 in Hidalgo County 
have had no schooling at all. Ante, at 6 n.8. Since 
one requirement for grand jury service is literacy 
in the English language, some 20% of adult-age Mexican-
Americans are likely to be ineligible on that single 
ground. This probability is further suggested by 
nationwide literacy rates among adult Mexican-
Americans, which as of November 1964, was only 71.5%. 
If Hidalgo County Mexican-Americans had in 1972 the 
same literacy rates as those prevailing nationwide in 
1964, then literate Mexican-Americans constitute 
approximately 52% of the total adult population of the 
county. Yet, as the Court observes, no less than 50% 
of the persons on respondent's grand jury list were 
Mexican-American. 
But respondent's use of overbroad statistics 
is not the only defect in his approach. As noted, 
one-half of the members of respondent's grand jury 
list were Mexican-American. Other grand jury lists 
at about the same time as respondent's indictment in 
March 1972 were predominantly Mexican-American. Thus, 
in the September 1971 grand jury list, 70% of the 
prospective grand jurors were Mexican-American. In 
the January 1972 term, 55% were Mexican-American. 
Since respondent was indicted in 1972, by what appears 
to have been an ethnically balanced grand jury, the 
mechanical use of Hidalgo County's practices some 
ten years earlier (beginning in 1962) is wholly indefen-
sible. We do not know, and on this record cannot know, 
whether respondent's 1970 gross population figures, 
which served as the basis for establishing the "disparity" 
complained of in this case, had any applicability at 
all to the period prior to 1970. For all we know, 
the 1970 figures may be totally inaccurate as to 
1/ The burden of establishing a prima facie case 
obviously rested on respondent. It will not do to 
produce patently overinclusive figures and thereby 
seek to shift the burden to the State. Rather, a 
prima facie case is established only when the challenger 
shows a disparity between the percentage of minority 
persons in the eligible population and the percentage 
of minority individuals on the grand jury. 
- 3 -
2/ 
prior years;- if so, the apparent disparity would 
improperly be increased. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and 
for the reasons set forth in Lewis' dissenting 
opinion, I will join him and add some observations 
along these lines. 
2/ Indeed, Judge Garza in this case referred 
to Hidalgo County as "rapidly changing" and as 
experiencing "rapid growth." This alone should give 
us pause in a case of this kind. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 1, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
if/"- ]1A/"'-/ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~o: 
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Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff, l . __ 
Petitioner, OnU 'Yrit Sof CertCoiorari to~tJo1.roulated: 
mted tates urt of "'.Ap": -----
v. peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
Rodrigo Partida. 
[~arch --, 1977] 
~R. Jus·riCE STEWART, dissenting. 
In my view, the findings of the District Court iu this cas~ 
cannot be said to be "clearly erroneous." Fed. Rule Civ, 
Proc. 52 (a); United States v. Un·ited States GypS'IJ,m Co., 333 
U. S. 364, 394-395. * Given those findings, there was no 
constitutional violation in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted the respondent. Upon that basis I would rever&e 
the judgment of the Court of ApPfilals, 
;'"ThP "rlrarl ~· Prroneous" standard applies to the review of facts found 
b~· a cti~1rict cou rt . in a habra~; corpus proceeding . Wade v. Mayo, 334 
lL 8. 672. 683-6 4. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
j)u:puntt <!Jourl cf flrt 'J!lnittb ~hdt.e 
'JJtlrasfringhm. IS. <!f. 20,?'-1~ 
March 1, 1977 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
:MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have deleted Part I from the recirculation of my 
dissent that accompanies this memorandum. 
Although I adhere strongly to the view that federal 
habeas corpus review is not warranted, we can address this 




March 1, 1977 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
1 have deleted Part 1 from the recirculation of my 
dissent that accompanies this memorandum. 
l Although 1 adhere strongly to the view that federal 
habeas corpus review is not warranted, we can address this 
issue another day when it has been presented properly. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
~: ' 
1.~ . ... · _ ~ a • ~ ~ J _ ~- _ ~ .. (') To: The Chief Justice 
F~ ~1"<'4CI.V ~ ~Mr. JustX['c Bf!Pna 
w- ~~i{ _? Nt!:(S~ Mr. Just e s 
1 1 ~ } Mr. Just Wh te 
h (-~ '~1-z_~/-u.lv u r Mr · Justice Marshall 
~ ..--r- Mr. Just i ce Powell 
~ ~~ "'- I/ Mr. Justice Rehnquist. 
/} JJ . . Mr. Just i ce Stevens 
;~1/(~c~- II 
-·. j,.,. _ . From: Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~ ~ ~ H-<-1 '/- :;!};;_ ~ Circulated, ? :::r 
4 .1f-Vi-?yY1A~v-U ~ A/1-Ar;- U ll~AA .I - I ~(.su- 'k4U 4,.~ 
/ / I .. -/' - ..._;~,d:;;;;.fl Reoiroulhted, Z'f u;a.;..c) 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
w~ v 
Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff,) 0 W · f C · · to h n nt o ertwran t e 
Petitioner, United States Court of Ap. 
v. peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
Rodrigo Partida. 
[February -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opmwn of the 
<Court. 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the State 
of Texas, in the person of petitioner, the Sheriff of HidalgQ 
County, successfully rebutted respondent-prisoner's prima 
facie showing of discrimination against Mexican-Americans 
in the state grand jury selection process. In his brief, peti .. 
tioner, in claiming effective rebuttal, asserts : 
"This list [of the grand jurors that indicted respondent] 
indicates that 50 percent of the names appearing thereon 
were Spanish. ThP record indicates that 3 of the 5 jury 
commissioners, 5 of the grand jurors who returned the 
indictment, 7 of the petit jurors, the judge presiding at 
the trial, and the Sheriff who served notice on the grand 
jurors to appear had Spanish surnames." Brief for 
Petitioner 6. 
I 
This Court on prior occasions has considered the workings 
'Of the Texas system of grand jury selection. See Hernandez 
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 ( 1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
('1950); Aki!],§ v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas. 
316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v .. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940). 
Texas employs the "key man" system, which relies on jury 
~r--.~~~-*11(~~ 
~~ -/<J Jf/t-~~ ''.£.£~~) c~\'_ 1~ 
~~cJ.~ -~o~ s.w.~cL'-CCf 
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com1msswners to select prospective grand jurors from the 
community at large.1 The procedure begins with the state 
district judge's appointment of from three to five persons to 
serve as jury commissioners. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 
19.01 ( 1966) .2 The commissioners then "shall select not less 
than 15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of differ-
ent portions of the county" to comprise the list from which 
the actual grand jury will be dra.wn. Art. 19.06." When at 
least 12 of the persons on the list appear in court pursuant to 
summons, the district judge proceeds to "test their qualifica-
tions." Art. 19.21. The qualifications themselves are set 
out in Art. 19.08: a grand juror must be a citizen of TexM 
and of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be "of 
sound mind and good moral character," be literate, have no 
prior felony conviction, and be under no pending indict-
ment "or other legal accusation for theft or of any felony." 
Interrogation under oath is the method specified for testing 
the prospective juror's qualifications. Art. 19.22. The pre-
cise questions to be asked are set out in Art. 19.23, which, for 
the most part, tracks the language of Art. 19.08. After the 
court finds 12 jurors who meet the statutory qualifications, 
they are impaneled as the grand jury. Art. 19.26. 
1 The other principal state mode of juror selection is a random method 
similar to that used in the federal system. See 28 U. S. C. § 1864. See 
generally Sperlich and Jaspovice., Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the 
Constitution, 1 Hastings Const. L. Q. 63, 68 (1974). 
I! During the time period covered by this case, the statute was amended 
to omit the requirement that the commissioners be freeholders in the 
county. Acts 1971, 62d Leg., c. 131, § 1. That change has no bearing on 
the issues before us. 
8 Prior to 1965, the law directed the commissionf'rs to select "sixteen 
men." The Legislat;ure am€111ded the statute that year to substitute the 
words "twenty persons" for "sixteen men ." Acts 1965, 59th Leg., c. 722, 
p. 392. In 1967, the law was amended again to provide the present range 
of from 15 to 20 per,;ons. ActH 1967 , 60th L<'g., c . . 515, § 1. These changes 
in t.he number of persons required to be on the list account for the jump 
from 16 to 20 in the grand jury list ~tatistics set forth in n . 7, infra. 
• 
J .. j 
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II 
Respondent, Rodrigo Partida, was indicted in March 1972 
by the grand jury of the 92d District Court of Hidalgo County 
for the crime of burglary of a private residence at night 
with intent to rape. H...klalgo is one of the border counties 
of southern Texas. After a trial before a. petit jury, respond-
ent was convicted and sentenced to eight years in the custody 
of the Texas Department of Corrections. He first raised his 
claim of discrimination in the grand jury selection process 
on a motion for new trial in the state district court.4 In sup-
port of his motion. re~ testified about the general 
existence of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in 
that area of Texas and introduced statistics from the 1970 
Census and the Hidalgo c-;;untY grallil jury records. The 
cen'SUS gu~~s o~ t a in 1970, the popufat!on of Hidalgo 
County w 181,535~ 1970 Census of Population, Character-
istics of the p-ull:dion, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 1, Table 119, p. 914. 
Persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname totaled 
143,611. Ibid., and id., Table 129, p. 1092.5 On the assump-
4 In the state courts and in the federal courts on habeas, the State 
argued that respondent.'s challenge was not timely raised as a matter of 
state procedure, and therefore that he waived any complaint of this kind 
that he might have. Since the Texas courts considered the claim on its 
merits, however, we are free to do so here. See Coleman v. Alabama, 
377 U. S. 129 ( 1964) ; cf. Fmncis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 ( 1976). 
Furthermore, petitioner abandoned the waiver point in his petition for 
certiorari. 
5 For our purposes, t.he terms "Spanish-surnamed" and "Mexican-
American" are used as synonyms for the census designation "Persons of 
Spanish Language or Spanish Surname." Persons of Spanish language 
include both those whose mother tongue is Spanish and all other persons 
in families in which the hood of the household or spouse reportffi Spanish 
as the mother tongue. Person,s of Spanish surname, as the Census uses 
that term, are determined by reference to a list of 8,000 Spanish surnames 
compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. For Texas, 
social and economic characteristics are presented for persons of Spanislt 
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tion that all the persons of Spanish language or Spanish sur-
name were Mexican-Americans, these figures show that c:1 Iff 
79.1 ro of the county's population was Mexican-American.0 7 l I ( -I Zl 
Respondent's data compiled from the Hidalgo County 
grand jury records from 1962 to 1972 showed that over that 
period, the average percentage of Spanish-surnamed grand 7 c d!' I (J tyv - .:> I -I rJ 
jurors was 39.0%.7 In the two and one-half year period 
during which the district judge who impanelled the jury that 
indicted respondent was in charge, the average percentage 2 
1 1"2- - 'f 5" ,S /
0 was 45.5%. On the list from which the grand jury that in- I' 
dieted respondent was selecied, 50% were Spanish-surnamed. 
The last set of data that respondent introduced, again from Jtl% 7 ~ 
the 1970 Census, illustrated a number of ways in which Mex-
ican-Americans tend to be underprivileged, including poverty 
level incomes, less desirable jobs, substandard housing and· 
reports. 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population, vol. 
1, pt. 45, § 2, App. B. 
6 At oral argument, counsel for petitioner appears to have suggested that 
the presence of illegal aliens who have Spanish surnames might inflate the 
percent.a.ge of Mexican-Americans in the county's population. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 10-12. We cannot agree that the presence of noncitizens makes 
any practical difference.. Table 119 of the Censu~ brea.ks down the 181,535 
people who comprised the total county population into three groups: 
native of native parentage, native of foreign parPnta.ge, and foreign born. 
The only persorn as to whom the assumption of noncitizernhip would be 
logically sustainable are thE' foreign born. Even for thPm, it is probable 
that some were naturalizrd eitizens. Furt.hermore, only 22,845 persons 
were in the "foreign born" ca.tegory. If thosE' persons are excluded from 
the population of t.he county, the total becomes 158,690. Assuming that 
every foreign-born person wa::; counted as a Spanish-surnamed person (an 
assumption that favors the State), the total number of Mexican-Americans 
is reduced from 143,611 to 120,766. Using these adjusted figures, 
Mexican-Americans constitute 76.1% of thE' county's population, a figure 
only 3%, and thus negligibly, smaller than the one used throughout this 
litigation. For consistency, wr ~hall continue to refer to the population 
figures for the entire county, particularly since the State has not shown 
why those figures are unreliable. 
[Footuote 7 is on p. 5] 
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lower levels of education.8 The State offered no evidence at 
a!! either attacking respondent's allegations of discrimination 
or demonstrating that his statistics were unreliable in any way. 
, 7 The statistics for grand jury composition can be organized as follows: 












grand jury list surnamed per list Spanish surnamed 
16 6 37.5% 
16 5.75 35.9% 
16 4.75 29.7% 
16.2 5 30.9% 
20 7.5 37.5% 
20.25 7.25 35.8% 
"20 6.6 33% 
W 10 W% 
W 8 W% 
20 9.4 47% 
20 10.5 52.5% 
Of the 870 persons who were summoned to serve as grand jurors over 
the 11 year period, 339, or 39%, were Spanish surnamed. See Table 
showing Hidalgo County grand jury panels from to 1972, App. 17-18. 
8 At oral argument, counsel for petitioner suggested tha.t the dat.a rega.rd.-
ing educat.ional background explained the discrepancy betwe,en the per-
cent.age of Mexican-American!> in the total populat.ion and the percentage 
on the grand jury lists. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. For a variety of reasons, we 
cannot accept tha.t E>uggestion. First, under the Texas method of selecting 
grand jurors, qualifications are not te!>t.ed until the persons on the list 
appear in the District Court. Prior to that time, assumiqg an unbiased 
select.ion procedure, per~ns of a:ll educational chara.cteriE>iics should appea.r 
on the list. If the jury commissioners actually exercised some means of 
winnowing out those who lacked the abi!it.y to read and write, it was 
incumbent on the State to call tl1e commissioners and to have them explain 
how this was done, In the absence of any evidence in the record to this 
effect, we shall not. assume that the only people excluded from grand jury 
service were the illitera t.e . 
Second, it is difficult to draw valid inferences from the raw census data., 
sincE> the data are incomplete in ;;orne places and the definition of "literacy'' 
would undoubt.edly be the subject of some dispute in any event. The 
State's failure to discus::; the literacy problem at any point prior to oral 
· argument compounds the difficulties. One gap in the data occurs with 
respect to tho younger per~>ons in the jury pool. The census reports for 
75-1552-QPINION' 
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The state district court, nevertheless, denied the motion for· 
a new trial. 
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
the conviction. Partida v. State, 506 S. W. 2d 209 (1974). 
Reaching the merits of the claim of grand jury discrimina-
tion, the court held that respondent had failed to make out a 
educational background cover only t.hose who are 25 years of age and' 
above. Yet the only age limitation on eligibility for grand jury service is 
qualification to vot~. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 19.08 (1966). During 
the period to which the census figures a.pply, a person became qualified to 
vote at age 21. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. Art. 5.01 (1967). (In 1975, Art. 
5.01 was amended to give the franchise to all rx-r:sons 18 and over. Acts 
1975, 64th Leg., c. 682, § 3.) It i:,; not improbable that the educational 
characteristics of persons in t.he younger age group would prove to be 
favorable to Mexican-Americans. 
Finally, even assuming that the statistics for persons age 25 and over 
are sufficiently representative to br u::;eful, a significant discrepancy still 
e.xists between the m.1mber of Spanish-surnamed people. and the level of 
representation on grand jury lists. Table 83 of the 1970 Census shows 
that of a totru of 80,049 persons in that age group, 13,205 have no schooling. 
(Data for McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
This SMSA is identical to Hidalgo County.) Table 97 shows that of the 
55,949 Spanish-surnamed persons in the group, 12,817 have no schooling. 
This means that of the 24,100 rx-rsoru; of a.ll other races and ethnic groups, 
'388 have 110 schooling. Translated into percentages, 22.9% of the 
Spanish-surnamed person;; have no schooling, a.nd 1.6% of the ot.hers have 
no schooling. This mean::; that 43,132 of the Spanish-surnamed persons 
have oome schooling and 23,712 of t.hp other::; have some schooling. The 
Spanish-surnamed rx-rsons thus reprPsent 65% of the 66,844 with some 
schooling, and tJ1e others 35%. Thr 65% figurr ::;till crea.tes a significant 
disparity whrn compa.red to the 39% representation on grand juries shown 
over the 10-year rx-riod involvffi hrro. 
We prefer not to rely 011 thr 65% to 39% disparity, however, since-
there are so many implicit a;;::;umption::; in this analysis, and we consider it 
inappropriate for us, as an appellatP tribunal, to undertake this kind of 
inquiry without. a record bPlow in whic11 thosr assumptions were t-ested. 
We rest, instl:'ad, on fhr fact tha.t the record does not show any way by 
which t.he rducational charact.eristirH arfl t~1ken into account in the compila.-
tion of thr grand jury lists, since· t.lw procedure established by the Stat~ 
-provide;; that litemcy lli tested omly after the group of 20 are summoned. 
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prima facie case. In the court's view, he should have shown. 
how many of the females who served on the grand juries were 
Mexican-Americans married to men with Anglo-American 
surnames, how many Mexican-Americans were excused for 
reasons of age, health, or other legal reasons, and how many 
of those listed by the Census would not have met the statutory 
qualifications of citizenship, literacy, sound mind, mora.l char-
acter, and lack of criminal record or accusation. !d., at 210-
211. Quite ~ond the uncertainties in the statistics, the 
court four1d it impossible to oel!eVe tnat discnmination could 
have been directed against a Mexican-American, in light of 
the many elective positions held by Mexican-Americans in the 
county and .the substantial representation of Mexican-
Americans on recent grand juries.0 !d., at 211. In essence, 
the court refused to presume tbat Mexican-Americans would 
discrimma1e against t eir own kind. 
After exhaustmg fi1s State remedies, respondent filed his 
petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, al-
leging a denial of due process and equal protection, guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment, because of gross under-
representation of Mexican-Americans on the Hidalgo County 
grand juries. At a heaTing at which the state transcript was· 
introduced, petitio~sentea the testimony of the state 
ju ge w o seie~ ~ury_ cmmnission~rs~o_2iaa compiled 
the list from which respondent's grana Jury was taken. The 
judge first reviewed the State's grand jury selection process. 
He testified that he did not instruct the commissioners to 
strive for a representative cross-section of the community 
when they selected prospective grand jurors. App. 79. He 
9 The court noted that t.he for!'man of the grand jury that indicted 
respondent. was MPxican-American, nnd that 10 of the 20 summoned to 
serve had Spanish surnames. S!'wn of the 12 members of the petit jury 
that convicted him were Mexican-American. In addition, the state judge-
·who presided over the trial was Mexican-American, as were a number oi: 








admitted that the actual res process m 
fact had not produced gran jury lists that were "represent-
ative of the ethnic balanc in the community." 10 !d., at 84. 
Again, the State did- not call the jury commissioners, who 
did the actual selPcting, and who might have been able to 
provide information on how the process actually worked. 
On the basis of the evidence before it, the court concluded 
I 
that respondent had made out a "bq,re prima facie case" of 
i~yidious discrimination with his proof of "a- long continued 
dis~ composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo 
County." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90 (SD Tex. 1974) (emphasis in 
original). Based on an examination of the reliability of the 
statistics ofl'ered by respondent, however, despite the lack of 
evidence in the record justifying such an inquiry, the court 
stated that the prima facie case was weak. The court believed 
that the census statistics did not reflect the true situation 
accurately, because of recent changes in the Hidalgo County 
area and the court's own impression of the demographic char-
acteristics of the Mexica.n-American community. On the 
other hand, the court recognized that the Texas key man 
system of grand jury selection was highly subjective, and was 
"archaic and inefficient," id., at 91, and that this was a factor 
arguing for less tolerance in the percentage difl'erences. On 
balance, the court's doubts about the reliability of the sta-
tistics, coupled with its opinion that Mexican-Americans 
constituted a "governing majority" in the county, caused it to 
conclude that the prima facie case was rebutted. The "gov-
10 The Federal District. Judge observed, during the state judge's testi-
mony, t.hat the S('}ection proc('Ss for grand jurofi:i in Hidalgo County 
typically r('sultro in a progr(':::sive reduction of th(' number of Mell:ican-
Americans involvro at e>ach stage. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 
625 ( 1972). For example, snid the> court, if 60% of the jury commis-
sioners were Mexicall-Amcrican, the jury panel might be only 55%, and 
the actual grand jury only 43%. The court ·peculate>d that the reason for 
this might be cultural. App. 84-85. No testimony, however, wa.s offered' 
on this point, and we do not. rely on it. 
~c's 
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erning majority" theory distinguished respondent's case from 
all preceding cases involving similar disparities. On the basis 
of those findings, the court dismissed the petition.u 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reversed. 524 F. 2d 481 (1975). It agreed with the District 
Court that respondent had succeeded in making out a prima 
facie case. It found, however, that the State had failed to 
rebut that showing. The "governing majority" theory con-
tributed little to the State's case in the absence of specific 
proof to explain the disparity. In light of the State's abdi-
cation of its responsibility to introduce controverting evi-
dence, the court held that respondent was entitled to pre-
vail. We granted certiorari to consider whether the existence ( 
of a "governing majority" in itself can rebut a prima facie 
case of discrimination in g~jury selection, and, if not, 
whether the State otherwise met its burden of proof. 426 
u.s. 934 (1976). 
III 
A. This Court has long recognized that "it is a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws t,o try a defendant of a par-
ticular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand 
jury ... from which ~ persons of his race or color have, 
solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the 
State .... " 12 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 477. See 
11 The court suggest£d that the actual discrimination operating might 
be economic. The jury commi~~ioner~ were from the higher socio-economic 
cla~cs, and thry trnded to select prospect.ive jurors from among their 
peers. Consequently, the number of Mexican-Americans was dispropor-
tionately low, ~ince they were concentrated at. thE' lower rnd of the 
economic scalE'. We find it. unneCE'8Sary to decide whether a showing of 
simple economic discriminat.ion would ~ E>nough to make out a. primn, 
facie case in the absence of other evidence, since that case is not before us. 
Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co ., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
12 Ca;;es in this Court holding uncon;;titutional discriminatory selection I 7~./yt...;V 
procedures in the grand jury contrxt includ,e Alexander v. Louisiana, 405. 
U. S. 625 (1972); Arnold v. North Carolina,376 U. S. 773 (1964); 
7 
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Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628 ( 1972); Carter v. 
Jury C!omm'n, 396 U. S. 320, 330 ( 1970). See also Peters v. 
Kifj, 407 U. S. 493, 497 (1972) (plurality opinion); id., at 507 
(dissenting opinion). While the earlier cases involved ab-
solute exclusion of the disfavored, later cases established the 
pr~at ~bstantTal ;nder~presentation of the group 
constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if i.t results from 
p.!_.lrposeful discrimination. See Turner v. Fouche, "396 U. S. 
346 (1910); tarler if.' Jury Comm'n, supra; Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U. S. 545, 552 ( 1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 
202 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, supra. Although no right to 
strict proportionalit h ever been reco nize by this Court, 
t e grand jury must be selected in a manner untainted by 
bias against any identifiable group, in order to insure that 
a body truly representative of the community exercises the 
grand jury's serious responsibilities. See Carter v. Jury 
Comm'n, 396 U. S., at 330. Implicit in this principle is the 
goal that the grand jury, over time, should reflect a fair 
cross-section of the community.l 3 
In order to prove a case of unconstitutional discrimination 
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 
85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 
400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana,. 
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. 
Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); :Uld Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 
(1883). 
13 'I'~or. v. Lov:isiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), held in tho context of petit 
jurie:; th~st be drawn from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity. The samep'rinciple applies to grancfjury seiection. See- Carter v. 
iuii/"tJomm'n, supra; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S., at 358. See also 
United States v. Mandu 'an.,o, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (plurality opinion)' 
(referring to the importance of bringing serious criminal accusations "only 
upon the considered judgment of a representative body of citizens" 
(emphasis added)). At least for defendants who are member~ of the 
\
'<disfavored cla&S; the right to a fair cross-section rests in pa1im t e Equal 
ProtectJon Clause, and, for tho~e persons, there is no difference betweea 
the principles governing a grand jury and those governing a petit jury. 
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in grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the 
procedure employed resulted in substantial under-representa-
tion of his race or the identifiable group to which he belongs. 
T~ dothis,-he ~st first estab11Sh that the gr;up is one tha 
is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treat-
ment under the laws, as written or as applied. H ernandez v. 
Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-479. Next, the degree of under-
representa.tion must be proved, by comparing the proportion 
of the group in the total population to the proportion called to 
serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. I d., 
at 480. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935). This 
method of proof, sometimes called the "rule of excl..!:l§i.Qn," has 
been held to be available as a method of proving discrimina-
tion in jury selection against a delineated class.1 ' Hernandez 
v. Texas, 347 U. S. 480. Fu1al1y, the Court has noted that a 
selection procedure t~rt is susceptible to abuse or not racially 
neutral ~u~ports th~ p~umption of discrimination raise by / tc:.... ~ 
the __!tatistiCal sh,2.fmg. exan er v. ou1.81ana, 405 U. S., 1-o 
attrutr." 6nce the defendant has shown substantial un lJ. • ~ 
representation of his group, the ur en shifts to the State to A:A--.wf 
rel],u t tiiiip faciecase. --.... - v ~ 
B. In this case, it is no longer open to dispute that Mexi- ~
can-Americans are a clearly identifiable class. See, e. g., I a • 4 Ill"\.. 
Hernandez v. Texas, supra. The statistics introduced by re~ 
spondent from the 1970 Census illustrate disadvantages to 
which the group has been sub,ject. Additionally, as in 
Alexander v. Louisiana, the selection procedure is not racially 
neutral with respect to '"""MexiCall- mericansT Spamsh sur~ 
names-are .JustiS ~ti'fiableas race was from the 
14 Th0 idea behind the tt1le of exclu~iou is not at all complex. If a 
dispn rity is sufficiPnt.ly large, then it i:; unlikely that it is due solely t() 
chance or acridrnt, and , in t.he absence of evidence to the con~rary, one 
must concludr that racial or "other cla::;s-re)atea factors entered into thP 
;;election prores;;. S~gton v. Davis,, 426 U. S. 229, 241 (1976); 
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. ., at 587, Smith v . Texas, 311 U. S., at 131. 
Cf. n . 17, infra . 
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questionnaires in Alexander or the notations and card colors 
in Whitus v. Georgia, supra, and in Avery v. Georgia, 345 
U. S. 559 (1953). 
The disparity proved by the 1970 Census statistics showed 
that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-Amer· 
ican, but that, over an 11-year period, only 39% of the 
persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-
. American. 1~ This difference of 40%- is greater than that 
found significant in Turner v. Fouche, supra (60% Negroes 
in the general population, 37% on the grand jury lists). 
Since the State presented no evidence showing why the__!_!~ 
year period was not reliable, we take it as the relevant base 
~_____......_~ ~ 
for comparison.16 The mathematical dispantfes tnat have 
b~d by this Court as adequate for a prima facie 
case have all been within the range presented here. For 
example, in Whitus v. Georgia, supra, the number of Negroes 
listed on the tax digest amounted to 27.1% of the population, 
but only 9.1% of those on the grand jury venire. The dis ... 
parity was held to be sufficient to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 
(1967) (24.4% on tax lists, 4.7% on grand jury lists); Jones-
v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967) (19.4% on tax lists, 5.0% on 
jury list). We agree with the District Court and the Court 
1 ~ Since the 1960 Cen~us did not compile separate statistics for Spanish-
surnamed persons, it is impost;ible to a~;certain whf'ther the pE'rcentage of 
Mexican-Americans in the county changed nppreciably over tho period or 
time at issue. We are therefore forced to rely on the assumption that the-
79.1% figure remained constant. 
w Statistical analysis of the grand jur~· lists during the 2Y2-ycar tenure-
. of the sta.te dist.rict judge who ~elect.ed the commissioners in respondent.1i· 
case reveals that a significant di~parity Pxisted over thi~ time period a& 
well. See n. 17, infra. Thus, the District Court's assumption that ref-. 
erence t,o a shorter time period would ~;how that the prima facie ca:;c of' 
discrimination could not be proved wn::; unwarranted. Nevetheless, sincf.\ 
the longer time period provides a larger :sample, and is therefore pre-. 
:SUmpt.ivE'ly more reliable, we prefer not. to limit our analysis to the sug-
gested 2ljz-y!:'ar period. 
75-1.552-0PINION 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 13 
of Appeals that the proof in this case was enough to establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination against the Mexican-
Americans in the Hidalgo County grand jury selection.17 
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Texas sys-
tem of selecting grand jurors is highly subjective. The facial 
~--· 
17 If the jurors were drawn raJ1clomly from the general population, then 
the number of Mexican-Americans in the sample could be modeled by a 
binomial distribution. See Finkelstein, The Applica.tion of Statistic~d Deci-
sion Theory to Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 353-356 
(1966). See generally F. Mosteller, R. Rourke, & G. Thomas, Probability 
with Statjstical Applica.tions 13~146, 27~291 (2d eel. 1970). Given that 
79.1% of the population is Mexican-American, the t>xpectecl numbE'r of 
Mexican-Americans among the 870 persons summoned to serve as grand 
jurors over the 11-year period is approximately 688. The observed 
number is 339. Of course, in any given drawing some fluctuation from 
the expected number is predicted. The important, point, however, is that 
the statistical model shows that the results of a random dra.wing are likely 
to fall in the vicinity of the expect.ed value. See F. Mosteller, R. 
Rourke, & G. Thomas, supra, at 270-290. The measure of the predicted 
fluctuat.ions from the expected value is the standa.rd deviation, defined for 
t.he binomial distribution as the square root of the product of the total 
number in the sample (here 870) times the probability of selecting a 
Mexican-American (0.791) times the probability of selected a. non-Mexican-
American (0.209). !d., at 21:3. Thus, in this case the standard deviation 
is a.pproximBt,<:>ly 12. If the difference between the expected value and the 
observed number is greater than two standard deviations, then the 
hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be susp<:>ct. to a social 
scientist. The 11-yea.r data here reflect. a diffE'rence between the expected 
and observed number of Mexican-Amorica.ns of a.pproximately 29 standard 
deviations. The likelihood that such a substantial departure from the 
expected value would orrur by chanre is less than 1 in 10' ·"'. The data for 
the 2%-year period during which the state district judge supervised the 
selection process similarly support t.he inferencE' that the exclusion of 
Mexican-Americans did not orcur by chance. Of 220 persons called to 
serve as grand jurors, only 100 were Mexican-Americans. The expect~ 
Mexican-American representation is approximate!~' 174 and the standard 
deviation, as calculat,ed from the binomial model, is approximately 6. The 
discrepancy between the expected and observed values is more than 12 
standard deviations. Agajn, the likelihood that such a substantial depa.r .. 
ture could occur by chance i~:> negligible, being less tha.n 1 in 1025 • 
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constitutionality of the key man system, of course, has been 
accepted by this Court. S~rter v. Jury Comm'n, 
supra; Akins v. Texas, supra; Smith v. Texas, supra. Never-
theless, the Court has noted that the system is susceptible to 
abuse as applied. 18 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., a:t 
479. Additionally, as noted, persons with Spanish surnames 
are readily identifiable. l 
The showing made by respondent therefore shifted the 
burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of in-
tentional discrimination. Inexplicably, the State introduced 
practically no evidence. The testimony of the state district 
judge dealt principally with the selection of the jury com-
missioners and the instructions given to them. The com-
missioners themselves were not called to testify. A case such 
as Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S., at 207 n. 4, 209, illustrates 
the potential usefulness of such testimony, when it sets out 
in detail the procedures followed by the commissioners.19 
The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is par-
ticularly revealing as to the lack of rebuttal evidence in the 
record: 
"How many of those listed in the census figures with 
Mexican-American names were not citizens of the state, 
but were so-called 'wet-backs' from the south side of the 
Rio Grande; how mauy were migrant workers and not 
residents of Hidalgo County; how many were illiterate 
18 It. has been said t.ha.t random ~election methods similar to the fC?deral 
systf.'rn would probably avoid most of the potential for abuse found in 
the key man syst<'m. See Sperlirh and .Taspovice, supm, n. 1. 
HJ This is not to say, of cour::;c, that a simple prote ·ta.tion from a 
commis:;ioner t.ha.t. nwial consideration.~ played no part in the selection 
would be enough. This kind of testimony has been found insufficient on 
several occasions. E. g., Alexandn v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632; 
Hernandez v. Texas, 847 U.S., a.t 481; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S., a.t 
598. NC?ither is the State entitled to rely on a presumptjon that the 
officials discharged their ::.worn duti<':> t.o rebut the case of discrimination, 
Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967). 
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and could not read and write; how many were not of 
sound mind and good moral character; how many had 
been convicted of a felony or were under indictment or 
legal accusation for theft or a felony; none of these facts 
appear in the record." 506 S. W. 2d, at 211 (emphasis 
added). 
In fact, the census figures showed that only a small part of 
the population reported for Hidalgo County was not native 
born. See n. 6, supra. Without some testimony from the 
grand jury commissioners about the method by which they 
determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to 
the statutory time for testing qualifications. it is impossible J 
to draw any inference about literacy, sound mind and moral 
character, and criminal record from the statistics about the 
. population as a whole. See n. 8, supra. These are questions 
of disputed fact that present problems not amenable to reso-
lution by an appellate court. We emphasize, however, that 
we are not saying that the statistical disparities proved here 
could never be explained in another case; we are simply say-
ing that the State did not do so in this case. See Turner v. 
Fouche, 396 U.S., at 361. 
C. In light of our holdillg that respondent proved a prima 
facie case of discrimination, and that none of the evidence 
presently in the record rebutted his case, we have only to 
consider whether the District Court's "governmg majority" 
theory lied the evidentiary gap:--In our view, it dia not 
dispel the!Jr~Ur'nption OfPurposeful discrimination. Be-
cause of the many facets of human motivation, we are_®.,.-
willing to presume as a matter of law that human beings of 
one definable groupwilfnot discrim~te against tlleir own 
kind. Thi; is "a complex question, aBout wh.ich widely differ-
ing views can be held, and, a,s such, it would be inappropriate 
to take judicial notice of one view over another. 20 The rele-
·20 This is not :1 case where a ma.jorit.y is pract icing benevolent · cliscrimi-
·nution in f~.vo r of ~ tradit.ionally disfavored minority, alt-hough t.hat 
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vance of a "governing majority" of elected officials is ques-
tionable, as well. The fact that certain elected officials are 
Mexican-American tells us nothing about the motivations 
and methods of grand jury commissioners who select persons 
for the grand jury lists. Finally, the record does not indicate 
the length of time that the Mexican-Americans have enjoyed 
''governing majority" status, assuming that the term has 
some easily ascertainable meaning. For the list from which 
respondent's gra.nd jul'y was selected, Mexican-Americans 
constituted only 50%· of those called, in comparison to their 
strength of nearly 80% in the county. Thus, even for the 
most recent time period·, when presumably the political power 
of the Mexican-Americans was at its greatest, a large dis- V( 
qrepancy persisted.21 
IV 
Rather than adopt any approach to the jury discrimination 
question that would· be as subjective and faintly defined as 
the "governing ma-jority" theol'y, we prefer to look at all the 
facts that bear on the issue, such as the statistical disparities, 
the method of selection, and any other relevant testimony as 
to ~hich the selection process was imple-
mented. Under this standard; the proof offered by respond- l/ 
e,nt was sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of dis-
crimination in gFand jury selection. Since the State failed ) 
to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination by 
---~____.;::::·;.. \.. ""\.. \. ,.,. -
shuation illustrates that motivations not immediately obviou;; might enter 
into discrimination against "one's own kind." 
~1 The result in Reters v. Kifj, 407 U. S. 493 (1972), suggests yet 
anot.her reason why a "governing majority" should make no difference. 
If one has a right to a grand jury t.hat. is fairly represPnt.ative of the 
c<;>mmunity, and even a member of the majority has the right. to challenge 
the absence of members of minorities on juries, t.hen the fact of a "govern-
ing majovit.y" would seem to be irrelevant to t.he underlying right. The 
real disagreement in Peters was over standing to enforc<' the right , a 
problem we do not face here, since respondent is a member of the under-
represented group .. 
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·competent testimony, despite two opportunities to do so, we 
affirm the Court of Appeals' holding of a denial of equal 
protection of the law in the grand jury selection process in 
respondent's case. 
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Mn. CHrEF JrsTICE B.uRGER, dissenting. 
In adclitioH to the views expressed in MR. JuS1'ICE PowELL's 
diss(•n t, J idcn tify one other flaw i11 the Court's opinion. 
What the majority characterizes as a prima faci<' ease of <.lis-
crimination simply will not wash. The decisions of this 
Court. suggest. and common sense demands. that eliyible pop-
ulation statistics, not gross population figures, provitle the 
rrlPvant starti11g point. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 
02•'>. 6~0 ( 1972). for example, the Court in an opinion by MH. 
Jt 'STlCE WHl'l'E looked to the "population of blacks in the 
eligible population .... " (Emphasis supplied.) 
The failure to producr rvidence rela.ting to the eligible 
population in Hidalgo C'ounty undermines respondent's claim 
that any statistical "disparity" existed in the first instance. 
Particularly where, as here , substantial numbers of members 
of tlH• identifiable class actually served on grand jury panels, 
tlw burden rightly rests upon the challenger to show a mean-
illgful statistical disparity. After all , the presumption of con-
stitutionality attaching to all state procedures has even 
grPatcr force under tlw circumstances presented here, where 
c·xact.ly Ollc-half the 111embers of the grand jury list now 
thnll('nged hy respondc•ttt were members of the allegedly ex-
f'ltHif1d class of Mexica11-Americans. 
Tlw Court has not prrviously bren called upon to deal at 
)(•IIJ.dlt with tlw sort of statistics required of persons chaJleng-
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ing a grand jury selection system. TIHl reason is that in our 
prior cases there was little doubt that members of identifiable 
minority groups had been excluded in large numbers. In 
Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, the challenger's venire included 
only one member of the identifiable class and the grand jury 
that indicted him had none. ln Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 
346 (1970). Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967). Sims v. 
Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 (1967). and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. S. 545 (1967). there was at best only token inclusion of 
Negroes on grand jury lists. The case before us, in contrast, 
involves neither tokeni:::m nor absolute exclusion; r·athe•·. the 
State has used a selection system resulting in the inclusion 
of large numbers of Spanish-surnamed citizens on grand jury 
lists. In this situation. it is particularly incumbent on re-
spondent to adduce precise statistics demonstrating a signifi-
cant disparity. To do that, respondent was obligated to 
demonstrate that disproportionately large numbers of eligible 
individuals were excluded systematically from grand jury 
ser·vice. 
Respondent offered no evidence whatever in this respect. 
He therefore could uot have established any meaningful case 
of discrimination. prima facie or otherwise. In contrast to 
respondent's approach , which the Court's opinion accepts 
without analysis, the Census Bureau's statistics for 1970 
demonstrate that of the adults in Hidalgo County. 72%. not 
79.1 cy, as respondent implies. are Spanish-surnamed. At the 
outset, therefore, respondent's gross population figures are 
manifestly overinclusive. 
But that is only the beginning. Respondent ofl'ered no 
evidence whatever with respect to other basic qualifications 
for grand jury service.1 The stati~tics relied on in thf' Court's 
1 Th(' burden of p:;fnbli~;hing a prima facie c:t:>e obviou~;l~· re~;ted on 
respondt'nt. It will not do to produce patt'ntl~· ovPrinclusive figurr1< 
nnd thert'b~· ·et'k to shift the burden to the Statt'. Comparr. a11te, at 4 
Jl , 1j, 5 n . < . Uathrr, n. prim:1 fncic rn~c is e:;tabli~hcd only when the 
i 5-l 552-Dlt:R ENT (13), 
CASTANEDA v. PAHTIDA 
opinion suggest that 22.9% of Spanish-suruamPd persons over 
age 25 in Hidalgo County ha.ve had no schooling at all. Ante, 
at G n. 8. Since one requirement of grand jurors in Texas is 
literacy in the English language, approximately 20~ of adult-
age Mexican-Americans are very likely disqualified on tha.t 
ground alone. 
The Court's reliance on respondent's overbroad statistics 
is not the sole defect. As previously noted. one-half of the 
memb<>rs of respondent's grand jury list bore Mexican-Amer-
ican surnames. Other grand jury lists at about the same time 
as respondent's indictment in March 1972 were predominantly 
Mexican-American. Thus, with respect to the September· 
1971 grand jury list, 70cy,, of the prospective grand jurors were 
Mexican-American. In the .January 1972 Term. 5.57c were 
Mexican-American. Siuce respondent was indicted in 1972, 
by what appears to have been truly representative grand jury, 
the mechanical use of Hidalgo County's practices some 10 
years P-arlier seems to me entirely indefensible. We do not 
know. and on this record we cannot know, whether respond-
ent's 1970 gross population figures, which served as the basis 
for establishing the "disparity" complained of in this case. 
had any applicability at all to the period prior to 1970. Ac-
cordingly, for all we know, the 1970 figures may be totally 
inaccurate as to prior years; ~ if so, the apparent disparity 
alleged by respondent would be increased improperly. 
Therefore. I disagree both with the Court's assumption that 
respondent established a prima facie case and with the Court's 
implicit approval of respondent's method for showing 'an 
allegedly disproportiona.te impact of Hidalgo County's selec-
tion system upou Mexican-Americans. 
l'halkng1·r Hhow:-< a disparit~· between the percentage of minority perlSOn!l 
in 11H· rligible population nnd the percentage of minority individtl!lls on 
t lw g;raud jm~·. 
~ lndr('(.f, ,Judge Reyna.ldo Garza in thi~ ca;;e r<>ferred to Hidalgo County 
11 ~ ' ·rapidly rhanging" and ns experiencing "rapid growth." · 
-
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.§upumt Q):onrl o-f flrt ~t~ .§taftg 
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/ 
March 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, / 
v-1 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tutt Qfourl (t{ tltt ~~ ~fattg 
-:utlfht:gtou:. ~. <If. 2ll.;t~~ 
March 17, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida 
Dear Lewis: 
With several dissents now written, I find it necessary 
to make a slight change on page 16 of the Court's opinion. In 
the full paragraph on that page, 11th line, I am inserting after 
the word 11dissent 11 the words 11 of Mr. Justice Powell. 11 I feel 
that the reference to 11dissenters 11 in the first line of my foot-
note 14 on page 12 may remain as it is. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
·-
March 18, 1977 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
In light of the change made today in Thurgood's 
concurring opinion, it has been necessary for me to 
make a change in footnote 7, page 10, of my dissent. 
My new footnote 7, which I have today sent to 
the printer, reads as follows: 
lab 
7/ 
- I agree with Mr. Justice Marshall, 
ante, at 4, that stereotypes conclrning 
identifiable classes in our society have 
no place in the decisions of this Court. 
For that reason, I consider it inappropriate 
to characterize the Mexican-American majority 
in Hidalgo County as a "minority group" and 
on that basis to suftgest that these Mexican-
Americans may have adopt[ed] the majority's 
negative attitudes towards the minority." 
Ante, at 3. This type of speculation 
liiUstrates the lengths to which one must 
go to buttress a holding of purposeful dis-
crimination that otherwise is based solely 
on a lack of proportional representation. 
L.F .P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 3/22/77 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
Before today a criminal defendant had no right to 
proportional representation of his class on the grand jury 
which presented his indictment. He had only the right to 
insist that the state not deliberately and systematically 
exclude members of his class from serving as grand jurors. 
Every previous grand jury/ discrimination case,~reaching 
this Court, has involved a situation where the governing 
majority in the community,/ and the re~er over the 
selecti~ of grand jurors,j was held by J\ electorate/ 
and~ officials. 
In theP.~:~e have sustained claims of grand jury 
discriminatio~;'gainst politically powerless minorities, ;~ 
A.~ where they were totally excluded from - or limited to 
-- A . 
token participatio/'~n - grand juries. 
The facts of this case are altogether different. 
Here we have a Mexican-American defendant - ~ulz ---
convicted by a petit jury - who claimed discrimination~ 
in the selection of the grand jury/ that indicted him. 
But the defendant was not a mem~ ~f a minority group. 
l~t.41!J 
He was indicted and convicted in Hidalg~ County, Texas, 
a community in which 80% of the population~nd a majority 
of the elected official~lso are Mexican-American. 
ol 
2. 
The key actors in this drama were not Anglo; they 
were Mexican-Americans: 
(a) The judge who -and later presided over appointed the jury commissioners;' the trial; (b) three of the five .., ... 
jury commissioners; (c) five of the 12 grand urors who -
returned the indictment; (d) seven of the 12 petit jurors -
who found the respondent guilty; and (e) a majority of the ·- -persons on the grand ~ury !}~t in the year of respondent's 
- .. ~c-- . 
indictment ~ were Mexican-American. ~ 
;e h 1\ . .... {~-:~·~. f h er aps west Slglil;!>la84tla maJOr~ty 0 t e 
grand jury commissioners - who, under Texas law, select -
the grand jurors - were Mexican-American. 
. Thus, Mexican-Americans controlled both the selection 
1/.A. .lf,;~~sfnd the entire political process. In these 
circumstances,) rational inferences/from the most basic 
./, ( ~"'4~ 
facts in a democratic society/ render
1
improbible respondent's 
claim of purposeful discrimination~A2~~<~ 
There is for mej a sense of extraordinary unreality/ -1 
when Justices here in Washington)decide that the Mexican-
Americans - who control the levers of powerj(n this remote 
border community/- are manip~lating themJto discriminate 
against their fellow Mexican-Americans. 
~ In contrast, the judges~ot in Washington" ••eher 
~those on the scene,)bhe state judge who appointed the 
jury commissioners/and who presided over respondent's 
trial,,and the United States District Judge - both 
Mexican-Americansfond familiar with the community-




decision releases a Mexican-American 
~ 
3. 
defendant whose guilt - determined by a jury that included 
seven Mexican-Americans - is not questioned. 
But I am more concerned/by the holding that statistical 
disproportionalityJ'is ~ne sufficient to invalidate 
indictments and consequent convictions. The implications 
of this unprecedented holdingJ'may be far-reaching indeed. 
. . 
,, 
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Before today a criminal defendant had no right to 
proportional representation of his class on the grand jury 
which presented his indictment. He had only the right to 
insist that the state not deliberately and systematically 
exclude members of his class from serving as grand jurors. 
Every previous grand jury/ discrimination case,~re~ching 
this Court, / has involved a situation where the governing . 7 
majority in the community~and the resulting p~er over the 
selectiL; of grand jurors ,jwas held b~~ electorate/ 
and~ offi.cials. 
In the~:;;'e have sustained claims of grand jury 
discriminatio~/against politically powerless minorities,/ 
where they were totally excluded from - or limite~ 
-- . > A 
~participatio;fon- grand juries. 
The facts of this case are altogether different. 
Here we have a ~can-American defendant - ~uly 
convicted by a petit jury - who claimed discrimination/ 
in the selection of the grand jury/that indicted him. 
But the defendant was not a mem~~r~f a minority group. 
- ~j_,t. /:) 
He was indicted and convicted in Hidalgt County, Texas, 
a community in which 80% of the population~nd a majority 
of the elected official~lso are Mexican-American. 
2. 
The key actors in this drama were not Anglo; they 
were Mexican-Americans: 
(a) The ~e who appointed the jury commissioners;' 
and later presided over the trial; (b) three of the five ...... 
j~~J-~~.!£>Eers; (c) ~e of the ~~~~s who 
returned the indictment; (d) ~n of the ~etit jurors 
who found the respondent guilty; and (e) a majority of the 
persons on the grand jury list in the year of respondent's 
Lr-.. ,.,. 
-a~ 
indictment ~ were Mexican-American. ~ ~~ 
. 1\ .J ~:;~•->"- r__, ;eer;haps mgst sj gni:-fieaa~ a maJority of the 
grand jury commissioners - who, under Texas law, select -
the grand jurors - were Mexican-American. 
Thus-, Mexican-Americans controlled both the selection 
~~ . 
o~ jurorsfnd the entire political process. In these 
circumstances,jrational inferences/from the most basic 
facts in a democratic societyJ'render ~e respondent's 
1 -. ~-,.t-1 claim of purposeful discrimination~/.l,lLL.<~  
There is for meja sense of extraordinary unreality/ 
when Justices here in Washington}decide that the Mexican-
Americans- who control · the levers of power;{n this remote 
border community/- are manipulating them/to discriminate 
against their fellow Mexican-Americans. 
-11 
~ In contrast, the judges~ot in Washington;!~ 
Athose on the scene,)bhe state judge who appointed the 
jury commissioners/and who presid~d over respondent''s 
trial,jand the United States District Judge - both 
Mexican-Americansfond familiar with the community-
perceived no basis for respondent's claimJ'of invidious 
discrimination. 
The Court's decision releases a Mexican-American 
~ 
3. 
defendant whose guilt - determined by a jury that included 
seven Mexican-Americans - is not questioned. 
. But I am more concernedl'by the holding that statistical 
disproportionalityJ'is ~ne sufficient to invalidate 
indictments and consequent convictions. The implications 
of this unprecedented holdingJ'may be far-reaching indeed. 
) ) 
THE C . .T. " · · .T. B. P. S. B. R. \r . T. :.I. H.:\ . B. L. F. P. "··H. R. .T. P. :-'. 
I 11/J~/7, 
~.,;.J ~tf,46 ~ ~ r. fill/} 1~~ ~"'-·•' ~b/ ~'-,HB.S ·f~ ,,d¥ ~ r}?h7 -/7 ;.,7 , I t!711f ~tf'/11 ,;,"'h? -....) ?)-:r7 ~ In 311/ ,, t~, ~ 1+--£" ~ 3/,/7? I 
J.J.~ 
,,.__.till~ ·o .,J~vh, tJ¥ ~ ~c9 rJ"' 
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TO FILE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m 
No. 75-1552 
plaudio Castaneda, Sheriff ) 
' On Writ of Certiorari to t_he_. Petitioner, r-
United States Court of Ag=. v. 
peals for the Fifth Circui~: 
Rodrigo Partida. 
[February -, 1~7fl 
J\'[a, JusTICE PowELL, dissenting, 
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on 
federal habeas corpus a~though it finds no fault with the 
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest. 
The Court reaches this result by hoiding that the prisoner, a 
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the Mexican• 
Americans who controlled the jury selection process in Hi-
dalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Ameri.;.. 
cans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's 
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives both the 
proper scope of federai habeas corpus relief and established 
principles applicable to grand jury discrimination. 
I 
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary· 
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although 
·Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge 
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do 
so-respondent offered no timely objection to indictment or 
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingfy,. 
he was brought to trial _ before a petit jury. This jury, whose· 
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respond-
ent guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt. 
Afte~ respondent was convicted· and sentenced he raised for 
the first till11:) the cfuim that is. nCIM' before us: that the grand' 
... 
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jury which indicted him had been selected by a procedure 
infected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans. By 
accepting that claim, the Court today requires the State to 
release respondent-and to indict and try him again if the 
witnesses are still available-although there is no question 
that a properly constituted petit jury found him guilty. 
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we held 
that when a state prisoner asks a federal habeas court to over-
turn a state-court conviction because of an allegedly uncon-
stitutional grand jury indictment, the prisoner must show-as 
a general rule-either that he raised his claim within the time 
limits imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause 
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a timely 
objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, and can-
not show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he contends that 
we should consider his claim on collateral attack because the 
state appellate court considered its merits in affirming his 
conviction. 
In Francis we left open the question whether the general 
rule applicable to consideration of claims of unconstitutional 
grand jury discrimination in federal habeas proceedings should 
bar relief where the state courts consider the merits of an 
untimely claim. We said that in such a case "different con-
siderations would ... be applicable." 425 U. S., at 542 n. 5. 
It does not follow that. as the Court today summarily con-
cludes, "[s] ince the Texas courts considered the claim on the 
merits, ... we are free to do so here." Ante, at 3 n. 4. In 
my view, consideration of the merits by a state court a.ffords 
no basis for federal habeas review. Cf. Stone v. Powell,-
U.S.- (1976). 
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed 
petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, is like a 
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those con-
stitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the 
'15-1552-DISSE:t'{T 
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way of conviction, if factual guilt is est~blished." Menna v, 
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question, 
accordingly, is whether the alleged grand jury discrimination 
is the sort of defect that wilf "stand in the way of conviction, 
if factual guilt is validly established:" 
The function ot the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere, 
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the 
accused and for requiring him to- stand · trial. But there is 
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted 
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 ( 1884). 
In many States the gra.nd juryjs function is served by an in-
formation and, if the defendant is to be detained for any sig-
nific~nt period before triai, by a. judicial determination of 
probfl.ble cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 118-119 
( 1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect 
in the probable cause determination will not void a subse-
quent conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently 
detained may challenge the probabie cause for that confine-
ment, a conviction wiU not be vacated on the ground that the 
defendant was detained pending trial without a determina-
tion of probable cause." id., at 119. 
Where a State proceeds by indictment, it is true tha.t this 
Court has recognized a broader scope of review after convic .. 
tion. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 ( 1972), 
on certiora.ri to a state appellate court, we set aside a. convic-
tion on the ground that members of the defendant's race had 
heen deliberately excluded from the grand jury which returned 
his indictment. This broader scope of review reflects a con-
cern not for the rights of the convicted defendant, whose guilt 
is no longer merely probable, but for the rights of others. Cf. 
Peters v. Niff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972). We have, in essence, 
given the criminal defendant standing on appeal to assert the 
rights of those who ma.y yet be unfairly indicted, or improp-
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But allowing standing to assert the rights of others i~ 
inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. The pur-
pose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to the individ-
uaP Where a prisoner challenges the process that led to his 
convictiou, the inquiry on habeas corpus properly is limited 
to the integrity of the determination of guilt in the particular 
case. See Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold, therefore. 
that the State's decision on direct appeal to consider the claim 
of grand jury discrimjnation does not present a case for federal 
habeas relief where-as here-the state prisoner is not chal-
lenging the finding of guilt in his O\vn case. The decision of 
the Court today. snb silentio, appears to extend the availa-
bility of habeas corpus relief well beyond its present ample 
frontiers. t 
Although I think it was error to entertain respondent's 
claim. this issue was not briefed or argued in this case. In 
view of its importance to the federal system, the question 
should not be resolved in the absence of plenary consideration, 
It would be appropriate, rather. to set the case for reargu~ 
ment or to remand it for reconsideration of the question 
whether federal habeas corpus relief is available. 
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' ho1d.., 
ing that respondent established unconstitutional discrimina:. 
tion in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the 
merits. 
1 ''It is clear, not on!~· from thf' lauguage of [42 U.S. C.] §§ 224i (c)('3) 
and 2254 (a), but al:so from thf' common law histor~· of thf' writ, that the 
essence of habeas corpn:s i:< an attack b~· a per:scm in custody upon. the 
legality of that. custody, nnd that. the trnditiona.l function of th<.> writ is 
to ::;(>Cure releasf' from ill<.>gal custody . ... " Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 475, 484 (1973). 
2 In no case cited in the Courf's opinion did the Court havf' before it a 
federa.l habeas corpus p<'titioner who, likP thf' respondent here , com-
plained only of discrimination in thf' sf'l<.>ction of the grand jur~· which 
Indicted him. Indf'Cd, the onl~· habf'ws ca::;r cit.Pd by the Court is Peters v. 
Kif!. supra, 407 U. S. 493, which involvf'd claim::; of di;;rrimination in th\) 
~~electioJ1 of the petit. 11s well .ili:i the .gran.(! )t~ry . 
75-1552-DISSENT 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
II 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the sta.te and federal 
proceedings which shows underrepresentation of Mexican-
Americans in the grand juries of Hidalgo County; second, 
the testimony of the state trial judge outlining the Texas 
grand jury selection system as it operated in this case; and 
third, the facts judicially 11oticed by the District Court with 
respect to the political dominance and control by the Mexi-
can-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the 
District Court that in light of all the evidence respondent 
failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a. 
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It 
begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal de-
fendant has a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand 
jury "drawn from a fait cross-section of the community.)) 
Ante, at 10, and n. 13. In adopting that principle the Court 
abandons the traditional equal protection standards that have 
always applied to claims of grand jury discrimination and 
ignores our most relevant recent decisions: Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S. 299 ( 1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp.,- U. S.- (1977). 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra. A state 
defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institu-
tion of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead 
through prosecutorial information , as many States prefer to 
do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U. S., at 116-119. 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal 
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line of cases beginning wilih Stra,uder v, West Viryina, 100 
U. S. 303 ( 1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defend~ 
p,nt is denied equ~:tl protection of the Jaw if. as a result of 
purposeful discrimination. members of his own race are ex .. 
eluded from jury service, See. e. (!., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 ( 1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 287-290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 3:25 U. S. 398, 403-404 
(1945). As the Court points out. this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial 
under-representation rather than total exclusion of membere 
of the defendant's class, see, e. (!., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 
346 (1970). 
But a state defendant's right not to have members of his 
class excluded by discrimination from grand jury service has 
never before today been thought to embody a right to a grand 
jury that reflects "a fair cross-section of the community." 
Ante, at 10, and n. 13.a The right to a "representative" grand 
jury is a federal right that derives not from the requirement 
of equal protection but from the Fifth Amendment's explicit 
requirement of a grand jury. That right is similar to the 
right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representa.tive 
petit jury under the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). To the extent that the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only 
show substantial under-representation of his own race or class 
3 It nwr be, as the Court ~ugge:sts, thnt nondiscriminatory methods o( 
selection will, over time, result in a rrpresentntive grand jury. See 
Cm·ter v. Jut-y C'omm'n, supra, 396 U. S .. at 530. But the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not mandate thnt re~:;ult . Nothing would prevent. a State 
for example, from seeking to :u:::;ure informed decisionma.)<ing by requiring 
that all grand jurors be lnw~·er~ familiar with the criminal law; and if 
that requirement should re:,mlt in sub~tantial underrepresentntion on grnnd 
,iuries of some srgmpnts of t.he community in somr areas of the State, 
the Fourteenth Amendment would 110t render the ~election proces$ 
uncon><t itu tiona!. 
'• 
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to demonstrate a constitutional violation. But in a sta.te case 
in which the challenge is to the grand jury, only the Four-
teenth Amendment applies. and the defendant has the burden 
of proving that the under-representation is the result of 
systematic and purposeful discrimination. 
This equal protection analysis was explicitly mandated in 
our recent decisions in Wash£ngton v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolita;n Housing Development Corp. In 
Arlington Heights we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportio11ate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." -
U.S., at-. 
'Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate 
impact is enough: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepre-
sentation of his group. the burden shifts to the state to 
rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at-. 
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arling-
ton Heights in the circumsta.nces of this case. 
B 
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards 
for cases of this sort: 
"Determining whether invidious disc'riminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
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important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must. look to other evidence." - U. S., at -
(footnotes omitted). 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.4 This is 
4 Although Davis and Arlington Heights makP clear that. proof of dis-
criminatory intent is required and that proof of impact or effect nlone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that a lesser burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Becausf• of the 
nature of the jury selection task . .. we have permitted a finding of con-
stitutional violation even when the statistical pattern doe,; not appronch 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., at. - n. 13. As one illus-
tration, we cited Turne1· v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list. 
The Court found that the dispn.rity betwePn those figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. I d., 
at 350. But the Court did not view the statii:;tics in isolation. T·urner 
was not a criminal ca~e; it involved insteaJ Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointed 
jury commissionPrs, who in turn selected the grand jur~· · The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of educa.t.ion. At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the student:; in 
the county schools were NPgro. ewr~· white pupil having transferred 
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, as 
were all of the members of the jury comrnis:;ion. The District Court. 
hnd fotmd that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes hnd been system-
ntically excluded from the grand jurirs through token inclusion." ' !d., at 
352. It was again~St this background of pervasive discrimination that the 
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illustrated by the recent 9©cisiQI1 in Alexander v. Louisianq, 
.405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we st11ted; 
"The Court has never announced mathematical standard§ 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conciusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themseives were not racially neu-
tral." 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21 o/o of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white." appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire inciuded 20 persons, only one 
of whom was a Negro (5o/c); and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden 
should shift to the State. lbid.fi 
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex-
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
Court. found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Kegro repre~enta­
tion was the product. of continued, purpo~eful di~crimination. 
~The Court'::; rPiiance on "thr opportunit.y for discrimination" noted 
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, i~ clearly misplaced. The "::;ubjectivity" of 
the selection sy~tem cuts in f<tvor of the State where, as hPre, tho.,;e who 
control the selection procc::;s are member::; of the ~ame class as the person 
claiming discrimination. SPe text infra. 
.. 
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should be considered in light of usuch [ o~her] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
Heights, supra, - U. S., at -. 
c 
In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
,presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury arra.y were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were 
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials.6 
6 I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact that Mexican. 
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, 
a majority of the population may not be able at a particular time to 
control or significant.ly influpnc<' political dPci~ions or the way the system 
operat~s. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no on<' can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The cla:;sic situation in which 
a "minority group" may suffer di~>crimination in a community is where 
it is "relegated to . . . a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican~ 
Americans are pot politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian 
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The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
,vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors, 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
,ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from 
the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbable 
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against hi111. 
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, "I£ 
people in charge can choose whom they want. it is unlikely 
they will discriminate agaiust themselves.'' 384 F. Supp. 
79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant. has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendant. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 "C. S .. at 309. Were 
it not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogni· 
tion in the community. there would be no reason tD suppose 
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded 
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate 
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the 
politica,l element of thr community, with drmon~tratrd c11pability to elec~ 
and protect their own. 
Nor do I suggPst that prr:,;o11~ in po;;ition~ of power C'an never be 
shown to have discriminated ngainst other membrrs of the Harne ethnic 
or racial group. I would hold only that respondent's ::;tati;;tical rYidence . 
·without more, is insufficient to prove a clnim of discrimiHatjon in this case. 
,, 
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individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
pght to complain.7 
In Akins v. Texas, supra, 325 U. S., at 400, where appar~ 
ently no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 
16 was on the jury panel,' the Court emphasized the high 
threshold of proof required "to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal~ 
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be concluded that officers of the court disre~ 
gard this accepted standard 'of justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to 
Mexican .. Americans. 
D 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice-
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's priina facie case at the 
7 The likelihood that. the Mexican-Americ:m controlled jury commis--
sion would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans doe::; not, in itself, 
explain the statistical dispa rity shown b)· respondent.. The record is 
essentially silent as -to the manner in which the commission made its 
selections and its motivation in srlccting m; it did. But the composition 
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county 
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to conclude--
correctly, I think-that the stat istics wrrc instlfficient. to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broadrr range of va.riation should be 
tolerated herr becau~>e the Texas selection syst{'m allows the governing 
majority [of grand jury commissioner:;] to favor their group when' 
@electing grand h\ro~.:s." ~84 F , Supp.1 n,t 00, 
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outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys~ 
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, the State responded to respondent's statistical show-
ing by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed 
~he grand jury commissioners. Other facts, such as the 
presence of Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective 
positions of the county, entered the record through judicial 
notice. The testimony, together with the facts noted by the 
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of pro-
duction- even assuming that respondent's evidence was suf-
ficient to give rise to such a burden. Accordingly, at the 
close of the evidence, the question for the District Court was 
whether respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately and system-
atically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the 
right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice." 
Alexander, supra, 405 U. S., at 628. In my view the Dis-
trict Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination 
insufficient. 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.e, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for taking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt 
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases. would have 
thought that respondent's statistics, under tlie circumstances 
of this case and prevailing in Hildago County, were even 
arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic 
discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
.. 
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Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
statistics that Mexican-Americans in this remote border 
county who control the levers of power are manipulating 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that 
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the Dietrict 
Court . 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE joins, 
dissenting. 
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on 
federal habeas corpus although it finds no fault with the 
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest. 
The Court reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a 
Mexican-American, has adequateiy shown that the Mexican-
Americans who controlled the jury selection process in Hi-
dalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Ameri-
cans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's 
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives the proper 
scope of federal habeas corpus relief and misapplies estab-
lished principles governing grand jury discrimination. 
I 
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary 
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although 
Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge 
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do 
so-respondent offered no timely objection to the indictment or 
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingly, 
he was brought to trial before a petit jury. This jury, whose 
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respond-
ent guilty of the crime charged beyond a11y reasonable doubt. 
After respondent was convicted and sente11ced he raised for 
the first time the claim that is now before us: that the grand 
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jury which indicted him . had been selected by a procedure . 
infected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans. By 
accepting that claim, the Court today requires the State to 
release respondent-and to indict and try him again if the 
witnesses are still available-although there is no question 
that a properly constituted petit jury found him guilty. 
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed 
petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, is like a 
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those con-
stitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the 
way of conviction , if factual guilt is established/' Menna v. 
New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question, 
accordingly, is whether alleged grand jury discrimination 
is the sort of defect that will ·"stand in the way of conviction, 
if factual guilt is validly established." 
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere, 
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the 
accused and for requiring him to stand trial. But there is 
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted 
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884). 
In many States the grand jury's function is served by an in-
formation and, if the defendant is to be detained for any sig-
nificant period before trial , by a. judicial determination of 
probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 118- 119 
( 1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect 
in the probable cause determination will not void a subse-
quent conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently 
detained may challenge the probable cause for that confine-
ment. a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the 
defendant was detained pending trial without a determina-
tion of probable cause." !d., at 119. 
In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 ( 1972). on certio-
rari to a. state appellate court, the Court set aside a conviction 
on the ground that memb0rs of the defendant's race had 
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been deliberately excluded from the grand jury which returned 
his indictment. The decision reflected a concern not for the 
rights of the convicted defendant, whose guilt was unques-
tioned, but for the rights of others. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 
U. S. 493 (1972). The Court has, in essence, given the 
criminal defendant standing on direct appeal to assert the 
rights of those who may yet be unfairly indicted. or improp-
erly excluded from jury service, as a result of the alleged 
discrimination . 
But I find no justification for a rule that would permit a 
federal habeas corpus petitioner to assert the rights of others 
who may be injured by alleged grand jury discrimination. 
Permitting the prisoner to assert the rights of third parties is 
inconsistent with the overriding function of habeas corpus, 
which is to remedy injustice to the individuaP The inquiry 
on habeas corpus historically has focused on the integrity 
of the determination of guilt in the individual case. See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 (1973) 
(PowELL, J., concurring). 
In Stone v. Powell, - U. S. - (1976) , we held that 
"where t.he State has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner 
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or 
seizure was introduced at his trial." !d., at-. Unlike ~he 
prisoner in Stone, who could at least complain that his con-
1 "It is clear, not only from the language of [42 U.S. C.] §§ 2241 (c) (3) 
and 2254 (a) , but also from thr common law history of the writ, that the 
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the 
legality of that. custody, and that the traditional fun ction of the writ is 
to secure release from illega l custody . . . . " Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 475, 484 (1973) . 
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viction rested on evidence tainted by Fourth Amendmen~ 
violations and could ask for a new trial with that evidenec 
excluded, the prisoner in this case challenges only the 110w 
moot determination tha.t there was probable cause to proce<'cl 
to trial. He points to no flaw in the trial itself. As in Stoue, 
the incremental benefit of extending habeas corpus as a means 
of correcting unconstitutional grand jury selection procedures 
"would be outweighed by the a.cknowledged costs to othPr 
va!ut• vital to a rational system of criminal justice.' ' /d., at 
f would hold , therefore. that a state prisoner's claim of 
grand jury discrimination is not cognizable on federal habeas 
corpus.~ 
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' holrl-
ing that respondent established unconstitutional discrimina-
~ ln no case cited in the Court's opinion did the Court biP'@ !;te~ete it a i""IIA4-t 1\ii.A{ 'f-
fcdr rnl habr11s corpus pctit.ioner who, like the respondrnt lwrc. eom-. 
plained only of discrimination in the selection of the grand jur~ · whi"h 
indicted him . lfleeed, the (')III.) habeiiS Cll~ eitce e, tke Ct:lMPt io; Pete1'S V, 
Ki/J , ~Oi U.S .493, ~involved claim~ of discriminntion in thr ~rleetion 
of thr petit as well as thP grand jury. 
Thr availability of fedrrnl hahea ~ corpu:s as a rrmedy for claimed gmnd 
jur~· discrimination wa:s not ron,; idert>d in Francis v. Hender.~on. 4:!5 LT. S. 
!i>l6 ( Hli6). In Francis. dPridrd lwfon· Stone v. Putre/1 . WI' mrn· l~ · hPld 
lhnl n HtMe pri:soner who fnilrd to n1:1ke a timPiy ol.Jjr!'tion. uncl<·r ~tate• 
ruiP~ of procPdurc , to thP composition of the grand jm~· lwd waived an~ · 
right to havr ,:uch :1 C'laim ronsidPn•d in frdPml bnbl'a" c·orpus pro<'P<·din~"· ' 
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tion in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the 
merits. 
II 
As I read the Court's opuuon, it writes new law on tlw 
subject of grand jury discrimination, expanding the reach of-
and in some instances misapplying-our prior authorities. 
Given the unique factual situation before us, the Court's 
sweeping resolution of this issue seems wholly unnecessary. 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal 
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
sentee! on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts .iucJi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political 
dominance and control by the Mexican-American ma.]ority iu 
Hidalgo County. I agree with the District Court that in light 
of all the evidence respondent failed to establish unconstitu-
tional grand jury discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a 
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It 
holds that a criminal defendant may demonstrate a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause merely by showing that the 
procedure for selecting grand jurors "resulted in substantial 
under-representation of his race or the identifiable group to 
which he belongs.'' Ante, at 11. By so holding, the Court 
ignores the traditional constitutional distinctions between the 
grand and petit juries, and misapplies the equal protection 
analysis mandated by our most recent decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not; 
apply to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra_ 
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A state defendant cannot complain if t.he fita~ foregoes th~ 
institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him in-
~tead through prosecutorial information. as many State~ 
prefer to do., See Gerstein v. Pu(lh, 4;20 P. 8 .. at 116-119; 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses tO proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the conl?~raints i!flp9sed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
Jine of cases beginning with Stra?J,der v. West l'irgina, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880) , this Court. has held that a criminal defend~ 
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as. a r·esult of 
purposeful discrimination. members of his own r·ace are ex~ 
eluded from jury service. See, e. y., Ale~ander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Cormn'n, 39~ 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282. 287-2~)0 (1950); Akins v. 'l'exas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendanrs 
class. see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community." The right 
to a "representative" grand jury is a federa.I right tha.t derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro,., 
ceediugs--to a representative petit jury under the Sixth 
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisia.na, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), 
nIt ma~· be that nondi:scriminatory methods qf selection will, over time, 
rr~ult. in a l't>prt>sentative grand jury. See Carter v. lury Comm'n , 396 
U. S., at :3:30. But the Foul't•Penth Amendment docs not mandate that 
result. Xothing would prevent a St.ate for example, from seeking to assure 
informed decisionmaking by rrquiring that all grand juror:s be lf)w~·ers 
familiar with tlw nriminal l11.w; and if that requiremrnt ;.;hould result in 
subst.nnt.ial undrr-repn">rnt~tiou on grand jurie.rs of ~onw ~cgments of i he 
communli~· in -"Olll<' arPilH of t.he Stil.te, the FourtC<'nth Amm1drrlent wotllg 
flOt rendr.r the ,;('lt'ttion procP~:< unconstitljtion111 ~ 
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To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli~ 
cable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection 
procedure "systematically exclucle[s] distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail is] to be reasonably representative 
thereof.'' !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chal-
lenge is to the grand jury. only the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies. and the defendant has the burden of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal ProtRction Clause. 
Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 299 ( 1976). and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Developrnent Corp., - U. S. - (1977). Iu Ar-
lington Heights wf' said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 
F. R. 229 ( 1976). made it clear that official action wili 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant. but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious 1·acial discrimination.' I d., at 242. Proof 
of raciaJiy discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to sho'vr a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." - · 
r. 8 .. at - . 
Today the CoUJ·t holds that a showing of disproportionate 
impact is !:'nough: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underreprc-
sentation of his group. he has made out a prima facie case 
of discriminatory purpose. and the burden shifts to the 
state to rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at 12. 
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and A rling-
to-n Heights in the circumstances of this case. 
B 
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards 
for resolving issues of discriminatory intent or purpose: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur~ 
8 
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pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial" and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick W o v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson , 307 U.S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as sta.rk as that in Gomillion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. S. , at -
(footnotes omitted). 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.,4 This is 
4 Although Davis and Al lington Heights make clear that. proof of dis-
crimina tory intent is required a.nd that proof of impact or effect alone 
Is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the 
nature of the jury selection task . .. we have permitted a finding of con-
stitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach 
t he extremes of Yick W o or Gomillion." !d ., at - n . 13. As one illus-
tration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) . 
In Turner the statisti ca l evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list . 
The Court found that the disparity between those figure:; wa::; not i"O 
"insubstantial" as to foreclo:se corrective action by a federal court. ld ., 
at 350. But. the Court did not. view the stati:sti cs in isolation. Turner 
was not a criminal ca~e; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of educa tion. The circuit judge appointed 
jury commissioner:;, who in turn ;;elec ted the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn , selected the board of educa tion . At every layer of thi :s systrm 
white citizens were in total control. E ven though aJI of the student · in 
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual iuquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone. for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially neu-
tral." 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, ouly one 
of whom was a Negro (5o/c); and none of the 12 persous on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
the county schools were Negro, every white' pupil having t mn~frrred 
elsewhere, all of the mrmbers of thr board of education wrrr whit.r, as 
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District. Comt 
'had found that., until the suit was instituted, "Negroes hnd Jx.en Hystrm-
a.tically excluded from the grand jurif' · through token inclusion." !d., at 
352. It was agai11st this background of JX'rvasive di~crimination that the 
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro rPprr~rntn­
tion was the product. of continued, purposeful di~crimination. 
B~· contrast, in Ca.rter v. Jury Comm'n, :396 U. S .. at :338-3:~9, iHoiHtrd 
proof that for 12 years no Negro had brrn nppointrd to the jur~· commi~­
sion of a predominantly Negro county W<l~ found insufficirnt, standing 
alone, to E'StnbJish discriminatory intrnt. 
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for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden 
should shift to the State. lbid.r. 
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex-
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
Heights,- U.S., at -.6 
c 
In this case, the following critical facts a.re beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
,presided over respondent's trial was Mexican:..American; three 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were 
Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent was 
indicted, 52.5% of the persons on the grand jury list were 
5 The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for di::;crimination" noted 
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of 
the selection system cuts in favor of the St.ate where, as here, those who 
control tl1e selection process are members of the same class as the person 
claiming discrimination. See text infra. 
0 The Court 's opinion makes selective usc of language in Arlington 
Heights, while largely ignoring the basic rationale of this most recent 
relevant decision. The Court quotes only one sentence from that case 
("Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the effect of state action .... "), ante, at 10, lifting the 
sentence from the middle of a paragraph. -U.S., at-. It. is rvident 
from the full paragraph, quoted at pp. 7-8, supra, and even more evident 
from the full opinion, that the language taken out of context by the 
Court. does not fairly reflect the rationale of Arlington Heights or the cases 
it follows. Indeed, the same paragraph from which the single sentence 
was selected mnkes clear that "[a]b ·ent a pattern as stark that in 
Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the CoUl:t 
must look to other evidence." Seen. 9, irtfra. 
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Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of the judges. That these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials.7 
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
. were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from 
7 I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact that Mexican~ 
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, 
a majority of the population may not be able at a pa.rticular time to 
control or significa.nt.Jy influence political decisions or the way the system 
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which 
a "minority group" may suffer discrimination in a. community is where 
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexiran-
Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian 
political element of the community, with demonstrated capabilit.y to elect 
and protect their own. 
Nor do I suggest that persons in positions of powrr en n 1wver be 
shown to have discriminated against other members of thr snmr ethnic 
or racial group. I would hold only that respondent's statistical evidence, 
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of discrimination in this case, 
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the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbable. 
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against him 
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, "If 
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely 
they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. upp, 
79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendant. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S., at 309. Were it 
not for that natural inclination, a.nd for its general recogni-
tion in the community, there would be no reason to suppose 
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded 
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate 
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the 
individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain.8 
In Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 400, where apparently no 
Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was on 
8 The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commis-
sion would not, discriminate agninst Mexican-Americans does not, in itself, 
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is 
essentially silent as to t.he manner in which the commis~ion made its 
selections and its motivation in selecting as it did. But the compositiott 
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county 
by Mexica.n-America.ns, prompted the District Judge to conclude--
correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent.. "A broader range of variation should be 
tolerated here because the Texas selection syst.em allows the governing 
majority [of grand jury commis~;ioner:s] to favor their group when 
selecting grand j·urors." 284 F . Supp., at 90. 
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the jury panel, the Court emphasied the high threshold of 
proof required to brand officecrs of the court with discriminatory 
intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selectiug a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be concluded that officers of the court disre-
gard this accepted standard of justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to 
Mexican-Americans. 
D 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice~ 
r:tble facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
outset or as rebutting it after it. was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys" 
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican"" 
Americans- while substantially represented on the grand jury 
lists- were not represented in numbers proportionate to their 
share of the total population .9 The State responded by pre-
u Nothing in this ca!>c remotely re~embl c:; the stark discrimination in 
Oomillion and Yick W o. Nor do the ~tati :; ti c~ in this case approa ch th~ 
degree of exrlusion tha t has characterized the cases in which we have 
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senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury commiSSIOners. Other facts, such as the presence of 
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of 
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court, 
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even 
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise 
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the cvidcncc, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that tho 
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied -1 to mem-
bers of [respondent's class] the right to participate as jurors 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, supra, 405 U.S., 
at 628. In my view the District Court correctly found that 
the judge and jury commissioners had not intentionally dis. 
criminated against Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. 
At the very least, the District Court's finding was not clea.rly 
erroneous. 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
. duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.e, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not present-
ing more evidence than it did. But until today's decision one 
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases. 
would have thought that respondent's statistics. under the 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago County, 
previously found grand jury discrimination. Ser n. 4, supm. In thi~ rasr. 
in thr year in which the rei:ipondrnt was indicted, 52.5% of the pcrsonl:i on· 
the grand jury lists were Mrxican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupation with thf' disparity of representation of Mexican-Amrrirans 
in the total popula.tion and on the grand-jury lists, the Court Josf'l:i sight of 
the constitutional standard. Respondent has no right to "proportional 
n•prcspnta,tion" of Mexican-Americans, Carter"· Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S., 
at. 3~9. He has only the right "to require that the State not deliberately 
and systematically deny to !Mexican-Americans] the right to participate 
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were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate a11d sys-
tematic discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on tlw basis of inferences from 
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers 
of power in this remote border county are manipulating 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast. the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge- both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that 
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District 
Court . 
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dissenting. / ~ 
As 1 read the Court's opinion, it writes new law on the 
subject of grand jury discrimination, expanding thr reach of-
and in some instances misapplying-our prior authorities. 
Given the unique factual situation before us, the Court,'~ 
sweeping resolution of this issue seems wholly un1wcessary.' 
The evidence relevant t.o the issue of discrimination iu t,h is 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidP.ncc 
1 A strong ca!>r might be made that claims of grand jur~· dil'(('riminat ion 
arr not cognizablr on federal habeas rorpu~ under thP rationaiP of :)tolle \' , 
l'ou•ell,- P. S.- (1976). In Stone wr held that •·wlll'rP tlw State has 
prO\ridrd nn opportuuity for full and fair litigation of a Fourl"h Amrudmrnt 
claim, a state• prisotwr ma.\· not br grantl'd J frd!'ral hah:>as rorJHI~ rPlid on 
tlw ground that rYidrtH'l' obtainrd in ar1 uncon~titutional ~rarrh or HE'izure 
w;t~ introducrd at hi~ trial." /d .. at.--. Unlikr the prisotH'l' in Stmw. 
who could complain that his l'otwiction rrstl'cl on evidence taitltPd br 
Fourth Anwndment violation,; and could :t~k for a nc•w trial with that 
evidencP exchrdrd, thr pri~onrr in this rn~e cba llengr~ on I~· t hp now moot 
dPtPrmination by the grand jury that thrrc wa~; suflirient causr to proc·eC'd 
to trial. · HP point,; to no'! Haw in thl' trial itself. A.,; in 8to11e, tlw itH'rc·-
mrntnl benefit of Pxtrnding habra;; c'orpus flH a means of corrPrting UJH'On-
::;titutiona l grand jury ~elrction procedure,; might bP virwed as ''outwrighed 
b~· thl' acknowledged coRt~ to other values vital to a rational ~y;;tc>m of 
crimina l ju::;tirP." /d., at-. 
But a,..: thi,; i,;~ur was not addrC'f'.-ed below and wa,; not briefrd or argued 
in thi~ Court , it II'O\IId br lll:l)l]li'Oj)l'i:t!P to fl'>'olvc ' i1 in thi~ <'ase. 
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introduced by respondent in both the state and federal 
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
sented on the grand jury lists; secoud, the testimony of the 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third, the facts judi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political 
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority iu 
Hida.Igo County. I agree with the District Court that in light 
of all the evidence respondent failed to establish unconstitu-
tional grand jury discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a 
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. J t 
holds that a criminal defendant may demonstrate a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause merely by showing that the 
procedure for selecting grand jurors "resulted in substantial 
under-representation of his race or the identifiable group to 
which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so holding, the Court 
ignores the traditional constitutional distinctions betwe<'n the 
grand and petit juries. and misapplies the equal prot<-diott 
analysis mandated by our most recent decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply 
to a state prosecution . Hurtado v. California, 110 r. S. 516f 
(1884). A state defendant, cattnot complaint if the State forP-
goes the institutio11 of the grand jury and proceeds against him 
instead through prosecu to rial information. as many States pr<'-
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S., 103, 116- 119 (Hl75).f 
Nevertheless. if a State chooses to procred by grand jury it 
must procrecl within the constraints imposed hy the Equal 
Protrction Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100 
LT ..... 303 ( 1880) , this Court has held that a criminal defend-
ant is denird equal prot0ction of the law if, as a result of 
.: 
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purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex· 
eluded from jury service. See, e. (!., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 ( 1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S, 
282, 287- 290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community.t The right 
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro-
ceedings-to a representa.tive petit jury under the Sixth 
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) . 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-
cable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection 
procedure "systematically exclude [s] distinctive g'roups .in the 
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative 
thereof." !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chaf-
Ienge is to the grand jury, only the Fou teenth Amendment 
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitiy 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 
2 ft may be that nondiscrimi-natory· methocfs of select.ion will , over tin'l'e', 
result in a representa.tive grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Com.rn'n, 39fj' 
U. S., at 33D. But the FotrrteenU1 Amend'ment does not manilit.te tlia.t' 
result. Nothing· would' prevent a State for example , from seeking to assu·re 
fnformed decisionmaking by requiring that a ll grand jurors he lawyers 
familiar with the criminal law ; and if that requirement should result in 
substa ntia.! under-representa tion on grand juries of some segments of the 
community in some areas of the Sta.te, the Fourteentli Arroom:fment woaicl 
nmt mmcdhr the selecti'on process un.co.ustitt1utii:mrnL 
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U. S. 299 (1976) , and Arlington Heights v . . Metropolitan 
Ho·using Development Corp. , - U. S. - (1977). In Ar-
lington Heights we said: 
"Our decision last Term in ·washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 ( 1976). made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' f'd., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatot·y intent or purpose is required 
to sho"v a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." -
U.S., at -. 
Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate 
impact is enough: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepre-
sentation of his group, he has made out a prima facie case 
of disct·iminatory purpose. and the burden shifts to the 
state to rebut the prima facie case." A.nte, at 12. 
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arling-
ton Heights in the circumstances of this case. 
B 
T.n Arlington Heights we identified the following standards 
for resolving issues of discriminatory intent or purpose: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Dav·is, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the rffect of tlw state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 ( T . • •. 35G (1886); Gu-iun v. United States, 238 
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U.S. :347 (1915); La:ne v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); 
Oomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
an• ran•. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. S., at -
(footnotes omitted). 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
'b'rimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.8 This is 
~Although Davis :U1d Al'lington Heights make clear that proof of dis-
criminator:-· intent is required and that proof of impact or effect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden 
rn11y be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the 
nature of the jury selection task ... we 'have permitted a finding of con~ 
stitutiona.l violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." /d., at- n. 13. As one illus-
tra.tion, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. '340 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed t11at Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list. 
The Cou,rt found that the dispa.rity between those figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. /d., 
at 350. But. the Court, did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner 
was not a criminal rase; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the C'ounty board of education. The circuit judge appointttl 
jur~r commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of t.he students in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred 
elsewhere, 11ll of the members of the board of educa.t.ion were white, as 
were a.Jl of t.he members of the jury commission. The District Court 
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-
atically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion." /d., at 
352. It was against this background of pervasive discrimination that the 
Court found that, even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representa-
tion was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination. 
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, :396 U. S., at 338- 339, i:;olated 
· proof that for 12 years no Negro had bt'f'n appointed to thr jur~· commi~­
sion of a predominantly Negro count~· wa:-; found insuffirient, ~tanding 
·alone, to establish discriminatory intent. 
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illustrated by the recent P!'!Ci~ign in Alexander v. Louisiana,l 
1!05 U.S. 6~5 (1972), where we st11ted : 
"The Court has nevev announced mathematical standard~ 
fov the demonstratiou of 'systematic' exclusion of black~ 
but has, rather, emphaHized that a factual inquiry i~ 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos:. 
sib1e explanatory facters. The progressive decimatioq 
of potential Negr.o gr.and jurors is indeed striking here
1 
but we dq not rest our. conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis~ 
crimination on statistic~:Ll improbability alone. for tlH' 
selection pr-ocedur-es themse~ve§ were not racially ll<'U ~. 
tral." 405 U. ~-, at 6~tJ .. 
In Ate:oonder, the evidence showed that 21 % of the rele vant 
community wer() Negrq; the jui'y commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom wer-e white," appoiuted by a white 
judge; the grand jury venit-e inc} uded 20 persons, only OIH' 
of whqm was a Negro ( 5~); and none of tho 12 persous 011 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., a1 
627, 628. This statistical ar1·ay was-as the Court notcd-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not found. in isolation. to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burde11 
should shift to the State. Ibid. 1 
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Ale:r-
r.mde1' make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other-! circumstantial 
1 Thr Comt's rrliance on "the opportunit~- for cli:::crimination " not<~! 
in Alfxa:nder, ante, at 11-14, is clrarly mi::;placecl. Thr "~ubjrr·tivity' ' of 
the srlcction system cuts in favor of the State whrre, a.~ herr , tho~e who 
control the selection procc::;s a.re membrr" of lhc ~amc class ns the l)CI'SOl1 
'elaiming disrrin1inalion. Src text infra. 
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and direct Pvidrnce of intent as may be available." A rl1:ngtun 
Heiuhts, - r. f • •• at-." 
c 
ln this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
tho judgP who appointed the j'ury commissioners and later 
presided over rt'spondent's trial was Mexican-American; thre<' 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury arra.y were Mexican-Amer-
ican ; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment. 
including the foreman. were Mexica11-American;" and sevt•tt 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt wN<' 
Mexica.n-Amcrican. In the year in which respondent was 
.indicted. 52.5% of the persons 011 the grand jury list wel'l' 
Mexican-American. In audition, a ma,lority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American. as wen' 
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power anti 
influe11ce were so held is not surprising iu a community when' 
80/'< of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
"Thr Court's opinion ll1<tkr~ ~rlrctiw 11::;r of langungt• in Arlingtoll 
llrioht . whilr lnrgrf~· ignoring thr ba~;ic ntiionnlr of thi::; mo:<t twrut 
rc•IPnmt deci:;ion . Thr Court quotr:,: only one :;enlence from that en::<<' 
("Sonwtime;,: a clrnr pnttern, UIH'xplainable on grounds other than nt<'<\ 
<·m<'rg<'R from tlw rffrct of stntr action .... "), ante. at 10, lifting 1lw 
~rntrnce from the middle of 11 pamgraph. -U.S .. at-. It. i~ evidrnt 
from thr full pantgrnph, quotrd at pp. 7-8 , supra. nnd evrn man• Pvidrnt 
from the full opiniou , that the language takrn out of contrxt br tlw 
Court doe~ not fairlr rpffect th<' rcttionale of Arlington Heights or the ca~r,. 
1t follow~. Indeed, the samr paragraph from which thr sin~lr ~entenc<· 
was ·elrcted makes clear that "Ln]b~ent a pHttern a;; ~tark that iti 
Gomillion or Yick Wo, impnct alonr i:; not determinativr , nnd thr Court 
mu;,:t look to other evidrncr." Ser n. 9, infra. 
"Thr Di:;trict Court notC'd th<tt thr number of .\Iexican-Am r ncan~ on 
thr ~rnnd jur~· mil-(ht baYr brPn highrr had it not hpr•n for thr inabilit~· of 
thr ,.ftt•rifT, a \frxican-Amrricnn, to lor·atr four of thl' originul mC'mbrr~ of 
tlh· arr:t~· who W<'l'l' .\Irxican-Amrricnn. :)H-1 F. Supp. 79, ~3 . Unrlr r 
Tt'X<I:- l:tw . ninr· of tlw 12 grand juror~ mu:;t concur brforp an indir·tmrJtl 
cnn lw prr,.cnt<·d. Tr-.; . C'odr C'rim. Proc. J\rt. 20.19 (Hlflli) . 
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phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-Americaq 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis., 
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi., 
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials.7 
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a. majority of the jury commissioners 
, were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court , 
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
identify in advance t.hose potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from 
the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbabl<' 
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against him 
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, 11If 
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely 
they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 
79, 90. 
7 I do not sugg<'st, of course, that the mere fact that Mexirt:tn-
Amcricans constitute a mnjority in Hildago County is dispositive. Th<'r<' 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other ret:t~ons , 
a majority of the population may not be able at a pa.rticular timr to 
control or significant.Jy influence political decisions or the way the system 
operates. &c Turne1· v. Fouche. supra. But no one can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The clm;sic situation in which 
a "minority group" may suffer di~crimination in a. community is where 
it is "relegated to . . . a po~ition of political powerles~ness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U . S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
Americans arc not politically "powerless"; they are the mnjoritarian 
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elert 
and protect their own. 
Nor do I 'liggest that pcr::;ons in position~ of power can never bt• 
shown to hav<' disrrirnilli\ted against ot.her members of the same ethnic 
or ra.cial group. I would hold only that re.~pond!'nt's statistical evidence, 
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of di. crimination in thii$ Cfll3~. 
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That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than aga.inst, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the• 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendan t,. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S .. at 309. Were it 
not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogui-
tion in the community, there would be no reason to suppo:e 
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded 
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimatt' 
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only th~ 
individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain.8 
In Akins v. Texas, 325 U. ti., at 400, where apparently no 
Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was on 
the jury panel, the Court emphasied the high threshold of 
proof required to brand officers of the court with discriminatory 
intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
s The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commis-
sion would not ru~;criminate against Mexican-Americans does not, in itsrl(, 
explnin the stntisticnl dispnrit~· shown by r<>spondcnt.. Tlw record is 
essentially silent as to the manner in which the commis::;ion made itl' 
selections and its motivation in Helecting as it did . But the rompo~ition 
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the eount y 
by MexicaJ1-America.ns, prompted t.he District .Judge t.o conclude-
correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient. to show t iH' 
requisite discriminatory intent.. "A broader range of vHri<ltion ~ houlcl bf' 
tolerated here because the Tt'xas selection Hystem allow:> the governing 
majority [of grand jury commi~:sioner::;J to f1wor their group when 
select.ing graJld iuror::;." 284 F. Supp., a.t 90. 
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the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal,. 
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can .. 
not lightly be concluded that officers of the court disre-
gard this accepted standard of justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioner~ 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairnes to 
Mexican-Americans. 
D 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially noticr~ 
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys. ... 
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican .. 
Americans- while substantially represented on the grand jury 
lists- were not represented in numbers proportionate to their 
share of the total population.0 The State responded by pre-
11 Nothing in this case remotely re~embles the stark discrimination 111 
Gomillion and Y ick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this ca~e a.pproarh the 
degree of exclu~ i on that haf' characteri11ed the ca,;e.,; in which we have 
prrviously found grand jury disc rimination . s('(' n. 4, supra. In thiH case, 
in the yc:u in which the re~pondent wa ::; indicted, 52.5.% of the JX' r~ons on 
the grand jur~· list.-; wer<> M<>xican-American . Ante, nt 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupntion with the diHparity of repre:::entation of Mexican-Americans 
in the total population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loHes sight sf 
the constitutionnl ~tandnrd . Respondent has no right. to "proportional 
representation" of ~lexican-Amcrirn n s, Cqrter v, Jury Com1n'1 ~, · 39§ U. 8.1 
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senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury commiSSIOners. Other facts, such as the presence of 
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of 
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court, 
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even 
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise 
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Sta.te had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to mem-
bers of r respondent's class I the right to participate as jurors 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S .. at\ 
628. ln my view the District Court correctly found that 
the judge and jury commissioners had not intentionally dis-
criminated against Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp .. at 90. 
At the very least, the District Court's finding was not ckarly 
erroneous. 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. A11te, at 
14. Pf'rhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not presPnt-
ing more Pvidence than it did. But until today's decision one 
ma.y doubt whether many lawyers. familiar with our cases. 
would have thought that respondent's statistics. under tlw 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago C'ounty. 
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers 
of power in thif; remote border county a.re manipulating 
nt 330. He ha ~ onJ_,. thr right " to rrquirc that the State not clelibemtely 
and systrmaticall~ · deny to rMrxiran-Americans] the right to participate 
us juror:; in till' admini:stration of ju:stie{·." Alexander, 405 U. S., at 
028-629. 
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them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed tpe jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for fincling 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that 
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the Pilstrict 
Court. 
• 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE a.nd 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join. dissenting. j ~ 
The evidence relevant to tho issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three cate-gories: first, the statistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal 
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
sented on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts judi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the politicai 
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in 
Hidalgo County. I agree with the District Court that in light 
of all the evidence respondent failed to establish unconstitu-
tional grand jury discrimination.1 
1 A strong cal'c might hP made thnt. claims of gmnd jnry di ~crimination 
a.re not cognizable on fpflpm] habrn:< eorptt~ a.ftrr Stone v. Pow !.'!/,- U.S. f 
- (197o). Tn Ston!.' wP lwld that "'"h"re the ~tate h [t~ provided an 
opportunity for fnll and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a 
state priRoncr may not lw grantPd federal halwa~ corpnR relief on the 
ground t.hnt evidence obtained in an unronstitntionnl ~enrch or ~ciznre 
was introdurrd at his trin.l." !d .. at -. UnlikP the prisoner in Stone, 
who could comp!nin thnt. hi:' conviction rrstecl on e'ic!Pnr.c taintPcl by 
Fourth Amcndmrnt Yiobtions and could n~k for a new trial with that 
evidcnrp cxrludPd, the prisoner in thi~ case chnllon.gcs only thp now moot 
determination by thr grnnd jury that there wa.< ~nfficiPnt rn11sc to proceed 
1977 
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A 
The Court today holds that a criminal defendant may/ 
demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely 
by showing that the procedure for selecting gra.nd jurors 
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the 
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so 
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinc-J 
tions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the 
equal protection ana.lysis mandated by our most recent 
decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not apply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 
(1884). A state defendant cannot complaint if the Sta.te fore-
goes the institution of the gra.nd jury and proceeds against him 
instead through prosccutoria1 information, as many States pre-
fer to do. Sec Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103. 116-119 (1975). 
Nevertheless. if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
line of cases beginnin!!; with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). this Court. has held that a criminal defend-
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex-
cluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-62!1 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282. 287 (1950); Akins v. Texa.s, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404{ 
(1045). As the Court points out, this right is a.pplicable 
to trial. H•o points to no flaw in the trial itself. As in Sto11e, the incre-
mental benefit of extending habeas corpus ns a means of corrrcting uncon-
stitutional grand jury selection procedures might be viewed as "outwrighed 
by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of 
criminal justice." !d., at-. 
But as this issue was not addressed below and was not briefed or nrgued 
in this Court, it would br innppropriate to rcsoh·e it in this ca~e. 
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""hrre purposeful discrimination results only in substantial / 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, sec, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 306 U.S. 34G (1070). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-:::ection of the community." The right 
to a "representative" grand jury iii a federal right that derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit rcquirc'ment of a grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro-
ceedings-to a representative petit jury undrr the Sixth 
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-
cable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection 
procedure "systematically excludc[s] distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail [s l to be reasonably representative 
thereof." !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chal-
lenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was C'xplicitly 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). a.nd Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-f 
ing Development Corp.,- U. S.- (1977). In Atlington 
H e1'ghts we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
2 It may bo that nondisrrimim tory met hods of selection will, ovrr time, 
rrsult in n. representative gra.nd .illD'· 8co Carter "· Jury Cnmm'n. ~95 
U. S., at 330. But the Fomteenth Amendment docs not mandate that 
result. Nothil'Jg would JWe\·ent a State for ex:unple, from seeking to assure 
informed decisionmaking by requiring that all grnnd jurors br lawyers 
familiar with tho criminal la.w; and if that requirement Rhould result in 
substantial undrr-rq1re,rntation on grnnd jnrie~ of some scgmcntl'i of 1hr 
community in some areas of the State, the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not render tho selection prorc.os uncons1 itutional. 
4 
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a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause .... " 
-U.S., at-. 
We also identified the following standards for resolving issues/ ~ 
of discriminatory intent or purpose: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattem, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick W o v. Hop-
lcins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick lVo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. S., at -
(footnotes omitted). 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.a This is 
3 Although Davis and Arlington []eights make clear that proof of dis-
crimmatory intent is required and that proof of impart or effect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that a lesser burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the 
nature of the jury selection task ... we have permitted a finding of con-
stitutiona1 violation even when the stati~tical pattern does not approach 
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially neu-
tral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630. 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., a.t- n. 13. As one illus-
tration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list. 
The Court found that the disparity between tho-"e figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. !d., 
at 350. But the Court did not. view the statistics in isobtion. Turner 
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointt..d 
jury commissioners, who in tum selected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in to1al control. Even though all of the students in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred 
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, as 
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District Court 
had found tha.t, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-
a,tica.lly excluded from the grand jnrirs through token inclusion." !d., at 
352. It was against this ba.ckground of pervasive discrimination that the 
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representa-
tion was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination. 
By contrast, in Cartel' v. Ju1'y Comm'n, 396 U. S., at 338-339, isolated 
proof that for 12 ycarR no Negro had been appointrd to the jury commis-
sion of n. predominantly Negro county was found insufficient, standing 
alone, to cstabli~h discriminntory intent. 
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In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21 7o of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one· 
of whom was a Negro (5%>); and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy oppo·rtunity 
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden 
should shift to the Sta.te. !d. , a.t 630.4 I 
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and A.lex-
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
Heights,-U. S., at-. 
B I 
In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were Mexican-American ,5 and seven 
4 The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted 
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of 
the selection system cuts in favor of the Sta.te where, as here, those who 
control the selection process a.re members of the same class as the person 
claiming discrimination. See text infra. J 
5 The District Court noted that the number of Mexica.n-America.ns on 
the grand jury might have been higher had it not been for the inability of 
the sheriff, a Mexican-American, to locate four of the original members of 
the array who were Mexican-American. 384 F. Supp. 79, 83. Under-
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of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were 
Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent was 
indicted, 52.5% of the persons on the gTancl jury list were 
Mexican-American. Tn addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-Anwrican, as were 
a majority of the judg0s. That these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is MPxican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in tlw Dis-
trict Court, this case 1:s unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the gov0rning majority. and tlw resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
~~~ I 
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-Amcriran. The jury commission is the body 
Texas bw, nine of the 12 grn.nd jurorR mu~t concur bdor(' nn indictment 
ran be prcsentC'd. Tex. Code Crim. Pror. Art. 20.19 (1906). 
G 1 do not RUggeRt., of rDllfSE', 1hnt the mere fnct thnt 1\fcxican- r 
Americans constitute a mnjority in Hildnr;o Connty is dispositive. There 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, 
a majority of the population may not be able at a particular time to 
control or significantly influence political decisions or the way the system 
operates. See Turner v. Fo~tche. supra. But no one can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which 
a "minority group" ma.y suffer discrimination in a community is where 
it is "relegated to ... a position of politica.! powerlessness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian 
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect 
and protect their own. 
Nor do I suggest that pcr8ons in positions of power ran never be 
shown to have di~rriminated against other members of the same ethnic 
or racial group. I would hold only thnt respondent's statiRtical evidence, 
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of discrimination in this case. 
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vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from 
the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbable 
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against him 
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, "If 
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely 
they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 
79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons who may have a natural inclination to favor the de-l 
fendant. See Strauder v. ·west Virginia, 100 U. S., at 309. 
Were it not for that potential inclination, and for its generalj 
recognition in the community, there would be no reason to 
suppose that a jury selection process that systematically ex-
cluded persons of a certain race would be the basis of any 
legitimate complaint by criminal defendants of that race. 
Only the individuals excluded from jury service would ha.ve a 
persona.! right to complain! I 
1 The likelihood that 1 he Mrxiran-Amerirnn rontrolkd jury rommis- 1 
sion would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans docs not, in itself, 
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is 
essentially silent as to the manner in which the commission made its 
selections and its motivation in selecting as it did. But the composition 
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county 
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to conclude-
correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent.. "A broader range of variation should be· 
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In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was onf 
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel, 
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to 
brand officers of the court with discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be concluded that officers of the courts discre- ( 
gard this a.ccepted standard of justice." 325 U. S., at 1 
400-401. 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the gra.nd jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural predisposition to assure fairness to / 
Mexican-Americans. 
c 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice-
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commis..c:;ion 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican-
Americans- while substantial1y represented on the grand jury 
tolerated here because the Texas selection system allows the governing 
majority [of grand jury commi~sioners] to favor their group when 
selecting grand jurors." 284 F. Supp., at 90. 
. . 
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lists-were not represented in numbers proportionate to their 
share of the total populatione The State responded by pre- ! 
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury comnuss10ners. Other facts, such as the presence of 
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of 
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court, 
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even 
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise-
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the-
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to mem-
bers of [respondent's class l the right to participate as jurors 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S., at 
628- 629. In my view the District Court correctly found that 
the judge and jury commissioners had not intentionally dis-
criminated against Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. 
At the very least, the District Court's finding was not clearly 
erroneous. 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not present-
S G Nothing in this case remotely resembles the stark cliscrimination in 
Gomillion and Yick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this case approach the 
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have· 
previously found grand jmy discrimination. Peen. 3, supra . In this case, I 
in the year in which the respondrnt was indicted, 52.5% of the persons on 
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupation with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans 
in tho total population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loses sight of 
the constitutional standard. Respondent has no right to "proportional 
representation" of Mexican-AmNicans, Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S., 
at 339. He has only the right "to require that the State not deliberately 
and systematically deny to [Mexican-America.ns] the right to participate 
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ing more evidence than it did. But unti.l today's decision one 
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
would have thought that respondent's statistics, under the· 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago County, 
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers 
of power in this remote border county are manipulating 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that 
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District 
Court . 
'', 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. T'' ;'; · '•' i3 r,..,nnan 
).,fr. .ru .. i; ~Gi) s l·'""art 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF Jusnc•; and 
Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrirnina.tior1 in thi~ 
case falls into three categories: first, the sta.tistical evidencf-l 
int-roduced by respondent in both the sta.te and federal 
~ . 
proCeedings which shows tha.t the 80% Mexictln-Americall 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
sented on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the 
state tri~l judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts judi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political 
dominance and control by the Mexica.n-Arnerican majority in 
Hirlalgo County. 
The Court today considPrs it dispositive tl)a.t tJ 1e lack of 
proportional rei)resentation of Mexican-Americans on the 
grand jury list.s in this county would not have occurred if 
jurqrs were selected from the population wholly at random. 
But one may agree that the disproportion did not occur by 
chance without agreeing that it resulted from purposeful 
• invidious discrimination. T n my view, the circpmstances of 
this unique case fully support the District Court's fi11ding 
. t~n t the statistieal disparity-the basis of today's deci-
sion-is more likely to have stemmed from neutral causes 
than from any intent to discriminate · against Ml•xican-
Al'nericans.' 
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A 
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon-. 
strate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely 
by showing that the procedure for sel('Cting grand jurorfi 
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his rac0 or tlw 
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so 
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinc-
tions between the grand and petit juri0s, and misapplies tho 
equal protectio11 analysis mandated by . our most recent 
decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not apply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S . . 116 
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complaill if the State fore-
goes the institutiou of the grand jury and proceeds again t him 
instead through prosecutorial information , as many Sta tes pre~ 
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. , 103, 116- 119 (1975) . 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equa l 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
line of cases beginning with Straudet v. West Virgina, 100 
nrc not cognizable on federal habeas corptl ~ after ,~ton e v. Pou•ell.- U.S. 
- (1976) . In Stone we held that "where the Slate ha ~ prO\·ided an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fomth Amendnwnt claim, n, 
sta.te pri ~oner rrut~· uot· be gnwtecl fec!Pral habeas corpu~ rdirf on t lw 
ground that. rvideiH'<' obt:1inecl in an unronstitutiotrnl searc·h or srizun• 
wnH introdncc•d at hi ~ trial. J' !d .. at - . Unllk1· the pri~otwr in Stone. 
who rould romplain that h i~ convietion rrstc•d on P\·icl r nrt' taint('(] b~' 
Fourth Amrndnwnt violation;; and could a ~:;k for n llC\1' trial with that. 
c·vicknre Pxcluc!Pd, tlw pri~onPr in thi;; c:rsr rhaltengp;,; onl~· the now moot, 
detr rmination by thr grand j m~· that there wns suffi cirnt cntt~c· to prorPed 
lo frinl. HP point s to no fl nw in the trial itself. As in Slonr, tlw imrc-
mPntal brnrfit. of rx t rndin~ habc•as corpus as n, mrans of rorrr('ting uncon-
~:d itutiomtl grand jnry ~el ec tion procrclures migh t be viewed as "outweighed 
h.\' lhc a'cknowlrdged ro~ t ~ to other values vital to a rational Ry~ t cm of 
criminal just ire." Icl., at.-. 
nut as thi ~; issur was not adclrcRsrd below and wns not bridc·d or nr·gucd 
in thi: Court , it would he· in:tppropriatc to re,;olve it in this !':t ':'('. 
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U. S. 303 (1880) , this Court. has held that a criminal defend. 
1111t is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination , members of his own race arc ex-
clud<'cl from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Low:siana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 3~!0 
U. 8. 320, 335- 337. 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas , 330 U. R. 
282. 287 (1950); Akins v. 1'exas, 325 U. S. 398. 403-404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantia.] 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right. 
to a "reprcsenta.tive" grand jury is a federal right that derives 
not from the requirement of equal t)rotection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro-
CC'edings-to a representative petit .i ury under the Sixth 
Amendment. Sec Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S .. 522 (1975). 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendm.cnts arc appli-
eable. a defendant need only show that the jury selection 
procedure "systematically excludels] distinctive groups in the 
eommunity and thereby faillsJ to be reas011ably representative 
thereof. " !d., at 538. But in a sta.te case in which the chal-
ienge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth AmendmeHt 
applies. and the defendant has the burdC'n of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
"Jt, mn~· be t hnt, nondi~criminatory me1 hods of selection will. over time, 
re~ult in a rC'pwsC'n t:ttivC' grand jur~·· SeC' Carter v. J?u·y Comm'n, :)96 
U. S., nt 3.10. But !he Fourt•renth Amendmrnt does not mandate th::~t 
result. Nothing would prevc•nt a State for rxamplr, from seeking to assure 
informrd decisionmnking b~ · rrquiring that nll grand jurors be ln.wyrrs 
familiar with the erimiwtl law; and if that. requirrment should result in 
~uhst.nntial undrr-rrpr<''i<'ntntion on grnnd juries of some ~C'grnrnts of the 
romrmmity in ~ornr arc:1s of 1hC' State, thr Fourteenth AmC'ndmcnt would 
not. rend<·r the srl<'ction prorrss uncon~titutiona l. 
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Proof of discl'iminatory intent in such a case was explicitly 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 420 
U.S. 229 (1976). and Arlington He·ights v. Metropolitan How; ... 
ing Development Corp.,- U. S. - (1977). In Arlington 
Heights we said: 
"Om· decision last Term in Washington v: Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not itTelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination. ' ld., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause ...• " 
-U.S., at-. 
We also identified the following standards for resolving is~ues 
pf discriminatory in teut or purpose: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumst~ntial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern. 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Go?nillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is thon relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a. pattem as stark as that in Gom·illion 
ot· Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and tho 
Court must. look to other evidence." - U. S., at -
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.R This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. R. 625 ( 1972), where we stated: 
"The C'ourt has never announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has. rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
a Although Dav'is and Arlinytun Heiyhts make clear that proof of dis~ 
criminatory intent is required and that proof of imp11ct. or (•fl'ect, alone 
is not, sufficient, we did recognize in Arlinyton Heights that. a les:>er burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Berause of the 
nat.ure of the jury selection task ... we have permitted a finding of ron~ • 
stitutional violation rven when the stati!ltical pattern does not nppro11ch 
the ext.remes of Yirk Wo or Gomillion." !d., at- n. 13. As onr illus-
tration, we cited T1trner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the stat.istical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general popula.tion and 37% of those included in the gra11d jur~' list. 
The Court. found that the disparity between those figures was not, so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a fedora) court. !d., 
at 350. But. the Court did not. view the statistics in isolation. 'l'ume1· 
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's pt'Cu!iar sy,.:trm of 
appointing the county board of rducation. The circuit judge UJlpointul 
jury commissioners, who in turn ~elected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students iu 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil ha.v'ing transfrrrrd 
e!sewheve, alt of t.hf> membE>rs of the board of educa.tion wrre whit<', ns 
were all of the members of the jury commission. The Dio;trici Court. 
had fOtmd thn.t.. until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had bern system-
atically excluded from thr, grand juriE>s through token inclusion." ld .. at 
352. It was against this background of pervasive discrimir1ation that the 
Court found that even a new grand jur~· list with 37% Negro rrprc:'enta-
tion was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination. 
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury C'omm'n, 396 U. S., at. 338-339, i;;olatrd 
proof thnt for 12 ~·ears no Negro had been appointed to the jury commis-
sion of a predominant!~' NE>gro eounty was found ins\rfficicnt, standing 
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of potential Negro gralld jurors is indeed striking he1•e, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alolle, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially neu-
tral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630. 
T n Alexander, the evidence showed that 21 r, of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
nwmbcrs "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only Oil(' 
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
'striking." Y <'t the statistics were not found, in isolation. to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
tlw selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
for discrimination" was the Court sa.tisfied that the hurden 
should shift to the State, ld., at 630.·' 
4 The Court's reli:mre on "the opportunity for discrimination '' 1101 c1! 
in Ale:cander. ante, nt 11-14, is rlearly mi::;piRcrd. Th(' Comt ha.,; hc•ld I 
rrprrtt rdl~· lhnt the Texa system of 8f'lecting grand juror::; by thr u~r of 
jur~· C'OmmisHionrr~ i1< ·' fair on its fnc(' and capable of being ut iliz<•d wit b-
out discrimirattion.' ' Ilenwndez v. Texas, 347 lJ. S. 475 . ..f-71<-4-79 (195-1) : 
nc<'ord, ::>mith '' ·Texas. 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). The "subjretiYity" of 
thr selection systrm cuts in fnvor of the St.atc where, n.· lwn', tho;;r whn 
rontrol the . rlcrtion process are members of tlw same cl:t>'s n,.; the IJC'r:-:on 
claiming di:>crimination. Sec text infra. 
Apnrt from Alr!:ca11der nnd 'l'uru er, :-;ec• n. :~. supra. rhis Conrt b:1 ~ 
>'ll~l :tined r]a im ; of grand jury clisr.rimination in ( WO Ritua tions. :\J o;;( 01" 
tltr• ea~e:< involvr totnl rxclu;;ion of mi11orilie::; from p::tr1icipntion on g;rnnd 
jmiP:c ,4, lltild .. Mort h Carolina, ·~;g V. B. 713 (191! '1) (r~e }lP!!(l't! j~.~.~:~·• 
iA ill :··uu'i ·). 8tebanhs v. f.~oui~; .. anu, :]56 F. 8. 6tl1 (196f) (no )rc~rQ 
.i~o~n11, i11 ij' PI' HI·'"'"'·') ; Rer!C<' v. Georgia. :l50 U. 8. ~5 {'1953) (no ~rgw 
juror~ ill' lK Year::;): 1/eruandcz \'. Texas, :3-1:7 U. 8 . . 4;75 (1954) (no 
.\lr•'\ icarl-1\nwri<·an jmor:-: ill 25 ymrs): Patton v. Missis~;ippi. :3:3~ U. S. 
~(i:l ( J9 17) (no :\<•gro jmor~ iu 30 ~·ea.r:'): //ill \'. 'l'exos. :nG l . S. 400 
(1!_1·12) (no :'\rgro gmnd jnror:-; in Hi ~·c:u~ or morr); Pierre v, /,ouisiana, 
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Considered together, Davis, Arhnuton Heights. and !lle:r~ 
a11der make' clear that statistical evidence showing undl'rn'p-
l'esontatioll of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should lw considered in light of "such r other l circumstantial 
and dirrct evidc'nco of intent as may bE:' available.'' A rlin{!tun 
He-ights,- U.S., at-. 
B 
fn this case. the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
prcsiciNI over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three 
of thf' five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amel'-
ican; fiw of tht> 12 grand jurors who returned the indictnwnt. 
including the foreman , were :Mexican-American." and seven 
of thr 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt "'C're 
-----------..._1 'le1 N.J.1ro 
:)()() l l. R. :~54 (1934) ( · : . · r in 40 ;.:en r>'); 1/a/e v. 1\.e/ltu r- k!/. jLtrrl.S 
:m:3 !T. S. (il;~ (19:~8) (no Nr~m ,]uror~); Norris v. Alabama. :2!.!.1 r. S . 
. )K7 (J0:iii) (no ~PI!:I'O juror~ in ll '' long: num lwr '' of ;.·Pa r~); l? r•ucr.< 1·. 
Alabama. 192 l l. S. 226 (1904) (no NP!!:I'O jmor~); ('artf'l' , .. Te.ras. 1/i 
!'. S. 44:2 (l !JOO) (no ~ '!.'( 1'0 ju1or~): Hush 1·. Kcnllt"k!f, 107 11. S. llO 
(II'~:~) (no ~rgro juror~); Neal 11. D eloll'n7'f', 10:3 F. S. :l70 (11-\i'O J (no 
Xq1;ro juror ;); Strauder v. Ires~ Virginia, 100 U. S. 30:3 (1~~0) (no 
\'Pgro jurors). Thr rrmaindrr of thP ra~<'ii involv<' srvere limitntion of a 
minorit;.· '" p:1rt iripn t io!J by rokc•n inclusion: Sims v. Ocoroia. :lS9 l ;. S . 
.f().f (HHii) (Nrgro<'~ con~ritntir•g 2-l.4% of tlw tuxpayrn; limited to 4.7<1, 
of t host' on th<' grand jury liHt); Jon es v. Q<'oroio, ;~~9 U. H. :24 ( l!JI\7 I 
(.\rgro(·~ C'OI!Htitnting HJ.i% of tlw tnxpn)·<·r~ limit t>d to 5.0 <'~ of thosP 
on th(' .imy [i , t): Whitus v. Ut!orgia. :3S.'i !J. S .. 545 (10tii) (\'rgror·' 
constituting 27.1% of tl](' tn>.payNs limit rd to 9.1 % of tlw grand .im;.· 
.~---\-. (-.n-:-ir ... <>-:-)"; Cn88ell , .. Texas. :r~9 U. ~- 28:2 (19.50) (limitation of ol!r l\'r~ro 
juror on raeh panel); Smith, .. '!'c.ras. 811 U. S. 1:21:' (l9i0); (5 ~c·gm 
gnt nd jmor~ in :1 i ·;.·r:: r period) . 
r. The Di~trirt Court notPd thnl the nntnb(•r of :\fexiean-Amrrir:ms 011 
lh(• grall(l jur~· might hav<' bern highrr had it r1ot hrl'n for, thr inability of 
the· Rhrrilf, a Mrxi<'au-Aut(•ri(·an , to locat<' four of thr origiwd membr1·~ of 
thr arr:t.l' who \\'PW ::\Ic•xi(•nn·Amerir::tn. :3S.f F. Snpp. 79, 83. Um!Pr 
Trxn~ lmr. nin<' of thr 12 gral!(l juror" ruust ('OtH'11r before mt indirlmPltl 
l•a11 h(' JHP~('I!Ic·d. Tex. Code• C'rim. Pnw. Art. 20.19 (1960). 
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 
(one Negro juror in 24 years)· 
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 u.s: 584 
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Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent wM 
indicted, 52.57c of the persons on the grand jury list were 
Mexican-American. In ~dditi~n ,' a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of the judges. That these positions of power aud 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
. trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials.6 
The most significant fact in this case, aU but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
W<'re Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by: the Court. 
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
o I do not suggr;,t., of c•ourst>, that the mere · fact thnt ·~d(•xic·an, 
Americans constitutf' a majority in Hildago County is diRpositivr . There 
are ·mnny rommunitie~ in whirh , by virtue of historical or otlwr reu ~ous, 
a majority of the populnt.ion may not be able at a particular tinw to 
control or significant.Jy influt>rwe political deciRions or the wny thC' system 
opcratRs. Sc>c Turnn· v. Fouche, SU]Jm. But no ont> cnn eoptend st' riously 
thnt Hildago County is such a community. The rla ,:sic situation in which 
a "minority group" mn~· suffer discrimination in a community i;; where 
it. is " relcga.trd to .. . a po~ition of politicnl powrrlcRsncs:>." San Antonio 
School Distri.ct v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (197.'3) ·. Hrre the Mexican-
Americans nre noL politicnlly "powC'rle,:s"; they are the mn.joritminn 
llolitieol rlC'mcnt of the cqmmunity, with demonstrated copnbility to elect 
und prot ect. their own. ' 
Nor do I .,:nggP,.:I. thnt pN~OJl:< in posi tions of power cnn never be 
Hhown to have discrimiua t('d 11gaiust ot hrr mcmbrn; of tlw ~H ITIC' ethnic 
o1· ral'inl group. I \\'onld hold only that rC'spondent 's stn ti.~t ieal cYidc>nee, 
widHlut more, is lll ~u!Tirient to proYe a elaim of di;;(•riminaOon in this case. 
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identify in advance thosE> potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, where Mexican-American~ I 
,control both the selection of jurors and the political process, 
rational inferences from tho most basic facts in a democratic 
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As 
Judge Garza observed. "If people in charge can choose whom 
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against them~ 
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than agu.inst. those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant. has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. See 
Straudcr v. West Virginia, 100 U.S., at 309. Were it not for 
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of I 
thf'ir own class. there would be no reason to suppose that a 
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons 
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate com-
pJaiut by criminal defendants of that nice. Only the in-
divi~uals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain. 
In A Ieins v. 'Pe:ras, supra, where apparently no Negro was on 
the jury commissio11 and only one of 16 was on the jury panel, 
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to 
brand officers of tlw court with discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of tliscriminatory practice in sf'lecting a 
grand jury panel challf'nges an essential element of 
proper judicial proccdurf'-the requirement of fairuess on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with pf'rsons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be rOJ)rludf'd that officers of the courts discte-
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gard this accepted standard of justice." 325 U. S., at 
400-401. 
With all respect, I am compe1led to say that the Court today 
has ulightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty but 
also their likely inclina.tion to assure fairness to McxicaH-
Americans. 7 
c 
It matters litt.le in this case whether such judicially notice-
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
outset or as rebl,Jtting it after it, was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either hy 
presenting proof or by calling attention to fa.cts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, respondent produced sta.tistics showing tha.t Mexican-
Americans-while substantiaUy represented on the grand jury 
lists-were not represented in numbers proportionate to their 
share of the total population. The State responded by pre-
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury commiSSioners. Other facts, such as the presence of 
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of 
the county. entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court, 
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even 
I 
7 r agrer with 1\fn . .f l'KTJCE MAHSliALL. ante, at 3, thnt Htr reot ~· pr~ ('CI)-
r0rning identifin blr c l n~:;<'s in our ;;ociPty havr no place in thr dPc is i on~ of 
t hi~ Court. That is n compelling reason . in my vil:w, not to apply 
~ t a t bti ral formul:ls and , tatrment.s of concern about discrrtionn r~ · HClC'C·-
l iou prorPdure>'-drvrloped in wholly different cirrum;;;tances, ~e<· n. 4, 
~ upra-to the rt\'Spondrnt 's claim of discriminatio1' against Mexicnn-
A tnPric·n n ~< in th ~.,; 1111iqm' Mexicnn-Am<'rirnn coUun.unity . 
• ~ t 
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assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise 
to such a burden. Accordingly. at ·the close of the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evide11ce that the 
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied I to mem-
bers of [respondent's class] the right to participate as juror·s 
, in the administration of justice." A lexauder, 405 U. S.. at 
628- 629. The District Court found that the judge ami jury 
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against 
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least. 
that finding was not clearly erroueous.8 
The C01.1rt labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.e, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not present-
ing more evidence than it did. But until today's decision one 
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our ca~Ps, 
would have thought tha.t respondent>s statistics. under the 
eircumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County. 
were even a.rguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
' temtt tic discl'imi na.tion. . 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
statisti~s that the Mexican-Americans who control the lev('J'g 
" Xothing in this easr remotely re~embles thr stark cjiscriminntion ill 
Gomillioa ;tnd Yick Wo. Nor do the Hta.tisties in this r:lilr approach thl' 
degri'C of exclusion that has charaCt('rized thr CH!:'CS in which we ha\·e 
pl't'viou><l~· found grand jur~· diserimination. Sre n. 3. su7n:a. In this ea"~'· 
in the yrnr in whieh the rrspondent wns indieted, 52.5% of the J1C'r8on~ on 
the grnnd jury li~ts wrrr Mexican-Amrrican. Ante, a.t 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupation with the disparity of reprei:ient.ation of Mexic11n-AmeriennH 
in the totRL population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loso:s sight of 
thd ronstitutioual standnrd. Hrspondent has no right to ''proportinual 
reprel:'('ntntion" of J\frxiean-Amrrirans, Cartel' v. Jury Cnmm'n, :l9fi {]. H .. 
nt 339. He has only the right "to rcqnire that the State not clPlib('I'Hfely 
and systemriticfllly den~' to [Mexicnn-AmPric:ms] the right to pnrticipate 
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of pmwr in this remotl.' honlC'r county ar<' ma.nipulat,ing 
them to discrimina.t<' "against th<'msel vPs." T n contrast, the 
judges on the scene. the state judge who appoint<•d tl1<' jury 
commis ·ioners and pr<'sidf'd ov<'r respondf'nt's tl'ial and the 
l .llikd Stat<'s District Judge- both Nl<>xican-An1<'rieans and 
familiar with the community-- perceived 110 basis for rPspond-
ent's claim of invidious diRcrimination. 
l t ~('<'InS to me that the Court today, in rejecting tlw Dif'-
trid ( 'nurt's finding that 11 0 such discrimination took plae(•. 
1,,1s <'rn·d grievou~ly. I would reinstate th<' judgnwnt of the 
[)j ~. trict Court. 
To : The Chief Justice 
t(· ~- 6 ) 0 /0 
414;r 7 
Mr. Ju~t1 ce Br ennan 
Mr. Justice s t~~art 
Mr. Just ice Wh \.te 
.( 8 ~?.? 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice RAhnquist 
Mr. Just i ce Stevens 
From: Mr. Just ice Powell 
h DRAFT Circulated: __________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAl'dtiroulated: 
No. 75- 1552 
Petitioner, On Wnt of Cert.wran to the 
Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff,) . . . 
United States Court of Ap~ 
I
> d . v.p 'd peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
"o ngo art1 a. 
[February-, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL. with whom THE CHIEF JusncF~ and 
Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST join , dissenting. 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistic~tl evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the sta.te and federal 
proeeedings which shows that the 80o/o Mexican-Americau 
majority · in Hidalgo County was .not proportionately repre-
sented on the grand jury lists; second. the · testimony of the 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts jurli-
cia.lly noticed by the District Court with respect to the political 
dominaiice and control by the Mexican-American majority in 
Hidalgo County. 
The Court today considfrs it dispositive that .tl te lack of 
proportional representation of Mexican-Amerjc1;1nS on the 
grand jury lists in this county would not have occurred if 
jurors were selected from the populatioll wholiy at rando)n . 
But one may agree that thf disproportion· did not occur by 
chance without agreeing that it resulted from purposeful 
· invidious discrimination. In my view, the circumstances of 
this unique case full y support the District Court's fi11ding 
t l{a t the sta tistical diepar:ty- the basis of today's d<'ci-
swn- Is more jikely to have stemmed from ~1. utral eauses 
than from a.ny intent to discriminatD ·against M('xicall-
Americalis.t 
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A 
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon., 
rstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merrly 
by showing that the procedure for selecting grand jurorfoi 
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his rae€' or tlw 
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so 
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinc-
tions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies tho 
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent 
decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not apply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. Cal1:jornia, 110 U. S. 516 
(1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the State fore-
goes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against hirn 
instead through prosecutorial information, as mauy States pre-
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-110 (1075). 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints ih1posed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Ameudment. Thus in a 
line of cases beginning with Straudet v. West Viryina, 100 
arc not cognizable on frdcrnl habca::; corptls aftrr -~tone v. Pou•ell.- U.S. 
- (1976). In Stone we lwld that "where the Statr h:1s providt•d an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fotlrth Amrndmrnt claim, a 
<'fa.tr pri~oner tru1~· not br gr<IJltrd frdrral habra:-; roqm~ rrlirf on 1 he 
g!'Ound thnt rvidenrc• obtained in an unron~titutional srnrch or seizure• 
wnH introduced at hi~ trial. l> !d .. at -. Unlike· thc pri~olirr in Stone. 
who could complain that hi,.; convietion rC',.;ted on P\'idC'nN' taintrd h~, 
Fourth Amrndmrnt. violations and rould ao:k for n t1cw trial with thnt. 
C'\'icl<•nrc rxrludNI, tlw pri~onrr in thil:' cnsr rhaliPngr:,: on]~ · t hr no\\' mooL 
det0nnination by th£> gmnd jnry that ihrr£> was sufficient rn\1~(' to proreed 
to trial. HP points to no flaw in thr trinl itself. As in StmU', thr inrre-
mC'ntnl benefit· of rxtending hah0m; C'Orpm; ns a meam; of rorrerting unron" 
:,:litutionnl grnnd jmy ~rlertion proerdures might be viewed ns "outweighed 
lJ.,. the acknowledged rost~ to other valucs vital to a rational sy~tcm of 
criminal justirc." !d., at-. 
Hut as this isRuc was noL addrc;;~cd below and w:1s not brirfrd or argued 
in thi,;; Court, it 1\'oulcl Jx- inappropriatr to re.;;olvc it in thi~ <':l::i(\ 
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U.S. 303 (1880) , this Court. has held that a criminal defend. 
ttnt is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination , members of his own race are ex-
cluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'11, ~~\){) 
r. S. 320, 335-337. 339 (1970); Cassell v. Te:ws, 339 U. S. 
282. 287 (HH50); Aki11s v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398. 403- 404 
(1945). As the Court poiuts out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimina.tion results only ill substantial 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) . 
But a state defendant has 110 right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community.2 The right 
to a "representa.tive" grand jury is a feclera.J right tha.t derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand .i ury . 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to· state pro-
ceedings-to a representative petit jury under the ~ixth 
Amendment. SPe Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-
cable. a d~fcndant need only show that the jury selection 
procedure ."systematically excludels] distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative 
thereof." /d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chal-
fcnge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies. and the defendant has the burcl<'n of proving a vio-
lation of thr Equal Protection Clause. 
"Tt mny bc• t hilt. nondi~criminator~· mC't hods of l'C'lectiqn will. over tinw, 
r<'8tdt in n i·Ppn,,.Pntntive grnnd jury. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n , :m6 
t . S., at 3~0. Bu t tlw Fourt•C'enth Amendment does not mandate that 
rC'sult. Nothing woHlcl prevPnt a StBte for C'Xmnple , from sC'eking to assure 
informC'd decisionmaking b~· rrquiring that all grand jurors bC' lawyers 
fllfnilinr with the rrimi11n! lnw; and if that requirement ~hould result in 
Rub:-;tantial llndrr-rPprP~<'nf:ttion on grand juries of some segment.s of the 
romrnunit y in ~orrw are:l ~ of tlw State, th <' Fourteenth Amendment would 
not. rendc·r the :-eiPction prorr~s un con~titutionul. 
'. ' 
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Proof of disct•iminatory intent in such a case was explicitly 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Dav'is, 420 
U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington He'ights v. Metropolitan Hous. 
ing Development Corp., - U. S. - (1977). In Arl-ington 
Heights we said: 
"Our· decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 42() 
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not iiTelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' ld., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, ... " 
-U.S., at-. 
We also identified the following standards for resolving issues 
pf discriminatory intent or purpose: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of iutent as; 
may be available. The impa.ct of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern. 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. YicA: "JtVo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a, pattern as stark as that in Gom,illion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Comt m.ust look to other evidence." - U. S. , at -
(footnotes omitted). 
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.R This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
40.5 1 . S. 625 ( 1972). where we stated: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical sta.ndards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
a Alt.}iough Davis and Arlington Heights make clea.r that proof of dis~ 
criminfttory intt>nt is required nnd thnt proof of impact or eft'ect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a. le::;ser burden 
ma.r be appropria.tt> in the eontext of jury selection. "BecausH of the 
nature of the jury selrction tqsk ... we have permitted a findin~ of con~ 
stitutionnl violation rvPn when the statiE'tical pattern does not appronch 
the t>xt.remes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." Id .. at - n. 13. As Oil<' Jllus-
tration, we rited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the stflt.istical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 130% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the gram! jury list. 
The Cou.rt, found that the disparity between those figures was not, so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal (•ourt. !d ..• 
at 350. But. the Court did not. view the statistics in isola.tion. Turner 
was J)Ot a criminal case; it involved instPad Georgia's I)('CU!iar sy,;trm of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointtd 
jury commissioners, who in turn !'elected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this ;;y;;tt>m 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of t.he studPnts iu 
the county schoolA were Negro, every white pupil having tnul8ferrcd 
elsewhere, all of t.he mPmbers of the board of education wcrP white, ns 
were all of the members of the jury commis.~ion. The District Court 
had found tha.t., until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-
atically t>xcluded from the grand jurit>s through token inclusion." ld., nt 
352. It was ngain~t tl1is background of pervasive discrimination that the 
Court found tha.t even a nt>w grand jury list with 3i% Negro rrprCRrnta-
tion was the product of continued, purpo~eful discrimination. 
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comrn'n, 396 U. S .. nt. 338-339, isolatrd 
proof thn.t for 12 ~·ears uo Negro had been appointed to the jury commis-
sion of a predominant!~' NPgro county wm; found ins~Jfficicnt, o;tandin!! 
alone, to establish di::;criminatory intrnt. 
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of potential Negro gra11d jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis~ 
criminatio11 on statistical improbability alone. for the 
SPlection procedures themselves were not racially neu~ 
tral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the r£'lcvan t, 
community 'n're l'legro; the jury commission consisted of fiv(• 
lll(lmbers "all of whom were white." appointed by a \rhit<' 
judge; the gnwd jury venire included 20 persons. only onP 
of whom was a Kegro ( 5% ) ; and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. /d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." · Y ct the statistics were not found. ill isola.tio11. to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining th11t 
thP ~Wlection system "provided a clear and easy opportu11ity 
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the hurdrn / 
should shift to the State, ld., at 630:1 / 
4 The Court's n•li:111re on " the opportunity for diPcriminiltiou' ' uon•t! 
itt Alexande1', ant r•, at 11-14, is elearl~· mi~plaerd . Thr Court has hrld 
t'l'praL·dl~ · that t lw Trxa" systrm of ~rlectin~ grand juror:; by 1ilC' u.-;c· of 
jur~· commisoiOIH'I'~ i1< "fair on ito fnce and capable of being utiliz<'d wit b-
out di~crimimt iou. " If e1'nandez v. 'l'exas. :347 lJ. S. 475, 47S-·H9 ( 1954) ;1 
:H·c·ord Smith , .. 'I'Pxas. 311 U. S. 128, 130 ( 1940). Thr "~ubjl' o t ivit~·" of• 
the selertion s~·f' tcm cuts in favor of the Statr wherr, as herl', tho~r whu 
rontrol the srlrrtion proress are members of the snrnc clas.~ a::; the prr«on 
elniming dii<crimiJHltion. Sec tcxl infm. 
Ap:~rt from Jtl e.rander a nd T·u1'11 er. >iC'C' n. :3, supra. 1 t•hi~ Court ha ." 
~ ll :'f:t i ll<'d ti:tii1H of gr:tlld jur~· di s~ rim ina lion in i WO. s ituations . .:\Jo . ..; t of 
t !JP C'Hl:>C'~ invol vr t ota I exclu~ion of minorit irs from p~Ht icipa t ion on grand 
- jurit)~: "~told<. No;th-b'aJoiJ';zu , !)76 P. ~. 7T!J (19_64) {IJO ?Jq.,tu j'.taliOh 
' W. ') J .'(ttl ' ) j i'1lfHl" 1'1J II , .JtJt:iLi:cf::l, '3~8 b ... . ~. 8t ' l (l96tJ) (lib ~ ~t~10 
x ·jlll I i:n 01 (I II ' :·nn ·).j Heer:e /1, Gc01'(Jia. :l50 U. tl . .'\5 (Hl5:i) (no ~l'gro 
.Pnor~ 111 ll' ~·<>:H~); Her11a11dez v. Texas, 847 U. 8. 47!) (1954) (no 
\ ] r,iean -.\m cr i<·<~n juror~ in 25 yenrs ) ; Patton ,., Mississip pi. :3:32 U. S 
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Considt>rccl together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and A.le:r-
rtllder mu.k<' clear that statistical evidence showi n~ undt>rt'('(l-
rPsc'ntatioll of a population group on tlw grand jury lists 
should be COIISidPrecJ in light of "such f Other J circumstan tia] 
HIH] direct evidence of intent as may br available." Arlington 
Heights,-U.S .. at-. 
B 
In this case . the following critical facts are beyond disp 
the judge who appointed the jury commission<:'rs later 
presickd over respondent's trial was Mexican-Am' can; thr<'e 
of the five jqry commissioners were Mexican- nerican; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array · , ·e Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of tlw 12 grand jurors who r rned the indictment, 
i1~t'luding the. f~reman, were Mexi .n-Ameri.can.r· an~l seven / 
ol tlw 1~ pet1t JUrors who retur ed thf' verdict of gmlt wc'r'('/ 
:~Ofi l l. :4. :~.'i-t (19:34) ( Kq~ro: uro in 40 )'<•nr~); fla il· "· [(eu tu ci.~S ~ 
:m;~ P. R. (il:~ (19:{8) (n Nrgro juror~ ; Norris v. Alabama. ~!H l'. ~ 
~ (J0>L'i i (no "\'(•gro .i nror::: in a "long nurnhr r" or ~ ·rar.•) : Uo(! r' t" , ., 
tllnballla. Hl~ ll. 8. 326 (Hl04) (no Nrp;ro jmors); ('arter , .. Te.ws. lii 
!'. S . .J-1:? t 1 0~l0) (no \ · ~ro jutor;.:): /Jush \' . Kr•J i/w•ktJ, 107 ll. ~. 110 
( ISS:3) (no ~rgro juror~); Neal ''· Delall'are. 10:) l'. S. :ml (lSSll ) (no 
:\cgro juror .:): Straurhr "· Jl' est Virgiuia, 100 ll. S. :;o:; (li'SOJ (no 
:\<'gro jmon.:). Th<' r<'mnind r r of tiH• ra~<'H invoiv<• ~rvPrr limJ lal ion of :1 
mino rit)··~ pnrtiripatio!l b)· tokc•n inriuHion: Sims v. Ueorgia. ;JS9 l l . t::'. 
-!U.J. (HHii) (~q?;rors con~titu t i Pg 2-t.4% of th<' taxpayer:; lirnit ('d to 4 . 7 ~~ 
of thos1• on tlw gra nd jm)· list); Jones .v. Georyia, :;sg ll. ~. 2-1 ( 19fi71 
(;\r·gro< '" rom;tit uting 19.7% of iiH' ta xpny<'r~ limit ed to 5.0'{ of those· 
on tlw jury Ji , t ): Whitus v. (ieoruia. :;x:i U. S . .5-!5 (lOtii) (:\cgroc•-.: 
eonstituti ng :Zi .l % of thr tn>.p:1yers limit rcl to 9.1 °1, of th e• gmncl jm~· 
wn m· : Cassel/ , .. 'Pe~·as. :l:lf) U. t-'. 2~2 (1!:11)0) (lin1it:liion of onr ~l'~ro 
juror on rac h patH'!): Smith\' . 1'c.ws. :) 11 U . S. 1:2S ( 19 HI); (5 ;\<•gr() 
grand juror~ in a 7-~· c·::r pPriod) . 
< Thr Di~trict C'omt nolt•d that tlw numhc•r of i\frxica n-Anwrir::u1s 011 
the gram! jur~· might havP lwPn highrr Jwcl it not hl'Pn for thl' inability of 
thr f'hrrilf, a J\lrxieaJt-Auwric:lll, to locnk four· of thr origitllli mrmhrrH or 
th<' arm.'' \l'ho \l'rrr :\fr xi rn n-A mPrirnn. :l84 F. Snpp. 79, 8:3. ll uckr 
'1' (':"\:1 ,; IH\\' . nin P of tl\(' 1:2 grand juror~ mn~t <'OIH'IIr before :Ill indirtmelt( / 
•·an ht• Jll'<'~t' lll('d . Trx. Co<l•· ('rim. l'ror. Art. 20.19 (19t:iiil. _/ 
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) 
(one Negro juror in 24 years)· 
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 u.s: 584 (1958) 
(one Negro JUror ~n 18 years); 
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Mexican-American. In the ye~,tr in which r~pondent w:u~ 
indicted, 52.5% of the persons op the grand jury list were 
Mexican-American. In ~ddition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of the judges. That these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials. 6 
The most significru1t fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion , is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court. 
ante, at 11- 14, the jury commission has the opportUJ)ity to 
o I do not ~uggr~t. , of I 'Our~e, that the mere fact that ).1Irxil·an-
Americnns constitutr a majorit~· in Hildago Count~· is dispositi\'C' . There 
are mnny communitieR in which , by virtue of historical or otlwr rca~on~, 
a mnjority of the populntion may not be able at n particttlnr t.ime to 
rontrol or ~ignificant.Jy inAurnce political deci~ions or thr, way thr s~·stem 
operates. Sec Tul'ner v. Fouche, su7>ra. But no one cnn contend st>riously 
thnt Hild11go County is such n. community. The cla~sic . ituation in whieh 
a "minority group" ma~· r;ull'(•r discriminntion in a community is where 
it Is "rclcgat ('([ to ... a position of political powcrlc~snPss." Son Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973) . Here the Mexican-
Americans are not politirnlly "powcrle;:s"; they are the mn.joritarian 
politica.J olrmcnt of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect 
tmd prot ect their own. 
Nor do I :m~gP~t that pN~ou::; in positions of power cnn nC'ver be 
;;howu to lmv1• di~c· riminntcd ngainst othrr mrmbrrs of the "amr ethnic 
or r:tl'ial gmnp. T 1\'0ttld hold o11ly that m;pondrnt!s stati~tiral cddence, 
wii hout more, is m;;nffirirnt to proye a elnim of dis1•rimina(j{)lt in this cuse. 
I 
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identify in advance those potA>ntial jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstancPs, where Mexican-Amc•ricanEJ 
,control both the selection of jurors and the political process. 
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratie 
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminatP against him and other Mexican-Americans. As 
Judge Garza observed. "If people in charge can choose whom 
they want. it is unlikely they will discriminate against themft 
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That in<.lividuals are more likely to discrimina.te in favor of. 
than against. those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defenda.nt. has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. ::-lee 
Straudcr v. West l'irg1:nia, 100 U. S., at 309. Were it not for 
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of ' 
their own class. there would be no reason to ' suppose that a 
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons 
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate com-
j)]aint by crimillal defendants of that race. Only thl:' in-
dividuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain. 
Ill Akins v. Texas, supra, where appa.rently no Negro was on 
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel, 
~he Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to 
brand officPrs of thr court with discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory pr.actice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an css0ntial element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness Oil 
tiH' part of the judicial ann of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not light~y he coticluded that officprs of the courts discte• 
• 
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gard this accepted standard of justice." 325 U. S., at 
400-401. 
· With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty but 
also their likely inclination to assure fairness to Mexican-
Americans. 7 
c 
It matters litt.le in this case whether such judicially notice-
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
outset or as rebutting it after it, was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
preseilting proof or by calling attention to faets subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys-
tE>matic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here,. respondent produced statistics showing tha.t Mexican-
Americans-while substantially represented on the grand jury • 
lists-were not represented in numbers proporti ~~..f?':'-n:;-;;e:7.m::-:.,...C~---:::;. 
share of the total population. The responded by pre-
senting the testimony of the · ge who appointed the grand 
jury commissioners. er facts. such as the presence of 
Mexican-America1 n a majority of the elective positions of 
the county, e1 red the record through judicial notice. The 
gether with the facts noted by the District Court, 
satisfy the State's burden of pr~duction-even 
~I agree with MH . .ft:sTIC~<; MAHSHALL~ that :,;tt>reot~ · pc•.:; <·cn-
rrnung iclentifiablr clas~<·s in our ~oriety havr no pT:l'Ce ,in the cl<' rision,; of 
thi~ Court. Thnt i-; n comprlling n•ason , in my view, not to apply 
stati;:ti<·al formulas :mel ,1ntements of conrern about discrrtionarY sclrr-
t ion proredur~-dcvrloped in wholly different cirrumsta~ccs, sc:e n. 4, 
wpra~to the rrspondent's claim of discrimination ag11in ~ t Mexican-





Rider, p. 10, n.7, 1st • (Casteneda) 
Cf} . 
M~ Just1ce Marshall views the 
Mexican-Americans of Hidalgo County as a "minority 
group" and suggests that these Mexican-Americans may 
have adopted "the majority's negative attitude towards 
the minority," much as "many Jewish prisoners [in Nazi 
concentration camps] adopted the values and behavior 
patterns of their Gestapo guards." Ante, at 3. 
The citizens of Hidalgo County, both Mexican-American and 
Anglo, may be more than a little astonished by this comparison. 
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assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise 
to such a burden. Accordingly, at ·the close of the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Rtate had "deliberately and systematically den [ied I to mem-
bers of [respondent's class] the right to pa.rticipat<> as jurors 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. R~. at 
628- 629. The District Court founcl that the judge and jury 
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against 
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least. 
that finding was not clearly erroneous." 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.c, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not present/ 
ing more evidence than it did. But until today's uccision one 
n~ay doubt whether many lawyers. familiar with our cases 
would have thought that respondeut's sta.tistics. under· tlw 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County. 
w~~re: even a.rguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
temritic discrimina.tion. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on tlw basis of inferences from 
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the lev<'r'S 
~ 2\"othing in this ca~P remotely re~embles thr stark discrimination in 
Gomillion and Yick Wo. Nor do the sta.tistics in this cn~e approach the 
degree of cxcluf'ion thnt has charactrrized the ca~,;es in !which we hn,·(• 
previou,;l~· found grand. jury di~crimination. See n. a. SU7JI'U. In this ('ili'C, 
in the yeflr in which the rrspondcnt was indicted, 52.5%, of the J:>eri'on~ on 
the gmnd jury li:sts werP Mexican-AmPrican. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupation with the disparity of reprc~entation of Mcxican-Amcrirnns 
in the tot.al popul11tion and on thr grnnd-jury lists, the Court lost'S >"ight of 
the ronl'titutionnl :shmdard. Hf'spondNtt has no right ' lo "proportinn:d 
reprc~Sentfltion" of .Mrxi(':tn-Arnf'rirnns, Carter v . . hp-y Cmmn'u. a9fi !J. R .. 
nt 339. He has on!~' the right "to require thllt the State not ddiberatdy 
and sysfemntically den~· to I Mexicnn-Americans] the right to pnrticipntr 
as · jurors .in the :Himini~tration of jm;tiec." Alcxa.nder, 405 U. S., at 
62-629. 
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of pow<'r in this rrmot<' border eounty arc ma.nipulaf,ing 
them to discriminate "against themselvc·s.'' Tn contrast, the 
judges on the scene. the state judge who appoill tr·d thr jury 
com m is ioners and presidf'd ovC'r rcspondrn t's trial and the 
P n i ted Statrs District J udgr-both MPxican-:\nwricans and 
fn 111 il iar with the community- perceived 110 basis for r<>spond-
f'nt's claim of invidious discrimination. 
l t "'f'C'ms to me that the Court today. in rejcctiiig tlw Dis-
t ril"t Court's finding that no such discrimination took plae<', 
l,;lf: f'IT<' d grievously. I would reinstate the judgmf'Ilt of the 
l )jq rict Court. 
IYl~K 1 8 1977 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and 
Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the sta.te and federal 
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
sented on the grand jury lists; second. the testimony of the 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts judi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political 
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority i11 
Hidalgo Cou11ty. 
The Court today considers it dispositive that the lack of 
proportional representation of Mexican-Americans on the 
grand jury lists in this county would not have occunw1 if 
jurors were selected from tlw population wholly at random. 
But one may agnJc that the disproportion did not occur by 
chance without agreeing that 1t resulted from purposeful 
invidious cliscrimination. rn my vie·w, the circumstances of 
this unique case fully support the District Court's fi.11diug 
that the statistical disparity--the basis of today's deci-
sion-is more likely to have stemmed from neutral causes 
than from a11y intent to discriminate against Mexican-
Americans. 1 
1 , \ ~trong l':t~t· ma,· he mad<· that claun~ of gr:tnd jnrv d1srriminntion 
75-1552-DISSENT 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
A 
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon- .. 
strate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely 
by showing that the procedure for selecting grand jurors 
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the 
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so 
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinc-
tions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the 
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent 
decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 51G 
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the State fore-
goes the institution of the grand .fury and proceeds aga.inst him 
instead through prosecutorial information, as many States pre-
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-119 (HJ75). 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Ji:qutll 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in n 
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West l!irg1:na, 100 
ttre not cogniz~tbk• on frderal hnbeas rorpu~ aftPr Stone v. Pou•ell.- l i. ~ . 
- ( 1970). In Stone we lwlcl · that "whrre the State hn~ provid<·d au 
opportunit y for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendmrnt elnir11 , a 
~t:t.t(' pri~oner ma~· not. be grautPd frdPntl hnbe:u< corpn~ rPlief on 11r(' 
ground t.hat. c vickncP obtained in an tllll'Onstitutionnl 8e!lrl'h or ~Pi7.tii'P 
wa.~ introduced :1t hi~ trial." !d .. at - . Unlike the pri~on<'r in Stoll e. 
who l'Ould complain that hi~ ronviet ion rr,;tl'd on evidPncC' t:tiutrd hy 
Fourt.h Am(·ndment violation~ :~nd could a"k for n nc•w trial wii h that. 
L·viden('C n:-.clucl~·d , tltt> pri,mwr in · thi~ rn~r ch;t.lleng(' ,.; only 1'l1c now ntool 
cldrrmination ),~· tht> grand jur~· that thrre w;ts :,;uHicicnt ca1t"P to proePcd 
to trial. He point" io no fhn1· in tlw trial itself. A~ in Stolle, the incrr-
wcnlal bcnrftt ol' t·xtrnding h;tbr;ts ('Ol'llUH a" a means of correding tlli<'Oll -
stitutionul grand jury "rlectwn pro('rclures might be viewed as "ou1weiglwd 
h~r the acknowlrdged eosts to other value, vital to a rational system of 
criminnljnstice." ld ., at -. 
Hut aR tbi. i~~tH' was uot addres8rd below and was not briefrd or Hrgucd 
tn this Cuurt , it would be inappropriate to n'~ulvc it 1n i hi ;; c·a ~e . 
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U.S. 303 (1880), this Court has held that a criminal defend .. 
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex-
cluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comrn'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 287 (1950); Akins v. 'Pexas, 325 U. S. 398, 403- 404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right 
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro-
ceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth 
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-
cable, a defendant need only show tha.t the jury selection 
procedure "systematically exclude [s] distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative 
thereof." I d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chal-
lenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
2 It may be that nondiscriminatory methods of selection will , over time, 
result. in a represcntativP grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Cornm'n, 396 
tJ. S., at 330. But the Fourbeenth Amendment does not mandate that 
result. Nothing would prevent a Stnte for example , from seeking to assure 
informed decisionmaking by rrquiring that all grand jurors be lawyers 
familiar with the criminal law; and if that requirement should result in 
subsiantial uuder-rcprcsrntation on grand juries of some segment~; of the 
eommunity in some nrens of the Stnte, the Fourteenth Amendment wot~ld 
~1ot render 1 he selection pl·ocess unconstitutional. 
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Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly 
mandated ill our rpcent decisions in Washinoto11 v. DaV1:s, 426 
'U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitam. Hous-
ing Development Corp.,- U. S.- (1977). In Arlington 
Heights we said : 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis. 426 
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it rPsults in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purposP is rPquit·<>d 
to show a violatio11 of the Equal Protection Clause .... " 
-U.S., at-. 
We also identified the following standards for rcsolvil1g is:-:U('I! 
o'f discriminatory i11tent or purpose : 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of i11tent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds othet· than race. emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Y ick lV o v. Hop-
lcins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick W o, impact alone is not determinative. and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. S., at ~ • 
(!footnotes omitted). 
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.3 This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Lo11isiana, 
405 U.S. 625 (19'72), whrrc we statrd: 
"The Court has 11ever announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a fa.ctual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes i11 to account all pos· 
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
3 Although Davis a.nd Arlington Heights make clear that proof of dis~ 
criminatory intent is required and that proof of impact m· efl'c<.'t alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognizE' in Arlington Heights that. a l e~~er burdE'n 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "B0eause of Llw 
nature of the jur~' selection task ... we have permitted a finding of con-
stitutional violation even when the stati~tical pattern does not approach 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., at - n. 13. A~; one illm;-
tration, we cited Tnmer v. Fmtche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) . 
In Tnrner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constJtutcd HO% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list,. 
The Court found that the disparity between those figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclo8e corrective action by a federal court. !d., 
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isola.tion. Turuer 
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculin.r sy~teru of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointu1 
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The graud .imy, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of thi~ sysl<>rn 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the studrnt~ in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred 
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, Wl 
were all of the members of the jury commission. Tlw District Cou rt 
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been syHtem-
a.t.ically excluded from the grand juries through token inclu~ion." ld., at 
352. It was against this background of JX'I'vnsivc discrimination that the 
Court found thnt even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro fl'JH'C'~<' llf a-
tion was the product of continued, purposeful di~crimination. 
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S., at 338-3~~9, isolat0d 
proof that for 12 ~·0ars no 1\egro had b0rn aprointecl to the jury eommiH-
-sion of a predominnntly Negro co1mly was found insufficient, sf :mding 
alone, ~o C's lablish discriminatory iutrnt. 
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of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here1 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for Lhe 
selection procedures themselves we1:e not racially neu~ 
tral. .... " 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one 
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 pcrsonf< on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. frl., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining thac 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
for discrjmination" was the Court satisfied that the burdC'n 
should shift to the State, I d., at 630.4 
·~The Court.'s reliance on "the opportunity for discrimin:ltlon" notrd 
,in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. Tlw Conrt has lwlcf 
repeatedly that the Texas system of selecting gra.n.d jurorH by t be us(· or 
jury commissioners i~ "fair on its face and capable of being utilized wit fl-
out. discrimination ." Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954) ;· 
'accord, Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 (1940). The '·subjectivity " or 
the selection system cuts in f:wor of tl1e State where, as I1erc, ti1osc wJw 
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person 
claiming discrimination. See text infra. 
Apart from Alexander and Turner, o>ee n. 3, supr-a., thi::; Comt h:~:, 
Rusta.iucd rlaims of gr:md jury discrimination, in two ~ituatio11~. Mo~t of 
! he case." involvP !otnl rxclusion of minorities from participation on grand 
jnriP.": Reece v. Oeoroio, :350 U. S. 85 (1955) (no Negro jmnrH i11 li'-
ycar~): l!ernondez v. Texas, :147 U.S. 475 (1954) (no Mexi('an-Am,.ricat .l 
juron. in 25 year~); Pattorn v . Mississippi. 3:32 U.S. 463 (1947) ~nu ~~·p;1o 
jurnrs in :30 .n·ar~); Hill 1·. Texas. :316 P. 8. 400 (1942) (no ~cgru 
grand jmurs in 1() .nar,; or morr); !'terre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. :35-1, 
(19:34) (no ;\'cgro r~rand jmor~ in 40 years); Hale v. Kenturky , ::;m 
U. IS . fiJ:{ (Htl~) (no ?\t·gro .iuror."); Norris v. Alabama, '294 1J. S. 
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex~ 
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing undcrrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such f other I circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlingtou 
Heights,- U. S., at-. 
B 
ln this case, thr following critical facts are beyond disp11te : 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three' 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictnwnt. 
including the foreman, were Mexican-Americal1,5 and seven 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were 
5N7 (19:55) (no Ne>g;ro juror~ in a "long number'' of yrar~); Nvu!'rs v. 
Alabama, 192 ll. S. 226 (1904) (no Negro jurors); Carter v. 'l'f'.m~. 177 
C S. 44:2 (1900) (no Negro jurors); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 l 1• S. 110 
(JNS;j) (uo N<·gro juror~); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. ;j/0 (l~NO) (110 
\Trgro juror-;); 8trauder Y. ·west Virginia, 100 U. S. 30:J (lK!-.0} (11o 
\Tegro juror:;). Tbr rrmainder of tlw case,; involve ~ev<•re limitntio11 of a 
miiwrity'~ pnrticipat ion by tokrn inclu ·ion: 8irns v. Georoia. ;~~D \'. t'. 
-104 (19fi7) (Nrgroe::; C'On~titnting 24.4% of the taxpayer~ limitPd to 4.7c1r 
of 1ho.'e on th<· grand jury list); Jones v. Gcoroia, ;{89 U. S. :24 (.HHi'i'l 
(:'\rgro<·~ con~titntiug 19.7% of thr taxpayrn; limitrd to 1).0~ of tho,-e 
on tlw jury list) ; Whitus v. Georgia, :385 U. S. 545 (19117) (1\egro<'' 
constituting :27.1% of thr t:txpa.'·crH limited to 9.1% of tlw grand jur.'· 
vrnire); Anwld v. North Carolina. :m1 U. S. 773 (191)~) (on<· :\q;ro 
juror iu 24 year~); Eubank8 v. Loui8iana. 356 U. S. 5i-:4 (1951'1) (<)JH' 
:'\<•gro juror in 11-\ yrar"); Cassell v. Tc.'Cas, 3:39 U.S. 2H:Z (HJ50) (lirnih-
tion of 011(' :'\<•gro juror Oll pae h pallel); Smith v. Texas. :311 l 1. :-1. u;; 
(J9-Hl) ; (5 ~egro grand jurors m a 7-yr:tr pniod). 
r. Thr J)i~t riel Comt noted thnt t IH' rHunber of :Vfrxiran-Anwrir:m~ 011 
the gr:1nd jury might· hnvr IJP(•n highrr had it not been for thr inability of 
thr sheriff, a 1\Jexican-Amrnran, to lornt'l~ four of the origiwrl rnrmbrr" of 
the :r.rrny who wC'n' Mrxiran-Americnn. 3S4 F. Supp. 79, 83. Undrr 
Trxns law, ninr of thr 12 grand juror" mu"t conrur brforr nn indi'rtmen( 
c·an h<• Jli'C'"rll!Pd . Tr-x. Co<ll' Crim . Proe. Art. 20.19 (19fifi) 
.. 
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Mexican-American. In the ye~r in which respondent WM 
indicted, 52.57c of the persons on the grand jury list were 
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of th~ judges. That these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surpnsing in a community where 
O«J'n of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District J uclge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in tlw Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has invoh·ed a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the JUry 
selection process, wa held hy a white clectorat<> and white 
officials.6 
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored m the 
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury connnis ioner~:; 
were Mexican-American. The JUry commissiou 11:; the' body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurot':'i. 
Und<.'r the Texas selC'ction system, as noted by tlw Court, 
rmte, at 11-14, tlw jur·y commission has the opportunity to 
0 J do not ~\II!:!?;<'HI, of rour~r, that th<· nwrr faet th:1t :\fP\H';tll-
Amerirans ronf'tllutc a majority in Hildago ounty ~~ di,;po:<it11·r. There 
arp mnny communitirs in whirh, by virtur of lu~torical or othPr rca:-on,, 
·1 mnjority of the population may not be able nt a parti('ulnr tim<· to 
r-ont rol or l'i~nifirnntly infturiH.'<' pohtiral drri•JOnl' or the w:1~ t h<' ~y>:tem 
oprratr8. Rrc 'l'urner v. F'ourhc, .supra. But no onr Pan <'Ontrnd ~<'riously 
I hn t. Illldago County i~ such n. rommunit~·. Til(' rla~.-<ic l"Jt ua tion in whrrh 
n "minority group" mn~· ~uiTrr d1~ermunat ion Ill a <'Olllllllllllt~ 1,.. where 
tt 11' "rrlrgnted to . . a positiOn of political powPrl<'>'• IH'~"·" Still Antonio 
SchoolDi.~tnct \ . Rodrif}uez, 411 F., J, 21\ (19i:;). Ilrrr thr ::\fp-.;wnn-
Americans arc not politically "powrrle•s"; tlH·~ arc tlw maJOflt.'lnnn 
political rlrmrnt of thr commun1ty, w1th dPmon,.tra1<'d <'ap:llHlit\ to cl<'ri 
and protect. their own. 
Nor do I -<u~gr·st that pN.·on~ 111 po,..1t10n~ of powPr <':Ill n<•n•r· lw 
.-hown to h:t,.,. di,<·rillliJJ:tl< ·d again"t otla•r m<·mlH•rs of thr ,-amr <•thmr 
or ra<·ial gronp. 1 \IOUld hold onl~· th·tt r<·•pond<•JJt\ "talbiH·al ('lidc•n<·, 
IYitlHllll IIIOr<'. is Jll"llfJif-H•rtt to pHl\.1' a f•l:tnn of (li,;<•ri rqin:tlion !11 tht" C':t!jQ, 
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identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, where Mexican-Americans 
control both the selection of jurors and the political process, 
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic 
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As 
Judge Garza observed, "If people in charge can choose whom 
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against them-
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor· of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. See 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S .. at 309. Were it not fol' 
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of 
their own class, there would be no reason to suppose that a 
jury selection process that systematically excluded persOilS 
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate com-
plaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the in-
dividuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain. 
In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was on 
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury pane], 
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to 
brand officers of the court with discriminatory intent : 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a. 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness 011 
thP part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly bP concluded that officers of the courts discre-
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gard this accepted standard of justice/' 325 U. S .• at. 
400-401. 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioner .. 
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty hut 
also their likely inclination to assure fairnes to .Mf'xican-
America.ns.7 
c 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notiee-
able facts as the composition of the grand j m·y commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's pr·ima facie case nt Uil' 
outset or as rebutting it after it, was established by statistieal 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limiLI'd 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to lhe 
State. Once tlw State has produced evidence- either hy 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subjeet !o 
judicial notiee- the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, l'esponclent produced statistics showing that 1\!Icxican-
America.ns--while substantially represented on the gratH] jur~· 
list _ ,verc llOt represented in numbers proportiona t<• to 1 heir· 
7 ,\lH. ,]Us'J'H.:E 1\L~HSITALT. \'lew~ t·he :vJt•x Jcnn-Anwncan .-: of Hld:tl).!:o 
C'ount.'· ~'" n "minorit)· ~roup" :tnd ~ugge~t~ that ilwse :Vfexi<·nn-AnH·ri(':Jil 
ma.1· han· adopt <·d ''1lw m:~jonty's negat1ve :111 it udf.' toward:- I ht· minorir.\' ... 
much a~ "man)· Jrwil'h priHonf•rs [in ?\lazi eoncPJJI.ration <'Hillps I adopl< ·<l 
flw ralu<·~ and lwhav10r pattrm~ of thrir C:oc;tapo !:(ll:trcb." Alll<'. al :{, 
T hP e i1JZ< 'II~ of Hidnlgo County, both MPxican-Amrricnu ami Ang.lo , lll :l,l' 
I>•· mon· than :1 ht.tlP nstoml:'hed by this comparison 
1 ~tg rrr with :\JiL .fUtr.I'ICE :'vfABSHALL thn1 ;;terPOt~·pp,; (•()Jl('('i'l\illg· 
idc•nt ifia hi<' dussrs in ou r ,-orll'h' h:l\'<' no plarP Ill llw clP"i~ion- qf 
f hi" Court. Th:ll 1~ a <·om pPlling, rea:,:on , 111 m~· Yirw, not f o a PI''·'· 
.statist!(':\] formulas and ~tat ('ffi<'ll l ~ of conct•rn a bout di,.<·n•t IOll:t r~· sc•lP<'·· 
t ion procrdun·- dPYc•lop<'d m wholly ditfPr<>nt cirrum,;tnn<'e~. ~<'<' 11. 4, 
upra -to the rr~ponclrllt '~ clnim of discrimination agamol l\fpxi<·an· . 
• t\l,n.<'ricnn~ in I h1~ uni<[llP ;\1<'XIr<ll1-Atl1Pl'll'll ll rotl)Jli111Jlly 
'15-155~~DISSENT 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 11 
!!hare of the total population. The State responded by pre~ 
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury commiSSioners. Other facts, such as the presence of 
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of 
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court. 
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even 
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give risf' 
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that thC' 
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to melll-
bers of [respondent's class] the right to participate as jurors 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 40.5 U. S .. at 
628-629. The District Court found that the judge and jury 
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against 
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very kast, 
that finding was not clearly erroneous.8 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the statC' iutro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not prf'SC'nt-
ing more evidence than it did. But until today's decision one 
may doubt whether ma.ny lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
8 Nothing in this case remotely rt>sembles the stark discrimmation m 
Gomillion ~tnd Yick Wo. Nor do the st~ttistics in this case approach the 
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have 
previou><ly found grand jury discrimination. Sec n. 3, supra. Iu thi:; r~tse, 
in the year in which the respondent was indicted, 52.5% of the per~ons on 
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. ln its 
preoccupation with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans 
in the tot~1l population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loses sight of 
the constitutional stand:ucl. HE'~pondent ha~ no right to "proportional 
representation" of MC'xican-AmPriean~, Carter v. Jury Com111'11, ;:1!)6 U.S., 
at 339. He has only the n~ht "to require that the State not deliberately 
and systematically deny to [Mexican-Americans] the right to participate 
as juror:; in the administration of justicC'" AleJ;ander, 405 U. S., at 
6~8-629. 
'75-1552- DISSENT 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
would have thought that respondent's statistics. under the 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County, 
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers 
of power in this remote border county a.re manipulating· 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judg<'S on tlw scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
colllmissioners and presided ov<'r respondent's trial and the 
Puit<'rl Stat0s District .Judge- both Mexican-Americans and 
fantiliar with th0 community-perceived no basis for respond-
ellt's claim of invidious discrimination. 
It S<'ems to me that the Court today, lll reJecting tlw Dis-
trict Court's finding that no such discrimination took place, 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join~ dissenting. 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evideuce 
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal 
1Jl'Oceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
st'ntcd on the grand jury lists; second. the testimony of tlw 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operatrd in this case; and third. the facts judi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the politieal 
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in 
.Hidalgo County. 
The Court today considers it dispositive that the lack of 
proportional representation of Mexican-Americans 011 thr 
grand jury lists in this county would uot have occurrc'cl if~ 
jurors were selected from the population \wholly at random. 
But Olll' may agree that the disproportioi\ did not occur by ~ 
chauee without agreeing that It resul~ti from purposeful 
invidious discrimination. ln my vi0w, the circumstances of 
this unique cas0 fully support the District Court's fiudiug 
that the statistical disparity-the basis of today's deci-
sion-is more likdy to havr stemmed from neutral causes 
than from any intent to discriminate against Mexican-
Amt'ricans. 1 
1 A .~ tro11g c:t"t' ma1 he rn:tdP that rhtlllL" of p;r:md ,inrv ch~rrimination 
75-1552-DI SENT 
2 CASTANEDA v PARTIDA 
A 
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon-
strate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely 
by showing that the procedure for . selecting grand jurors 
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the 
identifiable group to which he bPlongs." Ante, at 11. By o 
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutioual distinc-
tions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the 
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent 
decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand JUry does not apply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U .• '. 51 G 
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the ~tate fore-
goes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds agaillst him 
instead through prosecutorial informatiou, as many States pre-
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-119 (1075). 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
J inc of cases beginning with Strauder v. vVest T!1'rgina, 100 
:trr not cogniz:1 hl<• on f<'!kral habt>a~ <'orpu~ a ft!•r .'itonr ". Pm<'ell, - l i. :-\ . 
- (Hl7G). In Stone '''<' ]l('ld that "whcn• tlw Rtat<' ha~ prcn·id<'d au 
opportunity for full :tnd fair litigation of :1 Fourth Amrndmrnt <·lnim, a 
~1:1 t t' pri;;onl'!" mar not bt• gr:t nt !'d frdN:tl hn b!'a" l'Orpu" rrl it'!" on t IH' 
gmund that r,·idt'lll'l' obtained Ill an ltlH'Olli<titutional ~rarl'h or ~(· iwrP 
,,·n;; introdm·P<.I at lu~ trial." !d., at - . l.'nlikr thp pri,mwr in Stone . 
who rould l'Oillplnin that h1~ <·mwirtion n•::<tNl on Pvid<'n<·(• l:tint<'d h.1 
Fourth AnH•iHlntt•nt l'iolation~ :mel could a::<k for n rre11· trial with that. 
l'vid<·rH·t• P:~ochr<lt•d, t ht• pri~om•r in t hi~ ca~r challrnp;l'~ only t hl' 11011' mooL 
detNmination h)· tht• grand JIIr.'· that thrrr wa;; ~nfli('Il'nt c;~tr~l' to prO('<'l'd 
to trial. He polllt::< to no flaw irr tlw trial It~<'ll'. A~ in Stoll!'. thl' inrrr-
llll'lltal lwnf'fit of (•Xtendmg Jr:ilJl':l~ ('Ol'Jlll" H:< :t ITll'llllH Of C'OI'I'('('t lllg lnl(•()JI-
tititutionnl grand jur~ · ·'<'ic<·trmr pro<·<'durc::; might hr virll·cd a14 '·outwrigiH'd 
h~· til<' :trknowlrdgNI l'O;;t::; 1o other values vital to n. rationnl ;o;y~tcm of 
crimin[ll .instire." !d., at -
Tlut a>' thi:-; i~~u<' wa;; not addrP::<O'rd below ami was not brrrfrd or argur<.I 
til thi~ Court , 11 wonltl I)(' in:1ppropriate to n•>;oln· it 111 thi>i <·n~<.· 
• 
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U.S. 303 (1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defend~ 
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex~ 
eluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Cornrn'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282. 287 (1950); Akins v. 1'exas, 325 U. S. 308, 40~404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantia.} 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, sec, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community.2 The right 
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro-
ceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth 
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975) . 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli~ 
cable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection 
procedure "systematically exclude[s] distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative 
thereof." !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chal-
lenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
2 It mar be that nondiscriminatory methods of selection will, over time, 
rr~ult, in n reprr.~ent a tive grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Cornrn'n, 396 
U. S., nt, 330. But the Fourt,eenth Amendment docs not mandate that 
result. Nothing would prevent. a Statr for example, from seeking to assure 
informed decisiomnaking by rrquiring that all grand jurors be lawyers 
familinr with the crirmn:1l law; and if that. requiremrnt should result in 
substantial und<>r-repre~rntation on g;rnnd juries of some segments of the 
<'ommunity in i'orne arens of the S tat e, the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not rrndcr the :;election pl·orr;;s unconsti tut ional. 
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Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washingto11 v. Davis, 426 
11. S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Meb·opolitanHous-
ing Development Corp.,- U. S.- (Hl77). Tn Arlington 
Heights \Ve said : 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis. 426 
U. S. 229 (1976). made it elear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it rPsults in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is r·equir·('(] 
to show a violatiou of the Equal Protection Clause .... " 
-U.S., at-. 
We also idc11tified the following standards for resolving issues 
of discriminatory intent or purpose : 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of iJJtent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,' ' 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other· than race. emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the goveming 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yiclc Wo v. Hop-
lcins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yiclc W o, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidf'ncE>." - U. S., at ~ 
(•footnotes omitted). 
75-1552-DISSENT 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis~ 
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.3 This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in A.lexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. A. 625 (1972), whPre \\'e stated: 
"The Court has 11evcr· announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, ratlwr, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary i11 each case that takes into account all pos-
sible c>xplanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
a Alt.hough Davis and Arlington Heights make clear that proof of dis~ 
criminatory intrnt. is required and that proof of impact or ell'ect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights tl1at. a le~~rr burd<>n 
may be appropriate in the contrxt of jury selection. "Br<'aU~r of tlte 
11ature of the jury selection task ... we have permitted a finding of eon-
s1itutional violation rvrn when the stati~tica[ pattern does not appr·oach 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d. , at.- n. 13. As one illm:-
tration, we cited Tumer '"·Fouche , 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes const1tutcd ()0°{-
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list . 
The Court found that the disparity between tho~e figurr:;; was not flO 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. Td., 
at 350. But. the Court did not view the sta.tistics in isola.twn. 'l'urner 
was not. a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's prculin r system of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appoint< cl 
jury commissioners, who in turn ~elected the grand jury. The grand j11ry, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this sys(<'Jll 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the ~tudcnt~ in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transfcrn·d 
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were whit<', :li'l 
were all of t.he members of the jury commission. Thr District Court 
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negrors had brrn ~ystem­
atically excluded from the grand JUries through tokrn incluHion." !d., Hl 
352. It was against this background of prrvaHive cli~crimination that tlw 
Court. found that even a new grand jury list w1th 3i% Nrgro rrpn•,pnta-
tion was the product of rontinucd, purpo~eful di~crimination. 
By contrast, in Carter v . .!ury Comm'n. 396 U. S., at a:~s-3:m. i~olntcd 
-proof tha.t. for 12 years no Krgro had hr<'n appointrcl1o the jury <·ommiH-
'Sion of a prrdominnntl~· Nrgro eonnty was found insufficient, standing 
alone, to establish di~rriminatory intrnt 
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of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking herc
1 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves wet:e not racially neu-
tral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one 
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. lrl. , at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
11striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in .isolation , to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
for discrjmination" was the Court satisfied that the burrkm 
should shift to the State, !d., at 630.4 
·~The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted 
,in Alexander, ante, at 11- 14, is clearly misplaced. The Conrt has lwkf 
repeatedly that the Texas system of selecting gran,d juror~ by the u~c· or 
jury commissioners i~ "fair on its face and capable of being utili zed wit fl -
out discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas , 347 U. S. 475, 478- 479 (1954) ;· 
'accord, Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 ( 1940). The "snbjPclivit y" of 
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here, t hose wi10 
control the selection process a.re members of the same class as the pcrsorr 
claiming dis<'rimination. See text infra. 
Apart from Alexander and Turner, see n . 3, supm, tlus Comt ha H 
sustai n<'d claims of gr~md jury discrimination, in two situation ~. .\Iosl of 
the case,, involve tota l exclusion of minorities from participation on gra nd 
juriP~: Reece v. Geu1pia, :150 U. S. 85 (1955) (no Negro jmor~ 111 11\ 
_Y{';\r~): ll emandez v. Texas. :347 0. S. 475 (1954) (no lVlexic-:uH\m,.ricall 
,iuron· in 25 ye:m): Patton Y . Mississippi. 3:32 0. S. 463 (1947) lllu ~\Pp:Io 
jurnr~ in :30 ~·<·nrs): /h/1 v. Texas. a i6 TT. S. 400 (1942) (no :--Jcgro 
grand juror~ in 16 .n·ar,; or morr): P~er-re v. Luuiswna, :306 P. S. ~)5-t 
(1m3'!) (no :\'l'gro grand jnror~ m 40 y(•ar~): Hair v. Kentur·k y, :30:3 
U 8 . f\]:) (HJ>lK) (no NC'gro juror~): Norris v. Alaba'ma, 2.94 U. 8. 
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and A le.t~ 
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing und(•rrep-
resentation of a populatioll group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other I circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
Heights,- U. S., at-. 
B 
1 n this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; thrcr 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amel·-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were ·Mexican-American," and st•vrtl 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt wcrr 
5~7 (19:35) (no NPgro juror~ in a. " long numbpr'' of )'ear~); Uouers v. 
Alabama, 192 V. S. 226 (1904) (no Negro jurors); Carter v. 'J'r.m~. 177 
r. S. 44~ (1900) (no ~<'!2:1'0 jurors); Bush v. Kentucku, 107 l 1• S. 110 
(JI't<:3) (no Nrgro jmor~); Neal v. Dela·ware, 108 U. S. :370 (lt<t<O) (no 
~rgro jmor~); 8trauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. :3m (1~>-:0) (no 
N Pgro juror~). Thr rrmaindPr of ihP cases involve ~evt>rc limitation of a 
miiwrity'~ pari icipat ion by tokrn inclusion: Sims v. Georoia. :3S!J \". 1:'. 
404 ( l!)(i7) ( N rgroc:~ ron~tituting 24.4% of t hP taxpayer~ lirnitrd to 4.7 '7r 
of iho~P on tbc• grand jury li~t); Jones v. Georoia, :380 U. R. 24 (HJii7) 
(::\ep;ror~ constituting 19.7% of the: taxpayer;; limited to !).0% of thoH' 
on tlw jury li'it) ; Whitus v. Georgia, :385 U. S. 545 (19H7) (1\rgrot·~ 
ron;;tiiuting 27.1 % of tlw taxpa~·erH limilPd to 9.1 % of tlw grand jur~ 
vrnircJ ; Arnold v. North Caroli'lla, :m"\ U. S. 77:3 (190-i) (otw i\('p;ro 
juror in :!4 yrars) ; Eubanks v. Louisiana. :356 U. S. 584 (1958) (<lllP 
:\f>gro juror iu 11:1 ye~1r"); Cassell v. Texas, :3:39 U.S. 21'\2 (HJ50) (lil!lit:l-
tiun of our .'-:t·ll:ro juror on earh patl<'i); Smith v. TexaR. :~11 ll. ~- 12'1 
(J9-Hl); (5 ~r·gro gmnd juror~ 111 n 7-yr:u prriod). 
5 TllC' Di~trici Court notrd thai thr number of l\Jexiran-Amcric:lliH on 
the gn1nd jury mip;hi hav<' hPr·n highrr hnd it not been for thr in:tbility of 
the :;hPritT, a Mrxiran-Amrnran, to loeat'P fonr of the original membCI':- of 
thr a.rrny who w<·n• \lcxicnn-American. 384 F. Supp. 79, 83. Undrr 
Texaii law, nillr or thr 12 gr:md juror~ Illll~i concur brforc <111 indirimcnt 
·r·:tll be prP~rniPd . Trx. C'ocl<' Crin1. Pror . Ar1 . 20.19 (19f\6) , 
.. . 
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Mexican-American. In the ye~r in which respondent wa.s 
indicted, 52.5% of the persons O)l the grand jury list were 
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of th~ judges. That these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing maj'ority, and the resulting powe1· over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
o.fficials .. 0 
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a. majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
o I do not ~uggr:st., of cour~e, that thr mrre fact that MexH'an-
Amcric:ms constitute a maJority in I-Illdago County is cli~positive. There 
nrc many commun.itics in which, by virtue of historica.l or other rca ~IJllS, 
a maJority of the population may not be able at a. pa.rtirular time to 
r·ontrol or significantly influrncr political deciHiom; or the wn~· thr system 
opern.ics. Src Turner v. Fouche, supra. But, no one cnn contend ~eriously 
thnt. Hildago County is such a. community. The clas~ic situation in which 
n "minority group" may ~>nffcr di~rriminat ion 111 a commtmity j,. where 
it. is "J·rlegated to ... a position of politicnl powpr)e."~nc:>s." San Antonio 
, chool Distn'ct v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. l, 28 (197:~). Hrre the l\.fcxicnn-
America.ns are not politically "powcrle~s "; thc·y are thr n:w.ioritarian 
polltical clement of the commtm1ty, with demon~trated eapability to elect 
and protect their own. 
Nor do I .~nggrst. that pPr~ums in position~ of powPr <'all nrver be 
shown to h:~n' dis<"rimiuat<'d against othrr meml)('r~ of the ~amr rthnir 
or n1f'inl grnup. I would hold onl~· that rC'~pond<·n l\ ~tntl~li<"nl eYidcTlf'C, 
without. !1!01'(', is insu{fi('iP!It IO !Jl'O\'(~ a !']aim Of' r{i;.;<'rilltinafiOII j!l thi;; i'Hi)Q, 
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identify in advance those potential jurors who have , panish 
surnames. fn these circumstances, where Mexican-Americans 
control both the selection of jurors and the political process, 
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic 
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As 
Judge Garza observed. "If people in charge can choose whom 
they want, it is unlikely they \vill discriminate against them-
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against. those who share their own Identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. 8ce 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S .. at 309. Were it not for 
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of 
their own class. there would be no reason to supposr that a 
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons 
of a certain racE' would bE' the basis of any l0gitimate com-
plaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the in-
dividuals excluded from jury service would have a pcn;onal 
right to complain. 
In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was on 
th0 jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel, 
tlw Court cmphasiz0d the high threshold of proof r0quin'd to 
brand officers of tlw court with discriminatory intrnt : 
"An allrgation of discriminatory practicE' in selC'cting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essC'ntial elrmcnt of 
proper judicial procrdurc- the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with JWrsons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be concluded that officers of the courts discre-
5 1552· - DI EN'r 
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gard thi accepted standard of JU tice." 325 L1• ~: .• at 
400-401. 
With all respect, 1 am compelled to . ay that thr Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury conunisgionPr~ 
of this county have disregarded not only thc•ir Rworn duty bnt 
also their likely inclination to assurr fairnrs. to MPxi<'an~ 
merican ... ' 
It matter little in this case whethrr such judicially notie<'-
able facts a. the composition of the granrl J my commission 
are viewed a defeating respondent's prima facie cast' at !hC' 
outset or as rebutting it after it, was established by sta I istical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limit<-d 
to its effect in . hifting tlH' burden of going forward to 111<· 
tatR. Once the State has produced evidence rithrr hy 
prr<;enting proof or by calling attention to facts subj<>cf to 
Judicial noticP- the only question i whether Uw rvidPnc·p 
in the n•eord is sufficient to demonstrate delibcratr and :-;y:--~-
1 em a tic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, respondent produced statistics bowing that Mt>xtc:w -
Americans- - while substantially represented on the grarHl jurv 
hst - \\'ere not rrpresentecl in numbers proportion a l<• ( o t lwir· 
1111t .' :1,.; a ' 'm1 non1~· ~?;roup'' and ,.;uggl'>'t:-; that 
n ,_,. kt\P adopt Pd •·t llf' m:1jont~ ·~ IH•gati\T :lltitudP towarrh- lllli H nl!. 
1 1ch :t~ "ma n~· .fPwi~h pn~OlH'r~ [in ::\azi conr<·ntl':ltl< c·:mtw I adopt('d 
11 (' \ ' :illll'~ :Ill(! IJPhaVlOI' pattrm;; or thl'll' GP~t:l ,.(ll:ifCb ." Alt/ (', ai :J. 
'I ll' (' JtJZ('Ii' or Jlidnlgo Count~·. both :\fP:\1 .. -AnH'I'I('[\11 and .\nglo . 111:1~· 
I. · mon· th:111 a htt!P n,;tom::-;hrd b~· compari>'Oll 
) !lp;fP(' with :\ln . All~ HAI,L that ~l<'r<'Ot.\'j)('~ !'(HI( I Ill iii[!' 
1 c•ntifinhl!' c·la,,r, ori<'I\ h:l\< no plac•c• 111 tlw d< ·I~Ion' of 
i 1i.• ( 'ourt Th:il , . <·omp<•llui!!, rrn,..on, 111 m~· \'li'\1. not to :tppl,,· 
'ati,tu·al form " a nd ,r:tl<'ll1<'111" of C'O IH'<l'll about di,c·n·ttouar~· •<'I<···~ 
II'<'"· <fp,·<·lopc·d Ill wholl! chti'C'n•nt tlrrum;;1an<'t•::-;, '<'<' 11 4, 
t hr rr;;pondi'llt ·, rl:\1111 of dl>'(' l'lll111l:l t lOll tl)l;:illht .\ r (':\J('i\11 
li" lllllrpH' \fr''\H'nn-.\tll<'fl<':i ll <'Otnllllllllh' 
21 I agree with Mr. Justice Marshall, ante, at 4, 
that stereotypes concerning identifiable classes in our 
society have no place in the decisions of this Court. 
For that reason, I consider it inappropriate to characterize the 
Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County as a "minority 
group" and on that basis to suggest that these Mexican-
Americans may have "adopt[ed] the majority's negative 
attitudes towards the minority." Ante, at 3. This type 
of speculation illustrates the lengths to which one must 
go to buttress a holding of purposeful discrimination that 
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15hare of the total population. The State responded by pre~ 
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury commissioners. Other facts. such as the presence o~ ~ 
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions o~ 
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court. 
sufficed to sa.tisfy the State's burden of production-even 
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give' rise 
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence. 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to mem-
bers of [respondent's class] the right to participate as juror~ 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S .. at 
628-629. The District Court found that the judge and jury 
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated agatnst 
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least, 
that finding was not clearly erroncous.8 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state illtro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. A11t·c, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not pres('nt-
ing more evidence than it did. But until today's ckcision one 
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
8 Nothing in this rase remotely resembles the stark discrimmntion 111 
Gomillion and Yick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this cnse npproach the 
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have 
previously found grand jury di~rrimination. Sec n.;!, supra. In this ease, j 
in the yrar in which the re~pondent was indicted, 52.5% of the persons on 
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupation with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans 
in the total population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court lose~ 1<ight of 
the constitutional standard. Hespon.dent has no right to "proportional 
representation" of l\[rxicnn-Amrri<'nn~, Carter v. Jury Cornm'n, :~06 U. B., 
at 339. He has only the right •·to require that the Stnte not deliberately 
and systematically deny to [Mexican-Americans] the right to participate 
a<i juror;; in the admini~tration of justiC'P." Alexander, 405 U. S., at 
628-629. 
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' 
would have thought that respondent's statistics. under the 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County/ 
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers 
of power in this remote border county are manipulating 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
j udgrs on the scene; the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and t,he 
Pnitcd States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
fa1niliar with the community-perceived uo basis for respond-
ent's claim of invidious discrimination. 
It sc•ems to me that the Court today, in rejecting the Dis-
trict Court's fiiHiing that no such discrimination took place, 
has NrwJ grievously. J would reinstate the judgment of the 
District Court. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal 
proceedings which shows that the 80o/o Mexican-American 
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately repre-
sented on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the 
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third, the facts judi-
cially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political 
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in 
Hidalgo County. 
The Court today considers it dispositive that the lack of 
proportional representation of Mexican-Americans on the 
grand jury lists in this county would not have occurred if 
jurors were selected from the population wholly at random. 
But one may agree that the disproportion did not occur by 
chance without agreeing that it resulted from purposeful 
invidious discrimination. In my view, the circumstances of 
this unique case fully support the District Court's finding 
that the statistical disparity-the basis of today's deci-
sion-is more likely to have stemmed from neutral causes 
than from any intent to discriminate against Mexican-
Americans.1 
1 A strong case may be made that claims of grand jury discrimination 
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The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon-
strate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely 
by showing that the procedure for selecting grand jurors 
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his ra,ce or the 
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so 
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinc-
tions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the 
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent 
decisions. 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not a,pply 
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the State fore-
goes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him 
instead through prosecutorial information, as many States pre-
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-119 (1975). 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100 
are not cogniznble on federal habeas corpus after Stone v. Powell,- U.S. 
- (1976). In Stone we held that "where the State has provided an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a. Fourth Amendment claim, a 
state prisoner may not be granted federal habC'as corpus rdief on the 
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure 
was introduced at his trial." !d., at -. Unlike the prisoner in Stone, 
who could complain that his conviction rested on evidence tainted by 
Fourth Amendment violations and could ask for a new trial with that 
evidence excluded, the prisoner in this cnse challenges only the now moot 
determination by the grand jury that there was sufficient cause to proceed 
to trial. He points to no flaw in the trial itself. As in Stone, the incre-
mental benefit of extending habeas corpus as a means of correcting uncon-
stitutional grand jury selection procedures might be viewed as "outweighed 
by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of 
criminal justice." !d., at-. 
But as this issue was not addressed below and was not briefed or argued 
in this Court, it would be inappropriate to resolve it in this case. 
75-1552,.-DISSE:tfT 
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 3 
U. S. 303 ( 1880) , this Court has held that a criminal defend-
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex-
cluded from jury service. See, e. g. , Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 287 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403- 404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable 
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial 
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970). 
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right 
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives 
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury. 
That right is simila.r to the right-applicable to state pro-
ceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth 
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). 
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-
cable, a defendant need only show tha.t the jury selection 
procedure "systematically exclude [s] distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative 
thereof." Id., at 538. But in a state case in which the chal-
lenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
2 It may be that nondiscriminatory methods of selec6on will , over time, 
result in a representative grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U. S., at 330. But the Fourt,eenth Amendment does not mandate that 
result. Nothing would prevent a State for example , from seeking to assure 
informed decisionmaking by requiring tha.t all grand jurors be lawyers 
familiar with the criminal Jaw; and if that requirement should result in 
substant ial under-representation on grand juries of some segments of the 
community in some areas of the State, the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not render the selection process unconstitutional. 
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Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly 
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous ... 
ing Development 9orp.,- U. S. - (1917). In Arlington 
fi eights we said I 
"Our decision last Term in Wa~hington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 ( 11}76), made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a. racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause .... " 
-U.S., at-. 
We also identified the following standards for resolving issues 
of discriminatory intent or purpose: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Y ick W o v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. S., at-
(footnotes omitted). 
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.8 This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
a Although Davis and Arli11gton Heights make clear that proof of dis~ 
cri.nllna,tory intent is required and that proof of impact or effect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that a lesser burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the 
nature of the jury selection task . . . we have permitted a finding of con~ 
stitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." /d., at- n. 13. As one illus-
tration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list. 
The Cou,rt found that the disparity between those figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. /d., 
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner 
was not a criminal case ; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointtd 
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred 
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, as 
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District Court 
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-
atically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion." !d., at 
352. It was against this background of pervasive discrimination that the 
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representa-
tion was the product of continued, purpo ·eful discrimination . 
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S., at 338-339, isolated 
proof that for 12 years no Negro had been appointed to the jury commis-
sion of a predominantly Negro county was found insufficient, standing 
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of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially neu-
tral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one 
of whom was a Negro ( 5 ro) ; and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. Id., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to 
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that 
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity 
for discrimination" was the Court sa.tisfied that the burden 
should shift to the State, !d., at 630! 
• The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted 
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. The Court has held 
repeatedly that the Texas system of S<'lecting grand jurors by the use of 
jury commissioners is "fair on its face and capable of being utilized with-
out discrimination." H ernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478--479 (1954); 
accord, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (194-0). The "subjectivity" of 
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here, those who 
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person 
claiming discrimination. See text infra. 
Apart from Alexander and Turner, see n. 3, supra, this Court has 
sustained claims of grand jury disrrimination. in two situations. Most of 
the eases involve total exclusion of minorities from participat ion on grand 
juries : R eece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955) (no N<'gro jurors in 18 
years); Ilernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 4-75 (1954) (no l\lexican-American 
jurors in 25 years); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947) (no Negro 
jurors in 30 years); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (194-2) (no Negro 
grand jurors in 16 years or more); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 
( 1934-) (no Negro grand jurors in 40 years) ; Hale v. K entucky, 303 
U. S. 613 (1938) (no Negro jurors); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex~ 
(lnder make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
Heights,- U.S., at-. 
B 
In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were Mexican-American/ and seven 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were 
587 (1935) (no Negro jurors in a "long number" of years); Rogers v. 
Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904) (no Negro jurors); Carter v. T exas, 177 
U. S. 442 (1900) (no Negro jurors); Bush v. K entucky, 107 U. 8. 110 
(1883) (no Negro jurors) ; Neal v. D elaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880) (no 
Negro jurors ); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880) (no 
Negro jurors). The remainder of the cases involve severe limitation of a 
minority's pa.rticipation by token inclusion: Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 
404 ( 1967) (Negroes constituting 24.4% of the taxpayers limited to 4.7% 
of those on the grand jury list ); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967) 
(Negroes constituting 19.7% of the taxpayers limited to 5.0% of those 
on the jury list); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967) (Negroes 
constituting 27.1% of the taxpayers limited to 9.1% of the grand jury 
venire); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964) (one Negro 
juror in 24 years); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. 8. 584 (1958) (one 
Negro juror in 18 years); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950) (limita-
tion of one Negro juror on each panel); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 
(1940); (5 Negro grand jurors in a 7-year period). 
5 The District Court noted that the number of Mexican-Americans on 
the gra.nd jury might have been higher had it not been for the inability of 
the sheriff, a Mexican-American, to locate four of the original members of 
the array who were Mexican-American. 384 F. Supp. 79, 83. Under 
Texas law, nine of the 12 grand jurors must concur before an indictment 
can be presented. Tex. Code Crim. Pro c. Art. 20.19 (1966). 
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Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent WM 
indicted, 52.5% of the persons on the grand jury list were 
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
p. majority of the judges. That these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
soro of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials.G 
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to 
o I do not suggest., of course, that the mere fact that Mexican-
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, 
a majority of the population may not be able at a particular time to 
control or significant.ly influence political decisions or the wa.y the system 
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which 
a "minority group" may suffer discrimination in a community is where 
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. 8. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian 
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect 
and protect their own. 
Nor do I suggest that persons in. positions of power can never be 
shown to ha.vc discriminated against other members of the same ethnic 
or racial group. I would hold only that respondent's statistical evidence, 
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of discrimination in this case. 
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identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish 
surnames. In these circumstances, where Mexican-Americans 
control both the selection of jurors and the political process, 
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic 
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As 
Judge Garza observed, "If people in charge can choose whom 
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against them-
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. See 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S., at 309. Were it not for 
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of 
their own class, there would be no reason to suppose that a 
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons 
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate com-
plaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the in-
dividuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain. 
In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was on 
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel, 
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to 
brand officers of the court with discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
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gard this accepted standard of justice." 325 U. S., at 
400-401. 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty but 
also their likely inclination to assure fairness to Mexican~ 
Americans. 7 
c 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice~ 
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys~ 
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican~ 
Americans-while substantially represented on the grand jury 
lists--were not represented in numbers proportionate to their 
share of the total population. The State responded by pre~ 
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand 
jury commissiOners. Other facts, such as the presence of 
Mexican~Americans in a majority of the elective positions of 
7 I agree with MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, ante, at 4, that stereotypes 
concerning identifiable classes in our society have no place in the decisions 
of this Court . For that reason, I consider it inappropriate to characterize 
the Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County as a "minority group" 
and on that basis to suggest that these Mexican-Americans may have 
"adopt[ed] the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority." 
Ante, at 3. This type of speculation illustrates the lengths to which one 
must go to buttress a holding of purposeful discrimination that otherwise 
is based solely on a lack of proportional representation . 
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the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court, 
~ufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even 
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise 
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close o.f the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether respondent 
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
State had "deliberately and systematically den[ied] to mem-
bers of [respondent's class] the right to participate as jurors 
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S., at 
628-629. The District Court found that the judge and jury 
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against 
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least, 
that finding was not clearly erroneous.8 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro-
duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at 
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not present-
ing more evidence than it did.. But until today's decision one 
may doubt whether ma.ny lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
would have thought that respondent's statistics, under the 
circumstances of this case a.nd prevailing in Hidalgo County, 
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination. 
8 Nothing in this case remotely resembles the stark discrimination in 
GomiUion and Yick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this case approach the 
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have 
previously found grand jury discrimination . Sec n. 4, supra. In this case, 
in the year in which the respondent was indicted, 52.5% of the persons on 
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its 
preoccupa.tion with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans 
in the tot.al population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loses sight of 
the constitutional standard. Respondent has no right to "proportional 
representation" of Mexican-Americans, Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. 8., 
at 339. He has only the right "to require that the State not deliberately 
and systematically deny to [Mexican-Americans] the right to participate 
as jurors in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. 8., at 
628-629. 
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There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from 
~tatistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers 
of power in this remote border county are manipulating 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for respond-
ent's claim of invidious discrimination. 
It seems to me that the Court today, in rejecting the Dis-
trict Court's finding that no such discrimination took place, 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on 
federal habeas corpus although it finds no fault with the 
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest. 
The Court reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a 
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the Mexican-
Americans who controlled the jury selection process in Hi-
dalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Ameri-
cans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's 
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives both the 
proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief and established 
principles applicable to grand jury discrimination. 
I 
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary 
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although 
Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge 
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do 
so-respondent offered no timely objection to indictment or 
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingly, 
he was brought to trial before a petit jury. This jury, whose 
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respond-
ent guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt. 
After respondent was convicted and sentenced he raised for 
the first time the claim that is now before us: that the grand 
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jury which indicted him had been selected by a procedure in-
fected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans. 
. By accepting that claim, the Court today requires the State 
to release respondent:r-and to indict and try him again if the 
witnesses are still available-although there is no question 
that a properly constituted grand jury found him guilty. 
There being no question of respondent's guilt, the threshold 
question in this case is whether federal habeas corpus relief 
is available to challenge the composition of the grand jury. 
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we held 
that when a state prisoner asks a federal habeas court to over-
turn a state-court conviction because of an allegedly uncon-
stitutional grand jury indictment, the prisoner must show-as 
a general rule-either that he raised his claim within the time 
.~imits imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause 
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a timely 
objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, and can-
not show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he co-ntends that 
we should consider his claim on collateral attack because the 
state appellate court. considered its merits in affirming his 
conviction. 
It is true that in Francis we left open the question whether 
the general rule applicable to consideration of claims of un-
constitutional grand jury discrimination in federal habeas 
proceedings should bar relief where the state courts consider 
the merits of an untimely claim. We said that in such a 
case "different considerations would ... be applicable." 425 
U. S., at 542 n. 5. It does not follow that, as the Court today 
summarily concludes, "[s] ince the Texas courts considered 
the claim on the merits, ... we are free to do so here." Ante, 
at -. It may be that where a state court considers a grand-
jury-discrimination claim despite failure to raise it before 
trial , federal review is available by certiorari in this Court. 
See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283, 288-292 (1975). 
But in my view, the State's consideration of the merits affords 
L 
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no basis for federal habeas review. Cf. Stone v. Powell,-
U.S.- (1976). 
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed 
petit jury, based on properiy admissible evidence, is like a 
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those con-
stitutional violations not logicaliy inconsistent with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the 
way of CQnvi~Wm, if factuai guiH is established." M erma v. 
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question, 
accordingly, is whether the aiieged grand jury discriminatiort 
is the sort of defect that will "stand in the way of conviction; 
if factual guiit is va1idiy established." 
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere; 
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the 
accused and for requiring him to stand trial. But there is 
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted 
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
In many States the grand jury's function is served by an in"' 
formation and, if the defendant is to be detained for any sig-
nificant period before trial, by a judicial determination of 
probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 118-119 
( 1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect 
in the probable cause determination will not void a subse-
quent conviction . "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently 
detained may challenge the probable cause for that confine-
ment, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the 
defendant was detained pending trial without a determina-
tion of probable cause." I d., at 119. 
Where a State proceeds by indictment, it is true that this 
Court has recognized a broader scope of review after convic-
tion. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972), 
we set aside a state conviction on the ground that members 
of the defendant's race had been deliberately excluded from 
the grand jury which returned his indictment. This broader 
scope of review reflects a concern not for the rights of the 
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convicted defendant, whose guilt is no longer a mere probabil-
ity, but for the rights of others. Cf. Peters v. Kif!, 407 U. S. 
493 (1972). We have, in essence, given the criminal defend-
ant standing on appeal to assert the rights of those who may 
yet be unfairly indicted, or improperly excluded from jury 
service, as a result of the alleged discrimination. 
But allowing standing to assert the rights of others is 
inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. The pur-
pose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to the individ-
uaU Where a prisoner challenges the process that led to his 
conviction, the inquiry on habeas corpus properly is limited 
to the integrity of the state determination of guilt in the par-
ticular case. See Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold, 
therefore, that the State's decision on direct appeal to con-
sider the claim of grand jury discrimination does not present 
a case for federal habeas relief where-as here-the state 
prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt in his own case. 
The decision of the Court today, sub silentio, appears to 
extend to availability of habeas corpus relief well beyond its 
present ample frontiers. 2 
Although I think the Court of Appeals' decision to entertain 
respondent's claim could be viewed as plain error, this issue 
was not briefed or argued in this case. In view of its impor-
ta.nce to the federal system, the question should not be resolved 
1 "It is clear, not only from the language of [ 42 U. S. C.] §§ 2241 (c) (3) 
and 2254 (a) , but also from the common law history of the writ, that the 
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the 
legality of that. custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is 
to secure release from illegal custody .... " Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 
2 In no case cited in the Court's opinion did the Court have before it a 
federal habeas corpus petitioner who, like the respondC'nt here, com-
plained only of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury which 
indicted him. Indeed, the only habeas case cited by the Court is Peters v. 
Kiff, supra, 407 U. S. 493. Peters involved claims of discrimination in the 
selection of the petit as well as the grand jury. 
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in the absence of plenary consideration. It would be appro-
priate, rather, to set the case for reargument or to remand it 
for reconsideration of the question whether federal habeas 
corpus relief is available. 
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' hold-
ing that respondent established unconstitutional discrimina-
tion in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the 
merits. 
II 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the sta.tistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal pro-
ceedings which tends to show underrepresentation of Mexican-
Americans in the grand juries of Hidalgo County; second, 
the testimony of the state trial judge outlining the Texas 
grand jury selection system as it operated in this case; and 
third, the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with 
respect to the political dominance and control by the Mexi-
can-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the 
District Court that in light of all the evidence respondent 
failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a 
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It 
begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal de-
fendant has a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand 
jury "drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." 
Ante, at - , and n. 13. In adopting that principle the Court 
abandons the traditional equal protection standards that have 
always applied to claims of grand jury discrimination and 
ignores our most relevant recent decisions: Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S. 299 ( 1976) , and Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Corp.,- U.S. - (1977). 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply 
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to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra. A state 
defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institu-
tion of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead 
through prosecutorial information, as many States prefer to 
do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U. S., at 116-119. 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a 
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100 
U. S. 303 ( 1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defend-
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex-
cluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 ( 1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 287-290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable in 
cases involving grand as well as petit jury selection, see, e. g., 
Alexander, supra, and in cases where purposeful discrimina-
tion results only in substantial underrepresentation rather 
than total exclusion of members of the defendant's class, see, 
e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
But a state defendant's right not to have members of his 
class excluded by discrimination from grand jury service has 
never before today been thought to embody a right to a grand 
jury that reflects "a fair cross-section of the community." 
Ante, at 10, and n. 13. The right to a "representative" grand 
jury is a federal right that derives not from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury, 
That right is simlar to the right-applicable to state proceed-
ings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth Amend-
ment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). To 
the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-
cable, a defendant need only show substantial underrepre-
.. 
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sentation of his own race or class to demonstrate a constitu-
tional violation. But in a state case in which the challenge 
is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amen~ment applies, 
and the defendant has the burden of proving that the under-
representation is the result of systematic and purposeful 
discrimination. 
This equal protection analysis was explicitly mandated in 
our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. In Arlington 
Heights we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' I d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." -
U.S., at-. 
Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate 
impact is enough: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepre-
sentation of his group, the burden shifts to the state to 
rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at-. 
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arling-
ton Heights. 
B 
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards 
for determining whether an evidentiary showing constitutes 
a prima facie case of discrimination shifting the burden of 
going forward with evidence to the State: 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
B 
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may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. 8., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. 8., at -
(footnotes omitted). 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.8 This is 
3 Although Davis and Arlington Heights make clear that proof of dis-
criminatory intent is required and that proof of impact. of effect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the 
nature of the jury selection t{lsk ... we have permitted a finding of con-
stitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., a.t- n. 13. As one illus-
tration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list. 
The Court found that the disparity between those figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. !d., 
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner 
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointed 
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred 
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 ( 1972), where we sta.ted: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decima.tion 
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially neu-
tral." 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one 
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not sufficient to constitute 
a prima facie case. Only after determining that the selection 
system "provided a clear and easy opportunity for discrim-
ination" was the Court satisfied that the burden should shift 
to the State. lbid. 4 
were all of the members of the jury commiSSIOn. The District Court. 
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-
atically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion." I d., at 
352. It was a.gainst this background of pervasive discrimination that the 
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representa-
tion was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination. 
4 The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted 
in Alexander, ante, at -, is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of 
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here , those who 
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person 
claiming discrimination. See text infra. 
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex-
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
Heights, supra, - U. S., at-. 
In this case, the following critical facts a.re beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury arra.y were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the veridct of guilt were 
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white 
officials.~ 
5 I do not suggest., of course, that. t.he mere fact that Mexica.n-
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, 
a majority of the popula.t.ion may not be able at a particular time to 
control or significantly influence political decisions or the way the system 
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which 
a "minority group" ma.y suffer discrimination in a community is where 
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
.. 
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The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
. Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
. vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
ante, at-, the jury commission has the opportunity to iden~ 
tify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish sur-
names. This means that a majority of the commission ate in 
a position-if they so choose to exercise their power-to place 
only Mexican-Americans on grand jury panels. That they 
.have exercised their power with greater restraint scarcely 
justifies an inference of discriminatory intent. To the con-
tra.ry, rational inferences from the most basic facts in a demo-
cratic society render wholly improbable respondent's claim 
of an intent to discriminate against him and other Mexican-
Americans. As Judge Garza. observed, "If people in charge 
can choose whom they want, it is unlikely they will discrimi-
nate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant. has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons having a natural inclination to fa.vor the defendant. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.S., at 309. Were 
it not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogni~ 
tion in the community, there would be no reason to suppose 
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded 
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate 
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the 
Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the ma.joritarian 
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect 
and protect their own . 
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individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain.6 
In Akins v. Texas, supra, 325 U. S., at 400, where appar-
ently no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 
16 was on the jury panel, the Court emphasized the high 
threshold of proof required to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be concluded that officers of the court disre-
gard this accepted standard of justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has ulightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to 
Mexican-Americans. 
c 
It matters litt.le in this case whether such judicially notice-
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
6 The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commis-
sion would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans does not, in itself, 
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is 
essentially silent as to t.he manner in which the commission made its 
selections and its motivation in selecting as it did. But the composition 
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county 
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to conclude--
correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broader range of variation should be 
tolerated here because the Texas selection system allows the governing 
majority [of grand jury commissioners] to favor their group when 
selecting grand jurors." 284 F. Supp., at 90. 
... 
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outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
.in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
. Here, the State responded to respondent's statistical show-
ing by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed 
the grand jury commissioners. Other facts, such as the 
presence of Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective 
positions of the county, entered the record through judicial 
notice. The testimony, together with the facts noted by the 
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of pro-
duction-even assuming that respondent's evidence was suf-
ficient to give rise to such a burden. Accordingly, at the 
close of the evidence, the question for the District Court was 
whether respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately and system-
atically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the 
right to participate as jurors in the administra.tion of justice." 
Alexander, supra, 405 U. S. , at 628. In my view the Dis-
trict Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination 
insufficient. 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that "the state intro-
, duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant-e , at 
-. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for taking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt 
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would have 
thought that respondent's statistics, under tlie circumstances 
of this case and prevailing in Hildago County, were even 
arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic 
discrimination. 
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Washington decide solely on the basi~ qf inferences fnont 
~tatistics that Mexican-Americans in this remote border 
county who control the levers of power are manipulating 
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community- perceived no basis for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that 






SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-1552 
Claudio CllStanepa, Sheriff ) 
' On Writ of Certiorari to thEJ Petitioner, . 
United States Court of Ap:: 
v. peals for. the Fifth Circuit. 
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MR. JusTICE PowEJLL, diril§enting. 
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on 
federal habeas corpus although it finds no fault with the 
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest. 
The Court reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a 
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the Mexican-
Americans who controlled the jury selection process in Hi-
dalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Ameri-
cans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's 
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives both the 
proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief and established 
principles applicable to grand jury discrimination. 
I 
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary 
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although 
Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge 
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do 
so-respondent offered no timely objection to indictment or 
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingly, 
he was brought to trial before a petit jury. This jury, whose 
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respond-
ent guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt. 
After respondent was convicted and sentenced he raised for 
the first time the claim that is now before us: that the grand~ 
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jury which indicted him had been selected by a procedure in-
fected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans. 
y accepting t at c a1m, t e Court today requires the State 
to release respondent-a.nd to indict and try him again if the 
witnesses are still available-although there is no question 
that a properly constitutedl o@llftl'ld: jury found him guilty. 
TllePe 8eiR~ RQ 'fH9iti9R 9f P8BfJen8e~tt's ~wilt., tlle tliPel!liehi 
Afl81!liiiA iR thii QQM ii urbe*her federe 1 li9188ft@ 061}5&8 telief 
ii ?U9illltfile ~e challenge bhe eomt,eeiti8R 9£ *he grand jnqk 
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we held 
that when a state prisoner asks a federal habeas court to over-
turn a state-court conviction because of an allegedly uncon-
stitutional grand jury indictment, the prisoner must show-as 
a general rule-either that he raised his claim within the time 
~imits imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause 
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a timely 
objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, and can-
not show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he contends that 
we should consider his claim on collateral attack because the 
state appellate court considered its merits in affirming his 
conviction. 
H is ~~ ""e tftllt ~ Francis we left open the question whether 
the general rule applicable to consideration of claims of un-
constitutional grand jury discrimination in federal habeas 
proceedings should bar relief where the state courts consider 
the merits of an untimely claim. We said that in such a 
case "different considerations would ... be applicable." 425 
U. S., at 542 n. 5. It does not follow that, as the Court today 
summarily concludes, "[s] ince the Texas courts considered 
the claim on the merits, ... we are free to do so here." Ante, 
at-!-. 
' 
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no basis for federal habeas review. Cf. Stone v. Powell,-
U.S.- (1976). 
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed 
petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, is like a 
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those con-
stitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the 
way of conviction, if factual guilt is established." Menna v. 
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question, 
accordingly, is whether the alleged grand jury discrimination 
is the sort of defect that will "stand in the way of conviction, 
if factual guilt is validly established." 
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere, 
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the 
accused and for requiring him to stand trial. But there is 
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted 
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
In many States the grand jury's function is served by an in-
formation and, if the defendant is to be detained for any sig-
nificant period before trial, by a judicial determination of 
probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pu.gh, 420 U. S. 103, 118-119 
(1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect 
in the probable cause determination will not void a subse-
quent conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently 
detained may challenge the probable cause for that confine-
ment, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the 
defendant wa · ending trial without a determina-
---.,JLvu o probable cause." /d., at 1 
Where a State proceeds by indictment, it is r 
Court has recognized a broader scope of review after co 
tion. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 ( 1972), 
we set aside a ~ conviction on the ground that membersl 
of the defendant's race had been deliberately excluded from 
the grand jury which returned his indictment. This broader 
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convicted defendant, whose guilt is no longer} Mt8P8 }1F8ls&@ii 
~but for the rights of others. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 
493 (1972). We have, in essence, given the criminal defend-
ant standing on appeal to assert the rights of those who may 
yet be unfairly indicted, or improperly excluded from jury 
service, as a result of the alleged discrimination. 
But allowing standing to assert the rights of others is 
inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. The pur-
pose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to the individ-
uaJ.l Where a prisoner challenges the process that led to his 
conviction, the inquiry on habeas corpus properly is limited 
to the integrity of the iWoi determination of guilt in the par-
ticular case. See Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold, 
therefore, that the jtate's decision on direct appeal to con-
sider the claim of grand jury discrimination does not present 
a case for federal habeas relief where-as here-the state 
prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt in his own case. 
The decision of the Court today, sub silentio, appears to 
extend+ availability of habeas corpus relief well beyond its 
present ample frontiers. 2 
Although I think,.bltll C'!l~otPt 8f lx~:f.lelll!!' d88i8ien to entertainl 
respondent's claim,@llwl~ M8 zrin e8 ~!'! tJlllil~ etr8t , this issue 
was not briefed or argued in this case. In view of its impor-
ta.nce to the federal system, the question should not be resolved 
1 "It is clear, not only from the language of [42 U. S.C.] §§ 2241 (c) (3) 
and 2254 (a), but also from the common law history of the writ, that the 
essencr of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the 
legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is 
to secure release from illegal custody .... " Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 475, 484 (1973). 
2 In no case cited in the Court's opinion did the Court have before it a 
federal habeas corpus petitioner who, like the ~espondent here, com-
plained only of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury which 
indicted him. Indeed, the only habeas case cited by the Court is Peters v. 
Kif!, supra, 407 U.S. 4931 ~involved claims of discrimination in the 
selection of the petit as well as the grand jury. 
])e 'I f lop"'' t\1: 
.. . 
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in the absence of plenary consideration. It would be appro-
priate, rather, to set the case for reargument or to remand it 
for reconsideration of the question whether federal habeas 
corpus relief is available. 
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' hold-
ing that respondent established unconstitutional discrimina-
tion in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the _/ 
merits. ~ 
II 
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this 
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence 
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal pro-
ceedings which hmdlil t@ sho'-'! underrepresentation of Mexican-
Americans in the grand juries of Hidalgo County; second, 
the testimony of the state trial judge outlining the Texas 
grand jury selection system as it operated in this case; and 
third, the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with 
respect to the political dominance and control by the Mexi-
can-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the 
District Court that in light of all the evidence respondent 
failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a 
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It 
begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal de-
fendant has a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand 
jury "drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." 
Ante, at -t-, and n. 13. In adopting that principle the Court 
abandons the traditional equal protection standards that have 
always applied to claims of grand jury discrimination and 
ignores our most relevant recent decisions: Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976) , and Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan HousinglCorp.,- U.S.- (1977). 
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply 
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to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra. A state 
defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institu-
tion of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead 
through prosecutorial information, as many States prefer to 
do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U. S., at 116-119-. 
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it 
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal ~ 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a~ 
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100 
U. S. 303 ( 1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defend-
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of 
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex-
cluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 
U~ S. 320, 335-337, 339 ( 1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 287-290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404 
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable m 
OiliQil i~u9luii•@ @F&tH.~ 8:il wgll ali pQtit jHF3' i!Qlll9tieft, eee, e. g., 
.4le~81ruiBP; 8M~Ptll, a.nd in ett~ee where 2urposeful discrimina-
tion results only in substantial underrepresentation rather 
than total exclusion of members of the defendant's class, see, 
e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
But a state defendant's right not to have members of his 
class excluded by discrimination from grand jury service has 
never before today been thought to embody a right to a grand 
jury that reflects "a fair cross-section of the community." 
Ante, at 10, and n. 13} The right to a "representative" grand 
jury is a federal right that derives not from the Md9WPhen~h 
.A Hllondmontli! requirement of equal protection but from the 
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury . 
.1... That right is sinJar to the right-applicable to state proceed-
ings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth Amend-
ment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). To 
the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli-




sentation of his own race or class to demonstrate a constitu-
tional violation. But in a state case in which the challenge 
is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies, 
and the defendant has the burden of proving that the under-
representation i~ the result of systematic and purposeful 
discrimination. 
This equal protection analysis was explicitly mandated ill 
our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 1 Corp. In Arlington 
Heights we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in 
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate 
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' I d., at 242. Proof 
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." -
U.S., at-. 
Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate 
impact is enough: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepre-
sentation of his group, the burden shifts to the state to 
rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at-. 
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arling-
ton H eightsJ. 
B 
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards 
£Qp eletePI11iBiHg 'nH:ethet att evidcn:titt:r, sksv?iJ;~8 constitutes 
a -prii!Qa 'aQi@ @&!!e sf elieeriminte~isn eliifii¥~g t~Q l;mrQQA Qf 
SQiPS £~ward wit~ e v ielenee ~o bhe Obtete. 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
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may be available. The impact of the official action-
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an 
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick W o v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence." - U. S., at-
(footnotes omitted). 
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis-
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.\. This is 
j Although Davis and Arlington Heights make clear that proof of dis-
criminatory intent is required and that proof of impact. oJ. effect alone 
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden 
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the 
nature of the jury selection task . . . we have permitted a finding of con-
stitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach 
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., at_::::... n . 13. As one illus-
tration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970). 
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60% 
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list. 
The Court found that the disparity between those figures was not so 
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. !d., 
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner 
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointed 
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury, 
in turn, selected the board of education. · At every layer of this system 
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students in 
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred 
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards 
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks 
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is 
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos-
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation 
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, 
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis-
crimination on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially neu-
tral." 405 U. S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant 
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five 
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white 
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one 
of whom was a Negro (5o/o); and none of the 12 persons on 
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at 
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted-
"striking." Yet the statistics were not .;~tJtel'!* to constitute 
a prima facie case. Only after determining that the selection 
system "provided a clear and easy opportunity for discrim-
ination" was the Court satisfied that the burden should shift 
to the State. Ibid.'S., 
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District Court 
had found that., until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-~ 
aJ.ically excluded from the gra<ld juries through token inclusion." I d., at 
352. It was against this background of pervasive di~crimination that the 
Court. found that. even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representa-
tion was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination. 
) The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted / 
in Alexande1', ante, at. -i;-. is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of 
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here, those who 
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person 
clajming discrimination. See text infm. 
j 
(2,1:>~ A- P· ~ 
3/ 
- It may be, as the. Court suggests, that 
nondiscriminatory methods of selection will, over 
time, result in a representative grand jury. See 
Carter v. Jury Comm'n~ supra, 396 U.S., at 530. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate that 
result. Nothing would prevent a state, for example, 
f k . . f d d .. ") k' b rom see 1ng to assure 1n orme ec1s1o~ 1ng y 
requiring that all grand jurors be lawyers familiar 
with the criminal law;and if that requirement should 
result in substantial underrepresentation on grand 
juries of some segments of the community in some 
areas of the state, the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not render the selection process unconstitutional. 
c -
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex~ 
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington 
~Heights, supra,- U. S., at-. 
--~r,. In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute: 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later 
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three 
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of 
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amer-
ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, 
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven 
~· 
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the veyfijct of guilt were 
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected 
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were 
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power and 
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where 
80lfo of the population is Mexican-American. As was em-
phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi-
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where 
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury 
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white ~ 
officials.~ / 
.) I do not suggest., of course, that the mere fact that Mell.ican-
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There 
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, 
a majority of t.he population may not be able at a particular time to 
control or signifieant.ly influence political decisions or the way the system 
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously 
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which 
a "minority group" may suffer discrimination in a community is where 
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
75-1552-DISSENT 
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The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the 
Court's opinion, is that a. majority of the jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body 
.. vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors. 
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court, 
lH'f ante, at T • th~ jury commission has the opportunity to idenw 
tify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish sur-
names. T.Ai8 ~efW.ls t.Aa.t & m&;ierit) ef th.i QQ-"';A:l:issies ai:Q is-
fti l"BBitie~;~. if t.Aey sa I!Aeeee te ent".t'eiee ~wit power to pla~ 
9113ly Meyjcep, A mgrigaA8 88 ~Pft>fH~: jli~· }38>Rels. Tlu~t ~ey 
.R&.e exetcised their powet witlr greater testraittt scmeel;, 
juiiti~ii as iBfereBee sf Qiiigriminatwy intint To thi 88ft 
~' rational inferences from the most basic facts in a demd• 
cratic society render ~ improbable respondent's claim 
of an intent to discriminate aga.inst him and other Mexican .. 
Americans. As Judge Garza. observed, "If people in charge 
can choose whom they want, it is unlikely they will discrimi· 
nate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90. 
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of, 
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes 
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the 
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded 
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of 
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding 
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendant. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.S., at 309. Were 
it not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogni• 
tion in the community, there would be no reason to suppose 
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded 
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate ~ 
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only t~ 
Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritaria  
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect 




~ Nor do I suggest that persons in positions of power 
can never be shown to have discriminated against other 
members of the same ethnic or racial group. I would hold 
only that respondent's statistical evidenc~ ia tsis ease, 
without more, is insufficient to prove a cl~ of 
L'~ ~1.$ CQ~~. I 
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individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal 
right to complain.~ 
In Akins v. Texas, supra, 325 U. S., at 400, where appar-
ently no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 
16 was on the jury panel, the Court emphasized the high 
threshold of proof required to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a 
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of 
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on 
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal-
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can-
not lightly be concluded that officers of the court disre-
gard this accepted standard of justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today 
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to 
Mexican-Americans. 
.Q nA 
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice-
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission 
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the 
) The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commis-
sion would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans does not, in itself, 
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is 
essentially silent as to the manner in which the commission made its 
selections and its mot.ivation in selecting as it did. But the composition 
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the cmmty 
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to conclude-
correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broader range of variation should be 
tolerated here because the Texas selection system a.llows the governing 
majority [of grand jury commissioners] to favor their group when 
selecting grand jurors." 284 F. Supp., at 90. 
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outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited 
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the 
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by 
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to 
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence 
.in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
Here, the State responded to respondent's statistical show-
ing by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed 
the grand jury commissioners. Other facts, such as the 
presence of Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective 
positions of the county, entered the record through judicial 
notice. The testimony, together with the facts noted by the 
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of pro-
duction-even assuming that respondent's evidence was suf-
ficient to give rise to such a burden. Accordingly, at the 
close of the evidence, the question for the District Court was 
whether respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately and system-
atically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the 
right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice." 
Alexander, supra, 405 U. S., at 628. In my view the Dis-
trict Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination 
insufficient. _JI-
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that Ofhe state intra-
. duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at 
r · Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for taking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt 
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would have 
thought that respondent's statistics, under the circumstances 
of this case a.nd prevailing in Hildago County, were even 
arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic 
discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in 
14 CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
' . ' 
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences front 
statistics that Mexican-Americans in this remote border . '. \ 
county who control the levers of power are manipulating 
~hem to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the 
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the 
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and 
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that 
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District 
Court. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Rider A, p. 2 
Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from 
raw statistical data, the Court does not require "proof 
of racially discriminatory intent". Instead, finding that 
a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the 
statistical showing", the Court declared: 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Rider A, p. 6 
This case should have been laid permanently to rest, 
as to the trial court decided, because of respondent's 
failure to carry his burden of proving discriminatory intent. 
But even if one accepts arguendo that statistical evidence of 
disproportionality makes out a prima facie case, I agree 
with the District Court that respondent's case is over-
whelmingly rebutted by the facts of which that court took 
judicial notice. In Arlington Heights, speaking of the 
burden on the complaining party, that proof of discriminatory 
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available". As respondent introduced no direct 
evidence of intent, we must BB look to the entire record 
and setting none of which is in dispute - for such 
inferences as may be drawn that bear upon xx intent. In 
reality, all that respondent presents is an argument that 
discriminatory intent may be presumed from the statistical 
disproportionality. Even if the setting were a typical 
community with a predominantly white population the 
statistics here are not persuasive; there is no indication 
of mere tokenism. 
2. 
On the state's side of the case, wholly rational 
inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic 
society refute respondent's claim of intent to discriminate 
against him and other Mexican-Americans 
6. 
Although I think the Court of Appeals' decision to 
entertain respondent's claim could be viewed as plain 
error, this issue was not briefed or argued in this case. 
In view of its importancem the federal system, the 
question should not be resolved in the absence of plenary 
consideration. It would be appropriate, rather, to set 
the case for reargument or to remand it for reconsiders-
tion on the question whether federal habeas corpus relief 
is available. 
But absent a willingness on the part of the Court 




lfp/ss xxit 2/1/77 
"''() 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
/o.J._..., \• ~·., .~ ~ 
the Court eeaay ignores our most relevant recent 
t\ 
decisions: Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided 
January 11, 1977. Neither .Q:L,tbese.. case•.J • c:i ted, and 
::C ~P.e+<.~lj•L~-r 
~e Court's x preoccupation with ~Astatistics is ~salty 
incompatible with the equal protection analysis explicitly 
mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights. In the latter 
case we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact. 'Disproporationate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it not the sole touchstone of 
an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at 242. 
Proof of racially discriminatory intenr-or purpose 
is required to show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available. The 
impact of official action - whether it 'bears 
more heavily on one race than another,' 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242- may 
provide an important starting point. * * * 
But ..• [a]bsent a patt ern as stark as that 
in Gomillion [364 U.S. 339] or Yick Wo [118 
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative, 
and the Court must look to other evidence." 
- lfp/ss 2/10/77 Rider A, p. 2 
,.,. 
Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from 
raw statistical data, the Court does not require "proof 
of racially discriminatory intent". Instead, finding that 
a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the 
statistical showing", the Court declared: 
2. 
-~~:zz;(~ 
~ TAe ~\Hi't :t.fi~ wsei:l;rjaisregardin~l!' Htlllt n ( cnt 
Ill. r..~ '-; ~ ~"''C.tft,(-
pt'e9Q d ga1i,~olds in effect that pact alone" is 
~~a, · 
~J.y,1 ~ ...... ~·~ .... ....._~_,.....~ 
\ discri7 ion(.a(::!,.!J the statistical showing", the 
Court declared: - ---------
"Once the defendant has shown substantial 
underrepresentation of his group, the burden 
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie 
case." Ante at 11. 
;r~lington Heights, as in Davis, we held~~i~ 
the contrary: 
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply 
failed to carry their burden of proving 
[on the basis of impact alone] that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's 
decision." Slip op. at 17. 
To be sure, the ~ courts below also fell into the 
same error :}o finding that the defendant [respondent here] 
had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical 
disproportionality between Mexican American population and 
the composition of ~ grand jury panels. These courts 
did not have the benefit of our decisions in Davis and 
Arlington Heights, but - even so - they misapplied ~ 
~ perhaps the single most relevant precedent addressing 
pr22i~~ the issue of alleged discrimination in grand 
. I:~ '/o< 
jury selectio~A !lex~er v. Louisiana, aP6 U.S. 625 (1972)~ 
( 
3. 
I~ eke• e~ Mr. Justice White - speaking for the Court -
made clear: 
"The Court has never annou ced mathematical 
xxaHaiHgx standards for the demo stration' of 
'systematic' exclusion of blacks but has, rather, 
emphasized that a factual inqui is necessary 
in each case that takes into account all possible 
ex& explanatory factors. The progressive 
decimation of potential Negro grand jurors is 
indeed striking here, but we do not rest our 
conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated a 
prima facie case of invidious racial discrimina-
tion on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially 
neutral." 405 U.S. , at 630. 
~ 
In Alexander, the Court~reiterated the standard that 
a complaining defendant must show that the state has 
"deliberately and systematically der{ied] to members of 
his race the right to participate as jurors in the 
administration of justice." Id., at 628. ~~-~ In AJ eyaodir 
the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant community 
were Negro ; the jury commission consisted of five members 
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge; 
~ ... J •• l, "2.. f.)~ I 
o£ t!~aoper-~bfl'!!! 8IJ. the grand jury venire~ only one 
of ~Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the grand 
t\ 
jury that indicted defendant was Negro. Id. at 627, 628. 
This statistical array was - as the Court noted - "striking". 
~ ~.w ' ; - ·~44.~; (.·tfut),., ~ ~~ 
ami ~et ~as not (aio~ sufficien~o support a "conclusion -
that petition has demonstrated a prima facie case of 
invidious racial discrimination". Id., at 630. Rather, 
{ 
~ ~-~AMA•I-* 
the Court lookea to a cCfmbination of factors, specified 
" 
4. 
in detail:e. in the opinion.- as ~«SRKKXKHX.~« "constitut[ing] 
a prima facie case of discrimination". Id. at 631. 
~ There is simply Jf comparability between the facts in this 
case and those in any other jury composition case decided 
by this Court. 'FQQ "grotrp" alleged to aa.ve been discriminated 
~R~ Mexican-America~omprised 79.2% of the population; 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners was Mexican-
American; three of the five incumbent jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American; 10 of the 20 members of the grand 
jury array, five of the 12 grand jurors who indicted 
defendant, the foreman of the grand jury, and x seven 
of the 12 sfxxk:e. petit jurors who found petitioner guilty 
all were Mexican-American. 
5. 
As these facts belie on their face any inference of 
~· ~4_, ~ .,..e1 
discrimination, respondent ~elied on a 10-year statistical 
" 
presentation as proof of "systematic racial discrimination 
in the selection of grand jurors". These figures showed 
that for the 10-year period ending in 1972, only 39% of 
the grand jurors who served in Hildago County were 
Mexican-American. The trend was toward a higher percentage, 
averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year period prior 
to respondent's trial. Ante at 4. The Court relies almost 
exclusively on 
averages in holding that respondent~ made out a prima 
facie case xmaxxiR shifting the BKX~R burden of proof to 
) 
the state. Once having reached this conclusion, it was 
easy to resolve this case 
"The state offered no evidence at all either 
attacking respondent's allegations of ~am 
discrimination or demonstrating that his 
statistics were unreliable in any way." 
Ante, at 5, 11, 14 and 16. 
,, ,, 
Indeed, the Court thought it inexplicable that "the 
state introduced practically no evidence." Ante at 14. 
Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for taking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may 
doubt whether a many lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
ght that respondent's statistics, under 
the circumst ces of this case and prevailing in Hildago 
~ ~ ~<..,£:.., ,1-~ "Hoi£ • 4c..(._ 
County, a prima facie case. But if there was 
" room for doubt at the time of the trial below, all doubt 
6. 
was dispelled by our decision~n Davis and Arlington Heights 
making clear that disproportionate "impact alone is not 
determinative" and that the burden remains on the complaining 
, party to prove "discriminatory intent or purpose". '(/f' Jld 
Heights 
"demands a sensitive inquiry into 
) 
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may 
tl/ 
be available". This view was consistent with the Court's 
ai~ admonition in Alexander that, in a jury discrimination 
case, a court must consider the entire factual situation 
and "take into account all possible explanatory factors". 
405 U.S., at A Efte-f..a~t atld relevmrt: setting of 
th~ CqSe are ~ot in dispute, we are free to examine them 
alleged denial of equal protection with respect to jury 









The Court's opinion states that we "granted 
certiorari to consider whether the existence of a 'governing 
majority'iR in itself can rebut a prima facie case of 
) discrimination in grand jury selection. II Ante at 9. 
It is puzzling to speculate as to the origin of this 
asserted reason for granting certiorari. The questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari were not so framed, 
and neither was our grant so expressed or limited. The 
district court did emphasize that Mei Mexican-Americans 
were in theory and in fact a governing majority in 
Hidalgo County, but no one seriously suggests that this 
fact alone is relied upon to rebut a case of discrimination 
8. 
the burden of proof had been xksf shifted to ----- ------
alysis should commence with the facts relating 
to the indictment and conviction of this respondent. As 
noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five 
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority 
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge 
who presided at the trial ~pea~~v&-e~ Mexican-
~ 
Americans. It would be wkel~ irrational to suggest that 
~ 
these facts - the most relevant facts Ato respondent's 
conviction - permitted any inference of discrimination. 
The Court, therefore,H was forced to rely on the bare 
statistical bones of 
the ratio population mix. 
A far more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Court's 
opinion is the composition of the grand jury commissioners, 
) 
the body vested by Texas law with the authority to select 
grand jurors. Respondent did not choose to present statistics 
as to this body for the entire 10-year period. The record 
does show, however, that for the XHSXRRaxaak two and a 
half years prior to respondent's trial the judge who 
-~~~c..e~~~~~c-·~(~~ 
appointed the grand jury commissionersAfollowed the ~ • • \ 
' ' 14ttu., _ 
policy of naming "three Mexican-Americans and the other 
two might be Anglo with Anglo names or . . • a colored 
man." App. 63, 64. 
It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that 
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power. Here 
that power rested securely in the hands of Mexican-Americans. 
udge 
J~A~mi~ testified that he considered, in addition 
to other things, the population mix in appointing the jury 
commissioners. By naming three Mexican-Americans to the 
commission he gave them the power and authority - if they 
chose to exercise it that way - to place onlf Mexican-Americans 
on grand jury panels. ·The fact that they exercised that 
J IJ~ ~.J...+ 6._; 
power with greater restraint ~ scarcelyAa credible 
inference ~~~s~~~nclusive answer 
~ 
to any imputation of J..RViai.gw.s intent was given by United 
A. 
States District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's 
habeas corpus petition: 
"If pxapis: people in charge adt can choose whom 
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate 
against themselves. A broader range of variation 
should be tolerated here because the Texas selection 
system allows the governing majority [of jury 
commissioners] to favor their group when 
selecting grand jurors." 384 F. Supp. 79, 
- (1974) ('1~ ~ ~) 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 N~e to Jpe AceJ'ed ~quo_te- k om 
J d ·~~~th~wer to 
c ose 
~ 
Judge Ga~z , hi elf thoroughly f 1miliar wit? 
/ 
County, as follows: 
~opy . 36 of petition and end en 
~ In Akin v. Texas (supra) at 400, where apparently no 
W1L-•· 
Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 on the 
A 
jury panel, the Court emphasized the high threshold of 
proof required to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in 
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an 
essential element of proper judicial procedure -
the requirement of fairness on the part of the 
judicial arm of the government in dealing with 
persons charged with criminal offenses. It 
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of 




With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court 
" 
/() 
today has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
~ 
what m11y a.~eetnaea t:A be their natural inclination to 
assure fairness to Mexican-Americans~Finally, the fact -
found by the District Court - that Mexican-Americans were 
the governing majority in this county further refutes any 
inference of purposeful discrimination. The Court's opinion 
refers more than once to the absence of evidence on behalf 
of the state. But the critical facts,a of which judicial 
I; 
e 
notice could be taken, are beyond dispute. In addition 
to those set forth above evidencing control of the situation 
by Mexican-Americans, a majority of the elected officials 
were Mexican-American and a majority of the judges and jury 
commissioners in the county also were Mexican-American. 
That these positions of power and influence were so held 
is unlikely to be accidental in a community in which 80% 
of the population is Mexican-American. As Judge Garza 
emphasized, in dismissing respondent's petition , t his 
~ 
case is ~tally~unique in that every other jury discrimina-
tion case reaching this Court has involved situations 
HRHR where the governing majority, and the resulting power 
and control, lay with a white electorate and white officials. 
There is indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total 
~ 
unreality ~ Justices here in Washington decid~ on the 
;. 
basis of inferences from sael~s Q£ statistics~hat Mexican-
Americans in this remote county who control the iea levers 
of power are manipulating them to discriminate "against 
themselves". In contrast, the judges on the scene, the 
state circuit judge who appointed the jury commissioners, 
the state judge who presided over respondent's trial, 
and the United States District Judge - all Mexican-Americans 
and familiar with the community - perceived no basis whatever 
for finding the necessary invidious discrimination. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Rider A. p. 6 
:11 
This case should have been laid permanently to rest~ 
a-e • ~-~toat':-e~t-dee1:d~ because of respondent's 
failure to carry his burden of proving discriminatory intent. 
~ 
But even if one accepts arguendo that statistical evidence of 
.. 1\ 
~. ,.,..._ 
disproportionality me~~ OtiC a prima facie case, I agree 
with the District Court that respondent's case is 8¥e£-
~·4.,,..L •• 1 ·'- t.J_ 
wkel~a~ly rebutted by theAfacts of which thlt court took 
judicial notice. In Arlington Heights ~peakiR8 8f7tlt~ 
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available". 
~.-vAt.~~ 
)\evidence of intent, we must as look to the entire record 
and setting - none of which is in dispute - for such 
,,c..t.~~ 
I\ inferences as may be drawn ,. 
r~ie~ Jl11 that respondent presents is an argument that 
discriminatory intent may be presumed from the statistical 
disproportionality. Even if the setting were a typical 
community with a predominantly white population the 
-
tt . t• h ~M4~~~.~J~N.... s a :Ls :Lcs ere are '\nK- ~@li'8et&~i:'Ve", a-li's la8 rre Hl ;uui:&~n / 
~ ~/..-~ -~ .. ~,..,-
)(of mere tokenism. 
2. 
~ On the state's side of the case, ,~ell y rational 
inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic 
,~.,~~ ~ t 11'1~~ ... -6-t..t., ~ 
society refa~ respondent's claim of Lntent to discriminate 
~ 
against him and other Mexican-Americans 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda, fn. __ _ 
t 
~ 4~··-~~ 
This is aAo 8iJQn stronger case for requiring proof 
A A 
of discriminatory intent by the complaining party than 
WQre t~ ~i&waei~~ ~ Davis and Arlington Heights. The 
"impact" did not necessarily ever have a discriminatory 
effect. In a jury selection case the protected constitut·· anal 
interest is the right to a fair trial. 
Ln this case, statistical or otherwise, that 
prived of a fair trial. Putting 
the was controlled by a 
Americans, d respondent was 
drawn from a 
five 
, the disparity here 
resulting - "probably becau e 
four of the inal members of the array 
be located"; and, finally, t 
respondent had a majority 
dis proportionality 
tainted the fairness of ~ respondent's trial. 
2. 
~ By contrast, in Davis the effect of the alleged 
414.~~ 
discrimination was the deprivation of jobs to the complaining 
" parties. In Arlington Heights, the effect a~ jwpa.s&sr ~1e 
a1 1 e8~gnJJ.8'MWi.iaisuatien was total: the complainants there 
were denied the desired opportunity to build low-cost 
housing. . ~ 
~·"'--1... 
It is therefore evident that the p~waehjlh&y of 
causation between the alleged discrimination and the effect 
on the asserted constitutional right is far more attenuated 
in this case than in Davis and Arlington Heights. A more 
demanding level of proof of discriminatory xx intent 
therefore should be required. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Gastaneda fn. 
The holding in Davis and Arlington Heights was not a 
new departure, although we noted that "some contrary 
indications may be drawn from some of our cases". Arlington 
Heights, slip op. at 12. Indeed, one of the precedents 
relied on in Arlington Heights was Akins v. Texas, 325 
u.s. 398, 403-404 (1945), a jury selection case. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 ·Castaneda fn . 
The term "Mexican-American" is used here, as in 
the various opinions, to mean persons with Mexican-American 
surnames. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda fn. 
The Court's opinion may be read as implicitly 
suspicious of the Texas system for the selection of grand 
jurors. See,~·&·'~ at 13, 14. It is said that the 
system "is highly subjective", but this characterization 
cuts in favor of the state in this case because Judge 
Jose Alamia, who chose the jury commissioners, was Mexican-
American and he deliberately placed the commission in the 
control (3 to 2) of fellow Mexican-Americans . App. 62, 64, 
67-71. In any event, as the Court concedes the 
constitutionality of the Texas system has been accepted 
by this Court . ~. at 14 . Accordingly, there is no 
basis for relying on the Texas system as supporting the 
inference the Court draws from the sta tistics . Certainly, 
as applied in this case, the operation of the system 
refutes that inference . 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda fn. 
The Court relies on Judge Garza's finding (actually 
a legal conclusion) that respondent "established a bare 
prima facie case" by his statistical evidence. But, 
strangely, the Court ignores the most significant finding 
of fact made by the District Court, namely, that viewing 
the case as a whole there was no discrimination: 
"The petitioner's percentages appear somewhat 
inaccurate and the circumstantial evidence 
of lack of discriminatory intent is strong. 
• • • The petitioner did show a long continued 
history of alleged disproportion, but there 
is no evidence of tokenism, total exclusion, 
discriminatory acts or failure to act, or an 
inherently dangerous selection system." 
F. Supp., at _. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda fn. 
I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact 
that Mexican-Americans constitute a majority in Hildago 
County is dispositive. There are many communities in 
which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, a majority 
of the population may not be able at a particular time to 
control or significantly influence political decisions or 
the way the system operates . But no one seriously can 
contend that Hildago County is such a community. As we 
have noted elsewhere, the classic situation in which a 
"minority group" may suffer state discrimination is where 
it is "relegated to such a position of political powerless• 
ness" as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process." San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez, u.s. ' (1973). - -- Here 
the Mexican-Americans are not politically "powerless'f; 
they ~ the majoritarian political element of the community , 
with demonstrated capability to elect and protect their 
own. 
T 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda, fn. 
As pointed out in Arlington Heights proof of 
discriminating intent as a motivating factor "demands 
a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available.'' This view was 
consistent with the Court's admonition in Alexander that, 
in a jury discrimination case, a court must consider the 
entire factual situation and "take into account all!possible 
explanatory factors". 405 U.S., at -· As noted in Akins 
v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 402 (1945), the alleged denial 
of equal protection with respect to jury selection "calls 
for our examination of the evidence to determine ourselves 
whether a federal constitutional r&ght has been deined •••• " 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda, fn . ___ 
This is a stronger case for requiring satisfactory 
proof of discriminatory intent by the complaining party 
than Davis and Arlington Heights. The "impact" did not 
necessarily ~ have a discriminatory effect. In a jury 
selection case the protected constitutional interest is 
the right to a fair trial. Credulity is stretched to the 
breaking point to argue, in face of the degree of 
participation of Mexican-Americans in the entire process, 
that the effect of past disproportionality tainted the 
fairness of respondent's trial. By contrast, in Davis 
the effect of the alleged discrimination was the actual 
deprivation of jobs to the complaining parties. In 
Arlington Heights, the effect was total: the compla,inants 
there were denied the desired opportunity to build low-cost 
housing. 
It is therefore evident that the likelihood of 
causation between the alleged discrimination and the effect 
on the asserted constitutional right is far more attenuated 
in this case than in Davis and Arlington Heights . A more 
demanding level of proof of discriminatory intent therefore 
should be required. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 Castaneda, fn. ___ 
The Court's opinion states that we ''granted certiorari 
to consider whether the existence of a 'governing majority' 
in itself can rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in 
grand jury selection. " ~ at 9. It is puzzling . . . 
to speculate as to the origin of this asserted reason for 
granting certiorari. The questions presented in the petition 
for certiorari were not so framed, and neither was our 
grant so expressed or limited. The District Court did 
emphasize that MeKican-Americans were in theory and in fact 
a government majority in Hidalgo County, but no one 
seriously suggests that this fact alone is relied upon 
to rebut a case of discrimination even if the burden of 





lfp/ss/lab 2/10/77 caataneda fn. -
The Court'a opinion reflecta aome auapicion 
of the Texas ayatem for the selection of grand 
jurors. The ay1tem ia aaid to be "highly aubjective", 
~ at 13, 14, but this characterization cuta in 
favor of the atate in thia caae because Judge Jose 
Alamia, who choae the jury cosaiaaionera, waa 
Mexican-American and be deliberately placed the 
commiaaion in the control (3 to 2) of fellow 
Mexican• Americana, App. 62 , 64, 6 7-71. There ia
1 
no baaia for augge1ting that tbe Texaa ayatem 
aupporta the inference the Court draws from the 
statiatica. Certainly, aa applied in this case, 
the operation of the ayatem • wbether aubjective 
or not - placed the selection of grand jurors in 
the banda of Mexican-Americana. In any event, aa 
the Court concedea, the con.atitutionality of the 
Texas ayatem bae been accepted by thia Court. Ante, 
at 14. 
lfp/ss 2/10/77 
No. 75-1552 CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Today's opinion for the Court ignores our most relevant 
recent decisions: Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976) 
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided 
January 11, 1977. 
I 
The Court's preoccupation with the perceived impact 
of statistics is incompatible with the equal protection 
analysis explicitly mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights. 
In the latter case we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact. 'Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at 
242. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose is required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
* * * * 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available. The 
impact of official action - whether it 'bears 
more heavily on one race than another,' 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242- may 
provide an important starting point. * * * 
But ... [a]bsent a pattern as stark as that 
in Gomillion [364 U.S. 339] or Yick Wo [118 
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative, 
and the Court must look to other evidence." 
Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from raw 
statistical data, the Court does not require "proof of 
racially discriminatory intent". Instead, finding that 
a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the 
statistical showing", the Court declared: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial 
underrepresentation of his group, the burden 
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie 
case." Ante, at 11. 
But in Arlington Heights, as in Davis, we held precisely 
the contrary: 
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply 
failed to carry their burden of proving [on 
the basis of impact alone]that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's 
decision." Slip op., at 17. 
To be sure, the courts below also fell into the 
same error: finding that the defendant [respondent here] 
2. 
had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical 
disproportionality between Mexican-American population and 
the composition of grand jury panels. These courts did not 
have the benefit of our decisions in Davis and Arlington 
Heights, but - even so - they misapplied perhaps the single 
most relevant precedent addressing the issue of alleged 
discrimination in grand jury selection. In Alexander v. 
3. 
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), Mr. Justice White -
speaking for the Court - made clear: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical 
standards for the demonstration of 'systematic' 
exclusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized 
that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case 
that takes into account all possible explanatory 
factors. The progressive decimation of potential 
Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, but we 
do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial 
discrimination on statistical improbability alone, 
for the selection procedures themselves were not 
racially neutral." 405 U.S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the Court also reiterated the standard that 
a complaining defendant must show that the state has 
"deliberately and systematically den[ied] to members of 
his race the right to participate as jurors in the 
administration of justice." Id., at 628. In that case 
the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant community 
were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five members 
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge; 
the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one of 
whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the 
grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. Id., at 627, 
628. This statistical array was - as the Court noted -
"striking". Yet this result (effect) of the system was 
4. 
not sufficient alone to support a "conclusion that 
petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case of 
invidious racial discrimination". Id., at 630. Rather, 
the Court in Alexander looked to a combination of factors, 
specified in detail in the opinion, as "constitut[ing] a 
prima facie case of discrimination". Id. at 631. 
There is simply no comparability between the facts 
in this case and those in any other jury composition case 
decided by this Court. Mexican-Americans comprised 79.2% 
of the population; the judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners was Mexican-American; three of the five 
incumbent jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 
of the 20 members of the grand jury array, five of the 
12 grand jurors who indicted defendant, the foreman of 
the grand jury, and seven of the 12 petit jurors who found 
petitioner guilty all were Mexican-Americans. 
As these facts belie on their face any inference of 
discrimination, respondent was forced to rely on a 10-year 
statistical presentation as proof of "systematic racial 
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors". These 
figures showed that for the 10-year period ending in 1972, 
5. 
only 39% of the grand jurors who served in Hildago County 
were Mexican-American. The trend was toward a higher 
percentage, averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year 
period prior to respondent's trial. Ante, at 4. The Court 
relies almost exclusively on the disparity reflected by 
these statistical averages in holding that respondent made 
out a prima facie case, shifting the burden of proof to 
the state. Once having reached this conclusion, it was 
easy to resolve this case by observing: 
"The state offered no evidence at all either 
attacking respondent's allegations of dis-
crimination or demonstrating that his statistics 
were unreliable in any way." Ante, at 5, 11, 
14 and 16. --
Indeed, the Court thought it "inexplicable" that "the 
state introduced practically no evidence. Ante at 14. 
Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for taking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may 
doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would 
have thought that respondent's statistics, under the 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago 
County, were ever arguably sufficient to make a prima 
facie case~ But if there was room for~ time 
of the trial below, all doubt was dispelled by our decisions 
6. 
in Davis and Arlington Heights making clear that dispropor-
tionate "impact alone is not determinative" and that the 
burden remains on the complaining party to prove "discriminatory 
intent or purpose". 
-~-----
II 
This case should have been laid permanently to rest 
because of respondent's failure to carry his burden of 
proving discriminatory intent. But even if one accepts 
arguendo that the statistical evidence of disproportionality 
made a prima facie case, I agree with the District Court 
that respondent's case is rebutted by the record and by 
facts of which that court took judicial notice. In 
Arlington Heights, we said that proof of discriminatory 
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available". As there is no shred of direct evidence 
of intent, we must look to the entire record and setting -
. 7. 
none of which is in dispute - for such relevant inferences 
as may be drawn. All that respondent presents is an 
argument that discriminatory intent may be presumed from 
the statistical disproportionality. Even if the setting 
were a typical community with a predominantly white popula-
tion the statistics here are only marginally suggestive, 
as they refute an inference of mere tokenism. 
On the state's side of the case, rational inferences 
from the most basic facts in a democratic society render 
wholly improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. 
8. 
Analysis should commence with the facts relating to 
the indictment and conviction of this respondent. As 
noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five 
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority 
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge 
who presided at the trial were Mexican-Americans. It would 
be irrational to suggest that these facts - the more relevant 
facts as to respondent's conviction - justified an inference 
of discrimination. The Court, therefore, was forced to~ly 
on the bare statistical bones of a single element in the 
adjudicatory process: the composition of grand juries 
over a span of years as compared with thepopulation mix. A far 
more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Court's opinion, 
is the composition of the grand jury commissioners, the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select 
grand jurors. Respondent did not choose to present statistics 
as to this body f or the entire 10-year period. The record 
does show, however, that for the two and a half years 
9. 
prior to respondent's trial the judge who appointed the 
grand jury commissioners - himself a Mexican-American 
(Judge Jose Alamia) - follwed the policy of naming "three 
Mexican-Americans and the other two might be Anglo with 
Anglo names or .•• a colored man." App. 63, 64. 
It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that 
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power. Here 
that power rested securely in the hands of Mexican-Americans. 
The appointing judge testified that he considered, in 
addition to other things, the population mix in appointing 
the jury commissioners. By naming three Mexican-Americans 
to the commission he gave them the power and authority - if 
they chose to exercise it that way - to place only 
Mexican-Americans on grand jury panels. The fact that they 
exercised that power with greater restraint scarcely justifies 
a credible inference of discriminatory intent. A conclusive 
answer to any imputation of such intent was given by United 
States District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's 
habeas corpus petition: 
10. 
"If people in charge can choose whom they want, 
it is unlikely they will discriminate against 
themselves. A broader range of variation should 
be tolerated here because the Texas selection 
system allows the ~overning majority [of jury 
commissioners] toavor their group when selecting 
grand jurors." 384 F. Supp. 79, (1974). 
(Italics in original) --
In Akin v. Texas, supra, at 400, where apparently 
no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was 
on the jury panel, the Court emphasized the high threshold 
of proof required to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in 
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an 
essential element of proper judicial procedure -
the requirement of fairness on the part of the 
judicial a rm of the government in dealing with 
persons charged with criminal offenses. It 
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of 
the court disregard this accepted standard of 
justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that in my view 
the Court today has "lightly" concluded that the grand -
jury commissioners of this county have disregarded not 
only their duty but also what must be their natural 
inclination to assure fairness to Mexican-Americans. 
~~.;_ t ~u.41.., -~ 
Finally, the I&ae io&&J by the District Court -
" that Mexican-Americans were the governing majority in 
this county further refutes any inference of purposeful . 
11. 
discrimination. The Court's opinion refers more than once 
to the absence of evidence on behalf of the state. But 
the critical facts, of which judicial notice could be taken, 
are beyond dispute. In addition to those set forth above 
evidencing control of the situation by Mexican- Americans, 
a majority of the elected officials were Mexican-American 
and a majority of the judges and jury commissioners in 
the county also were Mexican-American. That these positions 
of power and influence were so held is unlikely to be 
accidential in a community in which 80% of the population 
is Mexican-American. As Judge Garza emphasized, in 
dismissing respondent's petition, this case is wholly 
unique in that every other jury discrimination case 
reaching this Court has involved situations where the 
governing majority, and the resulting power and control, 
lay with a white electorate and white officials. There is 
indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total unreality 
when Justices here in Washington decide on the basis of 
inferences from statistics that Mexican-Americans in 
~ 
this remoteJ\county who control the levers of power are 
12. 
manipulating them to discriminate "against themselves". 
In contrast, the judges on the scene, the state circuit 
judge who appointed the jury commissioners, the state judge 
who presided over respondent's trial, and the United States 
District Judge - all Mexican-Americans and familiar with 
the community - perceived no basis whatever for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. 
III 
In sum, this case should be reversed on either or 
both of two grounds: (i) it was plain error to approve 
the shifting of the burden of proof to the state on the 
basis of inferences drawn from statistical evidence of 
impact or effect, a holding contrary to Davis and Arlington 
Heights; and (ii) even assuming that respondent's statistics 
justified shifting the burden to the state, it also was 
error to disregard the District Court's finding - under 
the facts and unique setting of this case - that there 
was no intent to discriminate. 
No. 75-1552 CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Today's opinion for the Court ignores our most relevant 
recent decisions: Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976) 
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided 
January 11, 1977. 
I 
The Court's preoccupation with the perceived impact 
of statistics is incompatible with the equal protection 
analysis explicitly mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights. 
In the latter case we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact. 'Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone 
of an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at 
242. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose is required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available. The 
impact of official action - whether it 'bears 
more heavily on one race than another,' 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242- may 
provide an important starting point. * * * 
But ... [a]bsent a pattern as stark as that 
in Gomillion [364 U.S. 339] or Yick Wo [118 
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative, 
and the Court must look to other evidence." 
Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from raw 
statistical data, the Court does not require "proof of 
racially discriminatory intent". Instead, finding that 
a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the 
statistical showing", the Court declared: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial 
underrepresentation of his group, the burden 
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie 
case." Ante,at 11. 
But in Arlington Heights, as in Davis, we held precisely 
the contrary: 
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply 
failed to carry their burden of proving [on 
the basis of impact alone]that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's 
decision." Slip op ., at 17. 
To be sure, the courts below also fell into the 
same error: finding that the defendant [respondent here] 
2. 
had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical 
disproportionality between Mexican-American population and 
the composition of grand jury panels. These courts did not 
have the benefit of our decisions in Davis· and Arlington 
Heights, but - even so - they misapplied perhaps the single 
most relevant precedent addressing the issue of alleged 
discrimination in grand jury selection. In Alexander v. 
3. 
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), Mr. Justice White -
speaking for the Court - made clear: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical 
standards for the demonstration of 'systematic' 
exclusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized 
that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case 
that takes into account all possible explanatory 
factors. The progressive decimation of potential 
Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, but we 
do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has 
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial 
discrimination on statistical improbability alone, 
for the selection procedures themselves were not 
racially neutral." 405 U.S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the Court also reiterated the standard that 
a complaining defendant must show that the state has 
"deliberately and systematically den[ied] to members of 
his race the right to participate as jurors in the 
administration of justice." Id., at 628. In that case 
the evidence showed ' that 21% of the relevant community 
were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five members 
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge; 
the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one of 
whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the 
grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. Id., at 627, 
628. This statistical array was - as the Court noted -
"striking". Yet this result (effect) of the system was 
4. 
not sufficient alone to support a "conclusion that 
petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case of 
invidious racial discrimination". Id., at 630. Rather, 
the Court in Alexander looked to a combination of factors, 
specified in detail in the opinion, as "constitut[ing] a 
prima facie case of discrimination". Id. at 631. 
There is simply no comparability between the facts 
in this case and those in any other jury composition case 
decided by this Court. Mexican-Americans comprised 79.2% 
of the population; the judge who appointed the jury 
commissioners was Mexican-American; three of the five 
incumbent jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 
of the 20 members of the grand jury array, five of the 
12 grand jurors who indicted defendant, the foreman of 
the grand jury, and seven of the 12 petit jurors who found 
petitioner guilty all were Mexican-Americans. 
As these facts belie on their face any inference of 
discrimination, respondent was forced to rely on a 10-year 
statistical presentation as proof of "systematic racial 
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors". These 
figures showed that for the 10-year period ending in 1972, 
5. 
only 39% of the grand jurors who served in Hildago County 
were Mexican-American. The trend was toward a higher 
percentage, averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year 
period prior to respondent's trial. Ante, at 4. The Court 
relies almost exclusively on the disparity reflected by 
these statistical averages in holding that respondent made 
out a prima facie case, shifting the burden of proof to 
the state. Once having reached this conclusion, it was 
easy to resolve this case by observing: 
"The state offered no evidence at all either 
attacking respondent's allegations of dis-
crimination or demonstrating that his statistics 
were unreliable in any way." Ante, at 5, 11, 
14 and 16. 
Indeed, the Court thought it "inexplicable" that "the 
state introduced practically no evidence. Ante at 14. 
Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for ~aking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may 
doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would 
have thought that respondent's statistics, under the 
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago 
County, were ever arguably sufficient to make a . prima 
facie case~But if there was room for~~time 
of the trial below, all doubt was dispelled by our decisions 
6. 
in Davis and Arlington Heights making clear that dispropor-
tionate "impact alone is not determinative" and that the 
burden remains on the complaining party_ to prove "discriminatory 
intent or purpose" • . 
II 
This case should have been laid permanently to rest 
because of respondent's failure to carry his burden of 
proving discriminatory intent. But even if one accepts 
arguendo that the statistical evidence of disproportionality 
made a prima facie case, I agree with the District Court 
that respondent's case is rebutted by the record and by 
facts of which that court took judicial notice. In 
Arlington Heights, we said that proof of discriminatory 
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available". As there is no shred of direct evidence 
of intent, we must look to the entire record and setting -
7. 
none of which is in dispute - for such relevant inferences 
as may be drawn. All that respondent presents is an 
argument that discriminatory intent may be presumed from 
the statistical disproportionality. Even if the setting 
were a typical community with a predominantly white popula-
tion the statistics here are only marginally suggestive, 
as they refute an inference of mere tokenism. 
On the state's side of the case, rational inferences 
from the most basic facts in a democratic society render 
wholly improbable respondent's claim of an intent to 
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. 
8. 
Analysis should commence with the facts relating to 
the indictment and ' conviction of this respondent. As 
noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five 
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority 
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge 
who presided at the trial were Mexican-Americans. It would 
be irrational to suggest that these facts - the more relevant 
facts as to respondent's conviction - justified an inference 
of discrimination. The Court, therefore, was forced torely 
on the bare statistical bones of a single element in the 
adjudicatory process: the composition of grand juries 
over a span of years as compared with thepopulation mix. A far 
more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Court's opinion, 
is the composition of the grand jury commissioners, the body 
vested by Texas law with the authority to select 
grand jurors. Respondent did not choose to present statistics 
as to this body for the entire 10-year period. The record 
does show, however, that for the two and a half years 
9. 
prior to respondent's trial the judge who appointed the 
grand jury commissioners - himself a Mexican-American 
(Judge Jose Alamia) - follwed the policy of naming "three 
Mexican-Americans and the other two might be Anglo with 
• 
Anglo names or ... a colored man." App. 63, 64. 
It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that 
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power. Here 
that power rested securely in the hands of Mexican-Americans. 
The appointing judge testified that he considered, in 
addition to other things, the population mix in appointing 
the jury commissioners. By naming three Mexican-Americans 
to the commission he gave them the power and authority - if 
they chose to exercise it· that way - to place only 
Mexican-Americans on grand jury panels. The fact that they 
exercised that power with greater restraint scarcely justifies 
a credible inference of discriminatory intent. A conclusive 
answer to any imputation of such intent was given by United 
States District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American 
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's 
habeas corpus petition: 
10. 
"If people in charge can choose whom they want, 
it is unlikely they will discriminate against 
themselves. A broader range of variation should 
be tolerated here because the Texas selection 
system allows the governing majority [of jury 
commissioners] to favor their group when selecting 
grand jurors." 384 F. Supp. 79, (1974). 
(Italics in original) --
In Akin v. Texas, supra, at 400, where apparently 
no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was 
on the jury panel, ·the Court emphasized the high threshold 
of proof required to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in 
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an 
essential element of proper judicial procedure -
the requirement of fairness on the part of the 
judicial arm of the government in dealing with 
persons charged with criminal offenses. It 
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of 
the court disregard this accepted standard of 
justice." 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that in my view 
the Court today has "lightly" concluded that the grand -
jury commissioners of this county have disregarded not 
only their duty but also what must be their natural 
inclination to assure fairness to Mexican-Americans. 
~tc~~t~~-~ 
Finally, the ~ fo~ by the District Court -
" 
that Mexican-Amer'icans were the governing majority in 
this county further refutes any inference of purposeful . 
11. 
discrimination. The Court's opinion refers more than once 
to the absence of evidence on behalf of the state. But 
the critical facts, of which judicial notice could be taken, 
are beyond dispute. In addition to those set forth above 
evidencing control of the situation by Mexican- Americans, 
a majority . of the elected officials were Mexican-American 
and a majority of the judges and jury commissioners in 
the county also were Mexican-American. That these positions 
of power and influence were so held is unlikely to be 
accidential in a community in which 80% of the population 
is Mexican-American. As Judge Garza emphasized, in 
dismissing respondent's petition, this case is wholly 
unique in that every other jury discrimination'case 
reaching this Court has involved situations where the 
governing majority, and the resulting power and control, 
lay with a white electorate and white officials. There is 
indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total unreality 
when Justices here in Washington decide on the basis of 
inferences from statistics that Mexican-Americans in 
~ 
this remote!\county who control the levers of power are 
12. 
manipulating them to discriminate "against themselves". 
In contrast, the judges on the scene, the state circuit 
judge who appointed the jury commissioners, the state judge 
who presided over respondent's trial, and the United States 
District Judge - all Mexican-Americans and familiar with 
the community - perceived no basis whatever for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. 
,III 
In sum, this case should be reversed on either or 
both of two grounds: (i) it was plain error to approve 
the shifting of the burden of proof to the state on the 
basis of inferences drawn from statistical evidence of 
impact or effect, a holding contrary to Davis and Arlington 
Heights; and (ii) even assuming that respondent's statistics 
justified shifting the burden to the state, it also was 
error to disregard the District Court's finding - under 
the facts and unique setting of this case - that there 
was no intent to discriminate . 
.. 
lfp/ss 2/15/77 Rider A, p. 8 (Gastaneda) 
; and third, the facts judicially noticed by the District 
Court with respect to the dominance and control by the 
4-to-1 majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the 
District Court, presided over by a Mexican-American familiar 
with the county, that this evidence - in its cumulative 
effect - does not ·establish unconstitutional grand jury 
discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court assesses the evidence in light 
of serious misconceptions of the applicable legal principles. 
It commences with the novel assumption that a criminal 
defendant in a state court has a right under the 
' l 
lfp/ss 2/15/77 Rider A, p. 11 (Castaneda) 
But in a state case, in which the challenge is to the 
grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and 
the defendant has the burden of proving that the 
underrepresentation is the result of systematic and 
purposeful discrmmination. 
, . . 
lfp/ss 2/15/77 Ride·r A, p. 14 (Castaneda) 
Note to Charlie: I would move the substance of your 
discussion of Turner v. Fouche (p. 14, 15) to a footnote, 
as its presence in the text breaks the flow and force of 
~r opinion. I suggest a note along the following lines: 
Although the holdings in Davis and Arlington Heights 
racially 
makes clear that proof of/discriminatory intent is required 
and that proof of impact or effect is not sufficient, we 
did recognize that in Arlington Heights a somewhat lesser 
burden may be appropriate in the context of jury selection 
"Because of the nature of the jury selection task • • • 
we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation 
even when the statistical pattern does not approach the 
extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion". M·• at ' n. - 13. 
Turner v. Fouche, supra, was cited for this view. But 
it is clear from the Court's opinion in Turner that the 
statistical disparity of the gradd jury list was viewed 
as sufficient to meet complainant's initial burden only 
because of background facts strongly supportive of 
discriminatory intent. Wurner was not a criminal case; 
it involved, rather, Georgia's peculiar system of 
appointing the county board of education. That board, 
consisting exclusively of white members was selected by 
the grand jury which in ~was drawn from a grand jury 
list selected by a county jury commission. The 
2. 
commissioners were appointed by the circuit judge. At every 
layer of this system white citizens were in total control 
even though there was not a single white student in the 
county schools,~white flight~ having occurred 100%, the 
entire board of education was white, as were all members 
of the jury commission. The District Court had found that 
until the suit was instituted "Negroes had been systematically 
excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion". 
Id., at 352. I t was against this background of pervasive 
discrimination that the Court found that even a new grand 
jury panel with 37% Negro personnel (against a 60% Negro 
majority in the county) was not such an "insubstantial'~ 
disparity as to foreclose corrective action by a federal 
court. Id., at 359. 
lfp/ss 2/15/77 Rider A, p. 15 (Castaneda) 
The analysis of Davis, and reiterated in Arlington 
Heights, is wholly consistent in principle with that 
applied in the jury discrimination cases. This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated: 
1fp/ss 2/15/77 Rider A1 p. 18 (Castaneda) 
In Turner, supra, 60% of the total population of 
the county was black. But it is abundantly clear that 
the political power, as structured by Georgia law and 
as inf fact exercised , lay solely with the white population . 
See, note __ , supra. 
lfp/ss 2/15/77 Rider A, p. 20 (Castaneda} 
Note to Charlie: I suggest a rev~s~on of the paragraph 
that begins at the bottom of page 20, but would put it 
in a footnote substantially as follows: 
The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled 
jury commission would not discriminate against Mexican-
Americans does not in itself, explain the statistical 
disparity shown by respondent. The record is essentially 
silent as to the reasons, presumably largely subjective, 
that motivated the commission in making its selections. 
But the composition of the commission, in light of the 
overall political control in the county by Mexican-Americans, 
prompted the district judge to conclude - correctly, I 
think - that the statistics are insuffient to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broader range of 
variation should be tolerated here because the Texas 
selection system allows the governing majority [of grand 
jury commissioners] to favor their group when selecting 
grand jurors". 384 F. Supp., at • 
lfp/ss 2/15/77 Rider A1 p. 5 (Castaneda) 
Allowing standing to assert the rights of others at trial, 
~..,__( ~ 'J·'L•~t.l• f ~ .ty 
on direct appeal and cettiorari,AimplLQ&~S d1f~~e 
~ 4 14 ~;),~·~~· £b~F~~~~ 
considerationst\frOHl -~~axm}i-esbfle fi:P habeas corpus. ~ 
The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to 
the individual. The focus of inquiry in habeas corpus 
generally is limited to the integrity of the state 
determination of guilt in the particular case. See 
Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold, therefore, that 
the state~ decision on direct appeal to consider the 
claim of grand jury discrimination does not present a 
case for federal habeas relief where - as here - the 
state prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt 
in his own case. The decision of the Court today, 
~ sub silento, appea~s to extend the availability of habeas 
corpus relief well beyond its present ample frontiers. 
Note to Charlie: Depending on the outcome of your research 
as to class actions in habeas, we can add a footnote drawing 
the analogy and saying the Court kkas has not proved this 
use of habeas corpus. 
2. 
Although I think the Court of Appeals' decison to 
entertain respondents claim could be viewed as plain 
error, this issue was not briefed or argued in this Court. 
Accordingly, it would be appropriate - as a minimum - to 
remand the case for reconsideration of this question. In 
view of its importance to the federal system, the question 
certainly should not be resolved in the absence of plenary 
consideration. 
--------------~ 
~ ... h- , ~ 
~ 
~. 5 ,..., e..-~"- c..t 




LFP/lab 2/19/77 Ingraham ' 
L~iting the use or total abandonment 
of corporal punishment would be welcomed by many 
as a societal advance. But when such a policy 
choice may reau.lt from this Court's determination 
of an asserted right to due process, rather than 
from the normal democratic processes of debate 
and legislative action, we have the duty to weigh 
,...,.k 51/ 
the perceived societal ~.-- Mfthews v. 
Eldridge, supra at • 
that 
supra, 
LFP/lab 2/19/77 Rider A, pg. 34 Insraham 
We cannot say that these coats •• the 
asserted state interests -- are insubstantial. 
We are reviewing here the legialative judgment, 
rooted in history and reaffirmed in the laws of 
many states, that corporal punishment serves 
important educational interests. This judgment 
certainly cannot be viewed as irrational in 
light of the problem commonplace in the schools. 
As noted in §2!! v. Lopez, supra, 
· lfp/ss 2/24/77 Rider A, p. 5 (Castaneda) 
As I read the Court's opinion it writes new law on the 
subject of grand jury discrimination, expanding the reach 
of - and some instances misapplying - our prior authorities. 
It does so in terms that can have an effect far beyond the 
relatively narrow issue presented in this case. Moreover, 
because of the unique factual situation here presented, 
it was quite unnecessary for the Court to write so sweepingly . 
lfp/ss 3/24/77 Rider A a footnote) 
at some 
None of the cases relied upon by the Court goes as 
far as it does today in inferring purposeful discrimination 
from statistical disparity alone. Alexander, cited several 
times, expressly said that '"stastical improbability alone" 
is not enough. A prima facie case of discrmination was 
found there only because of the "combination of factors" 
that clearly showed deliberate and systematic discr~ation. 
1&·, at 628, 631. In Carter v. Jury Commissioner, 396 u.s. 
320 (1969), where no Negroes had been appointed to the 
jury commission "during the 12 years preceding the commence-
ment of suit", the Court found no discrimination saying: 
"The appellants are no more entitled to 
proportional representation by race on the 
jury commission than on particular grand or 
petit jury." Id., at 339. 
The Court also cites, with little or no regard to their 
factual setting, Aiken v. Texas, supra and Turner v. 
Fouche, supra. As shown elsewhere in this dissent (infra, 
at ___ ; and n. ---~' neither of these decisions supports 
the principle today enunciated. 
3/11/77 LFP/lab Rider A Castaneda p. 11 
It seems to me that the Court today, in rejecting 
the finding of the District Court, has erred grievously. 
Apparently bemused by statistical abstractions ( see, 
~' ante at ___ ), the Court also has ignored or mis-
applied the relevant precedents. I would reinstate the 
judgment of the District Court. 
. ~ . 
lfp/ss 3/8/77 Rider A, p. 9 (Castaneda! 
has "lightly" concluded that the Mexican-American grand 
jury commissioners of this county have disregarded their 
sworn duty as well as their natural predisposition not to 
discriminate against their fellow Mexican-Americans. 
lfp/ss 3/9/77 Rider A1 p. (Castaneda) 
Mr. Justice Marshall argues, in his concurring opinion , 
that because the Texas "selection system is.entirely 
discretionary" it is subject to abuse, citing cases 
recognizing this as a possibility. ~; at ___ • But 
the cases he cites also make clear that "the Texas synt:em 
of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury 
commissioners is fair on its face and capable of being 
utilized without discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas, 
347 u.s. 475, 478 (1954). 
Reliance on the discretion vested in the jury 
commission to "buttress" the inference of purposeful 
discrimination derived from bare statistics" (ante,at 
___ ) is a bootstrap argument. There is not a shred of 
evidence in thi~ case, other than the statistics, to show 
abuse of discretion by the jury commission controlled by 
Mexican-Americans. There is no evidence remotely comparable 
to the cumulative evidence of sustained, invidious discrimina-
tion against Negores in the cases cited by Mr. Justice 
Marshall. 
lfp/ss 3/8/77 Rider A, p. , (Castaneda) 
Mr. Justice Marshall , relying in his concurring opinion 
on "social science theory and research", rejects as 
implausible the view that the Mexican-American grand jury 
majority - acting in this predominantly Mexican-American 
community - would have a natural predisposition to deal 
fairly with their fellow Mexican-Amer icans. The only 
specific example of this "social science theory" is the 
rather startling one of the "concentration camps" in Nazi 
Germany. It would not have occurred to many observers, 
even at this distance, to make even th~a 6blique comparison 
between the treatment of "Jewish prisoners • • • [by] 
their Gestapo guards" with the Mexican-American officials 
accused of "purposeful discrimination" in this case. 
lfp/ss 3/10/77 Rider A, p. 1 (Castaneda) 
One may agree with the Court that the lack of 
proportional representation of Mexican-~ericans on the 
grand jury lists in this county would be unlikely to occur 
if jurors were selected from the population wholly at 
random. But it does not follow that the disproportion 
resulted from purposeful invidious discrimination. In 
my view, the totality of the circumstances fully supports 
the District Court's finding that this statistical disparity -
that constitutes the basis for the Court's decision -
stemmed from neutral causes rather than from any intent 
to discriminate against Mexican-Americans. 
lfp/ss xiii 2/9/77 
No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today ignores our most relevant recent 
decisions: Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided 
January 11, 1977. Neither of these cases is cited, and 
the Court's x preoccupation with bare statistics is totally 
incompatible with the equal protection analysis explicitly 
mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights. In the latter 
case we said: 
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact. 'Disproporationate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it not the sole touchstone of 
an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at 242. 
Proof of racially discriminatory inteor-or purpose 
is required to show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
* * * * 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available. The 
impact of official action - whether it 'bears 
more heavily on one race than another,' 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242 -may 
provide an important starting point. * * * 
But • • • [a]bsent a pattern as stark as that 
in Gomillion [364 U.S. ~39] or Yick Wo [118 
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative, 
and the Court must look to other evidence." 
The Court today, wholly disregarding our most recent 
precedent, holds in effect that " impact alone" .!!!. 
determinative. Relying on a perceived "presumption of 
discrimination raised by the statistical showing", the 
Court declared: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial 
underrepresentation of his group, the burden 
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie 
case. 1' ~ at 11. 
In Arlington Heights, as in Davis, we held explicitly to 
the contrary: 
2. 
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply '\ 
failed to carry their burden of proving 
[on the basis of impact alone] that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's 
decision." Slip op. at 17. 
To be sure, the g courts below also fell into the 
same error - finding that the defendant [respondent here] 
had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical 
disproportionality between Mexican American population and 
the composition of the grand jury panels. These courts 
did not have the benefit of our decisions in Davis and 
Arlington Hei&hts, but - even so - they misapplied what 
is perhaps the single most relevant precedent addressing 
precisely the issue of alleged discrimination in grand 
~o( 
jury selection: Alexander v. Louisiana, ~6 u.s. 625 (1972). 
3. 
In that case, Mr. Justice White - speaking for the Court -
made clear: 
"The Court has never announced mathematical 
axaadxags standards for the demonstration of 
'systematic' exclusion of blacks but has, rather, 
emphasized that a factual inquiry is necessary 
in each case that takes into account all possible 
ex& explanatory factors. The progressive 
decimation of potential Negro grand jurors is 
indeed striking here, but we do not rest our 
conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated a 
prima facie case of invidious racial discrimina-
tion on statistical improbability alone, for the 
selection procedures themselves were not racially 
neutral." 405 U.S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the Court reiterated the standard that 
a complaining defendant must show that the state has 
11deliberately and systematically der{ied] to members of 
his race the right to participate as jurors in the 
administration of justice." Is!·, at 628. In Alexander 
the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant community 
were Negro, the jury commission consisted of five members 
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge; 
of the 20 persons on the grand jury venire, only one 
was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the grand 
jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !£. at 627, 628. 
This statistical array was - as the Court noted - "striking", 
and yet was not alone sufficient to support a "conclusion 
that petition has demonstrated a prima facie case of 
4. 
invidious racial discrimination". Id., at 630. Rather, 
the Court looked to a combination of factors, specified 
in detaile in the opinion as ~EBRS:EiXIdtlkN« "constitut[ing) 
a prima facie case of discrimination". .!£. at 631. 
There is simply so comparability between the facts in this 
case and those in any other jury composition case decided 
by this Court. The "group" alleged to have been discriminated 
against, Mexican-American, comprised 79.2% of the population; 
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners was Mexican-
American; three of the five incumbent jury commissioners 
were Mexican-American; 10 of the 20 members of the grand 
jury array, five of the 12 grand jurors who indicted 
defendant, the foreman of the grand jury, and i seven 
of the 12 afxxke petit jurors who found petitioner guilty 
all were Mexican-American . 
5. 
As these facts belie on their face any inference of 
discrimination, respondent relied on a 10-year statistical 
presentation as proof of "systematic racial discrimination 
in the selection of grand jurors". These figures showed 
that for the 10-year period ending in 1972, only 39% of 




Mexican-American. The trend was toward a higher percentage, 
averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year period prior 
to respondent's trial. ~at 4. The Court relies almost 
exclusively on the disparity shown by these statistical 
averages in holding that respondent had made out a prima 
facie case smaixia shifting the BBX~R burden of proof to 
the state. Once having reached this conclusion, it was 
easy to resolve this case - as theCourt did - by observing: 
"The state offered no evidence at all either 
attacking respondent's allegations of &am 
discrimination or demonstrating that his 
statistics were unreliable in any way." 
~' at 5, 11, 14 and 16. 
Indeed, the Court thought it inexplicable that "the 
state introduced practically no evidence." Ante at 14. -
Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for taking this 
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may 
doubt whether a many lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
6. 
would have thought that respondent's statistics, under 
the circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago 
County, had made a prima facie case. But if there was 
room for doubt at the time of the trial below, all doubt 
was dispelled by our decisions in Davis and Arlington Heights 
making clear that disproportionate "impact alone is not 
determinative" and that the burden remains on the complaining 
party to prove "discriminatory intent or purpose". We did 
point out in Arlington Heights that proof of such a purpose 
as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry into 
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may 
be available". This view was consistent with the Court's 
aa, admonition in Alexander that, in a jury discrimination 
case, a court must consider the entire factual situation 
and "take into account all possible explanatory factors". 
405 U.S. , at -· As the facts and relevant setting of 
this case are not in dispute, we are free to examine them 
and drawn our own conclusion as to the constitutional issue. 
l/~~ 
As noted in Akins v. Texas, 325 u.s. 398~(1945), the 
alleged denial of equal protection with respect to jury 
selection "calls for our examination of the evidence to 
7. 
determine for ourselves whether a federal constitutional 
right has been denied •••• 11 Indeed, the finding by the 
district court that respondent had made our a "bare prima 
facie case" was based solely on the undisputed statistical 
evidence, and the district court's conclusion that this 
resulted in shifting the burden of proof to the state was 
an erroneous conclusion of law. 
I turn now, in light of the Court's duty to make an 
independent judgment, to consider the unique setting of 
this case. The Court's opinion states that we "granted 
certiorari to consider whether the existence of a 'governing 
majority'ia in itself can rebut a prima facie case of 
discrimination in grand jury selection. It Ante at 9. -• • • 
It is puzzling to speculate as to the origin of this 
asserted reason for granting certiorari. The questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari were not so framed, 
and neither was our grant so expressed or limited. The 
district court did emphasize that Met Mexican-Americans 
were in theory and in fact a governing majority in 
Hidalgo County, but no one seriously suggests that this 
fact alone is relied upon to rebut a case of discrimination 
• ~o, .,/'· 
8. 
even if the burden of proof had been s:kai shifted to the 
state. Analysis should commence with the facts relating 
to the indictment and conviction of ~ respondent. As 
noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five 
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority 
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge 
who presided at the trial appear to have been Mexican-
Americans. It would be wholly irrational to suggest that 
these facts - the most relevant facts to respondent's 
conviction - permitted any inference of discrimination. 
The Court, therefore,w was forced to rely on the bare 
statistical bones of a single element in the process: 
the ratio of grand jury members to the population mix. 
A far more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Cou~~t's 
opinion is the composition of the grand jury commissioners, 
the body vested by Texas law with the authority to select 
grand jurors·. Respondent did not choose to present statistic~ 
as to ~,his body for the entire 10-year period. The record 




half years prior to respondent's trial the judge who 
I 
appointed the grand jury commissioners followed the 
I' . 
policy of naming ' 'three Mexican-Americans and the other 
two might be Anglo with Anglo names or • • • a colored 
man." App. 63, 64. 
9. 
It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that 
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power. Here 
that power rested securely in the hands of\ Mexican-Americans. 
The appointing judge - himself a Mexican-American - Judge 
Joes Alamia - testified that he considered, in addition 
to other things, the population mix in appointing the jury 
commissioners. By naming three Mexican-Americans to the 
commission he gave them the power and authority - if they 
chose to exercise it that way - to place only Mexican-Americans 
on grand jury panels. The fact that they exercised that 
power with greater restraint is scarcely a credible 
inference under the circumstances. A conclusive answer 
to any imputation of invidious intent was given by United 
States District Judge Garza , the able Mexican-American 
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's 
habeas corpus petition: 
"If pltspis: people in charge m:k can choose whom 
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate 
against themselves. A broader range of variation 
should be tolerated here because the Texas selection 
system allows the governing majority [of jury 
commissioners] to favor their group when 
selecting grand jurors . " 384 F. Supp. 79, 
-- (1974) 
~: Add footnote keyed to above 
10. 
~ In ~ v. Texas (supra) at 400, where apparently no /~ 
Negro was on the jury conunission and only one of 16 on the 
jury panel, the Court emphasized the high threshold of 
proof required to brand officers of the court with 
discriminatory intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in 
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an 
essential element of proper JUdicial procedure -
the requirement of fairness on the part of the 
judicial arm of the government in dealing with 
persons charged with criminal offenses. I t 
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of 
the court disregard this accepted standard of 
justice. '' 
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court 
today has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury conunissioners 
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what may be presumed to be their natural inclination to 
assure fairness to Mexican-Americans. Finally, the fact -
found by the District Court - that Mexican-Americans were 
the governing majority in this county further refutes any 
inference of purposeful discrimination. The Court's opinion 
refers more than once to the absence of evidence on behalf 
of the state. But the critical facts,a of which judicial 
·~ -~ 
' 
notice could be taken, are beyond dispute. In addition 
to those set forth above evidencing control of the situation 
by Mexican-Americans, a majority of the elected officials 
were Mexican-American and a majority of the judges and jury 
commissioners in the county also were Mexican-American. 
That these positions of power and influence were so held 
is unlikely to be accidental in a community in which 80% 
of the population is Mexican-American. As Judge Garza 
emphasized, in dismissing respondent's petition. This 
case is totally unique in that every other jury discrimina-
tion case reaching this Court has involved situations 
KkBB where the governing majority, and the resulting power 
and control, lay with a white electorate and white officials. 
There is indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total 
unreality of Justices here in Washington deciding on the 
basis of inferences from tables of statistics, that Mexican-
Americans in this remote county who control the iaa levers 
of power are manipulating them to discriminate "against 
themselves". In contrast, the judges on the scene, the 
state circuit judge who appointed the jury commissioners , 
the state judge who presided over respondent's trial, 
:t'- ;r. to.• . ,, 
and the United States District Judge - all Mexican-Americans 
and familiar with the community - perceived no basis whatever 
for finding the necessary invidious discrimination. 
Castenida v. Partida, No. 75-1552 
Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court today requires the release of a 
state prisoner on federal habeas corpus although it 
) 
finds no fault with the finding of guilt on which 
his conviction and confinement rest. The Court 
reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a 
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the 
.scI« f.•'"" fr•ees.s , 
Mexican-Americans who controlled the j ~ry ieemmie.H;i8!l 
in Hidalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-
Americans in selecting the grand jury that returned the 
prisoner's indictment. In my view_, the Court misconceives 
both the proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief 
L..ts'tcb~s'-'d J 




Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of 
bu1lary of a private residence at night with intent to 
~ 
A.Ls-~-t- I 
rape. Although Texas law affordea Pa~~an opportunity 
to challenge the indictment before trial - and, indeed, 
l .J.,.u~~t"J 
required him to do so - -paz JE&t offered no 
to a~~ t~e indictment or the selection of the grand jury that 
returned it. Accordingly, he was brought to trial before 
a petit jury. This jury, whose composition is conceded 
~I'~IJ 
to have been proper, found '~£Aa guilty of the crime 
L~-#-:~t- , 
charged beyond any reasonable doubt. After Paiirlia was 
convicted and sentenced he raised for the first time the 
claim that is now before us: that the grand jury which 
indicted him had been selected by a procedure infected by 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans. 
By accepting that claim, the Court today requires ~ 4 
' ijt' the State to release respondent - to indict and try 
him again if the witnesses are still available - although 
there is no question that a properly constituted grand 
jury found him guilty. There being no 
question of respondent's guilt, the threshold question in 
this case is whether federal habeas corpus relief is 
available to challenge the ro mposition of the grand jury. 
... 
' 
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), we held 
hAhl•~ 
that when a state prisoner asks a federal court ~ 
;\ 
g aha aH ee!!'fttt8 l'!!'eeeeain~ to overturn a state-court 
conviction because of an allegedly unconstitutional grand 
jury indictment, the prisoner must show - as a general rule -
either that he raised his claim within the time limits 
imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause 
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a 
timely objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, 
and cannot show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he contends 
It is true that in Francis we left open the question 
whether the general rule applicable to consideration of 
claims of unconstitutional grand jury discrimination in 
federal habeas proceedings should bar relief where the 
state courts consider the merits of an untimely claim. 
3. 
We said that in such a case "different considerations would 
-•.. be applicable". 425 U.S., at 542 n. 5. It does not 
-.J 
,wt-Jiflc& ~ 
follow that, as the Court today sununarily concludes, I~inee :::0:. 
the Texas courts considered the claim on the merits, ... 
\ &.ti.. a.+ - • ) 
we are free to do so here." 1 It may be that where a state 
court considers a grand-jury-discrimination claim despite 
failure to raise it before trial, federal review is available 
by certiorari in this Court. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 
420 U.S. 283, 288-292 (1975). But in my view, the states 
L A f.l-.rJ..$ ~0 ~ 0 $ l S +<>-r 
consideration of the merits le~&s ;pen eke ;;;; ' e 
L~) 
federal habeas revie~Qt£8+l uthetwlse lsarreti elsa:i!m. Bae ~ 
Stone v. Powell,_ U.S. __ (1976). 
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and 
instructed petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, 
is like a valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant 
those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent 
with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do 
not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is 
established." Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). 
~ The initial question, accordingly, is whether thejgrand 
jury discrimination is the sort of defect that will "stand 
4. 
in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly 
established." 
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and 
elsewhere, is to establish that there is probable cause 
for detaining the accused and for requiring him to stand 
5vf +h.e.re 1S fl\o C.M..r -t, ~-lr~.; ~tfl.:rJ a•rflc'ctt ~/c +o fW 
trial. l'~e ConotitYtioA does not, bow~VQ~, ro~uire the 
8 .J. .. :Ie s ·> +o t, t.. -MA du f.t I 6 ~ ~ 1 r:.ll-:-MA-~~=--___, 
StRtQS ts ~reeeee ey sraBQ jur¥. Hurtado v. California, 
110 u.s. 516 (1884). In many states the grand jury's 
function is served by an information and, if the defendant 
is to be detained for any significant period before trial, 
by a judicial determination of probable cause. See Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 u.s. 103, 118-119 (1975). In that 
context the established rule is that a defect in the 
probable cause determination will not void a subsequent 
conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently de-
tained may challenge the probable cause for that con-
finement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground 
that the defendant was detained pending trial without a 
determination of probable cause." Id., at 119. 
Where a state proceeds by indictment, it is 
true that this Court has recognized a broader scope of 
----
. f . r"' . rev1ew a ter conv1ct 1on. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 
a 
405 U.S. 625 (1972), we set aside/xke state conviction on 
the ground tb£ members of the defendant's race had been 
tff,..,. qr-aM.d iCA/1,~ <tAJi.,c.t.. ~~wt~J lau ""'"J,c.1W~McT, 1 
deliberately excluded from] . ~44'4f This broader 
scope of review reflects a concern not for the rights of the 
l""" t... u -c. 
convicted defendant , 9"1" !iili~ guilt is no longer a mere 
. \ ~~ ~. ~ > 'fO 1 ..4 .S, 'I 1! {I'I]J.) • ..J 
probability, but f he rights of others.} We have, in 
essence, given the criminal defendant standing on appeal 
to assert the 
~ 
rights of those who _ mayJ be enlills¥Q@a £ann 
J ..,. .-.,"'f',. 4JI t"' J,,( 
jW'59 eeruiee er 
alleged discrimination.~ 
But allowing standing to assert the rights of 
others is inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. 
The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to 
_!_j 
the individual. Where a prisoner challenges the process 
that led to his conviction, the inquiry on habeas corpus 
properly is limited to the integrity of t he state 
determination of guilt in the particular case. See 
Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold, therefore, that 
the p.ate's decision on direct appeal to consider the 
~ 
claim of grand jury discrimination does not present a 
case for federal habeas relief where - as here - the 
state prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt 
-
-----
in his own case. The decision of the Court today, sub silentio, 
appears to extend the availability of habeas corpus 
~I 
relief well beyond its present ample frontiers. 
Although I think the Court of Appeals' decision to 
entertain respondent's claim could be viewed as plain 
error, this issue was not briefed or argued in this case. 
In view of its importancew the federal system, the 
question should not be resolved in the absence of plenary 
consideration. It would be appropriate, rather, to set 
the case for reargument or to remand it for reconsidera-
tion of the question whether federal habeas corpus relief 
is available. 
As the Court nonetheless affirms the ~ourt of 
----
Appeals' holding that respondent established unconstitutional 
discrimination in the grand jury selection process, I 
turn now to the merits . 
8. 
II \__.9--
The evidence relevant to the issue of 
discrimination in this case falls into three 
categories: first, the statistical evidence intro-
duced by respondent in both the state and federal 
proceedings which tends to show underrepresentation 
of Mexican-Americansm the grand juries of Hidalgo 
County; second, the testimony of the state trial 
judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection 
system as it operated in this case; and third, the 
facts judicially noticed by the District Court with 
respect to the political dominance and control by the 
Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree 
with the District Court that in light of all the evidence 
respondent failed to establish unconstitutional grand 
jury discrimination. 
A 
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence 
with a serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. 
It begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal 
constitutional 
defendant has a/right to be indicted by a grand 
jury "drawn from a fair cross-section of the corrmmnity." 
> Ante , at __ 
1
' n. 13 • 
9. 
In adopting that principle 
·the Court abandons the traditional equal 
protection standards that have always applied to 
claims of grand jury discrimination and ignores our 
most relevant recent decisions: Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 299 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hou~ing Corp., __ U.S. __ (1977). . -
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury 
does not apply to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. 
L .:S vf,.,.._ • J 
A state defendant 
cannot complain if the state foregoes the institution 
of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead 
through prosecutorial information, as many states 
prefer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 
at 116-119. Nevertheless, if a state chooses to 
proceed by grand jury it must proceed within the 
constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a line of 
cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 (1880), this Court has held that a 
criminal defendant is denied equal protection of 
the law if, as a result of purposeful discrimination, 
10. 
members of his own race are excluded from jury 
service. See, ~' Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 
U.S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n~ 
396 U.S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 
339 U.S. 282, 287-290 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 
U.S. 398, 403-404 (1945). As the Court points out) 
this right is applicable in cases involving grand 
as well as petit jury selection, see, ~' Alexander, 
supra, and in cases where purposeful discrimination 
results only in substantial underrepresentation 
rather than total exclusion of members of the 
defendant's class, see, ~' Turner v. Fouche, 396 
u.s. 346 (1970). 
right not to have 
members of his class excluded by discrimination from 
grand jury service has never before today been 
thought to embody a right to a grand jury that 
reflects "a fair cross-section c£ the community." 
The r i ght to a "representative" 
grand jury is a federal r ight that derives not 
~ ~ kc...~t- A--..J~+ ~ J 
from thejrequirement of equal protection but from 
11. 
the Fifth grand jury. 
That right is similar to the right -- applicable 
to state proceedings -- to a representative petit 
jury under the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). To the extent that 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a 
defendant need only show substantial underrepresent-
ation of his own race or class to demonstrate a 
constitutional violation. 






~ng wg~ld prevent 
12. 
But in a state case~n which the challenge is to the 
grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and 
the defendant has the burden of proving that the 
underrepresentation is the result of systematic and 
purposeful discri mination. 
This equal protection analysis was 
explicitly mandated in our recent decisions in 
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Corp. In Arlington Heights 
we said: 
I 
"Our decision last Term in Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it 
clear that official action will not be 
held unconstitutional solely because 
it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact. 'Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch-
stone of an invidious racial discrimin-
ation.' Id., at 242. Proof of racially 
discriminatory intent or purpose is 
required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause." U.S., at 
Today the Court holds that a showing of dispro-
I 
_) 
portionate impact is enough: 
"Once the defendant has shown substantial 
underrepresentation of his group, the 
burden shifts to the state to rebut the 
prima facie case." ~) at __ • 
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis 
and Arlington Heights. 
B~ 
In Arlington Heights 
following standards for determining whether an 
evidentiary showing constitutes a prima facie case 
to the state: 
"Determining whether invidious 
discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into 
such circumstantial and direct evidence 
of intent as may be available. The 
impact of the official action -- whether 
it "bears more heavily on one race than 
another, II Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. ' 
at 242 -- may provide an important start-
ing point. Sometimes a clear pattern, 





emerges from the effect of the state 
action even when the governing legislation 
appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. 
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane 
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Gomillion 
v. Lightfoot, 364 u.s. 339 (1960). The 
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively 
easy. But such cases are rare. Absent 
a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion 
14. 
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determin-
ative, and the Court must look to other ~ 
evidence." - IJ, S ·r..!!r.t- ( foo~~o t"s 0 *l'lli t> ). 
---
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana 
=-=.=..=.=::.' 




a countervailing explanation." 
1.) ... 16. 
"The Court has never announced math-
ematical standards for the demonstration 
of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks but 
has, rather, emphasized that a factual 
inquiry is necessary in each case that 
takes into account all possible explan-
atory factors. The progressive decimation 
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed 
striking here, but we do not rest our 
conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated 
a prima facie case of invidious racial 
discrimination on statistical improbability 
alone, for the selection procedures them-
selves were not racially neu:tral." 405 
U.S., at 630. 
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the 
~ relevant community were Negro; the jury commission 
consisted of five members "all of whom were white" 
appointed by a white judge; the grand jury venire 
included 20 persons, only one of whom was a Negro 
(5%); and none of the 12 persons on the grand jury 
that indicted defendant was Negro. Id., at 627, 
628. This statistical array was - as the Court 
noted - "striking". Yet the statistics were not 
sufficient to constitute a prima facie case. ~ 
Only after determining that the selection system 
' 
/ ~ 
"provided a clear and easy opportunity for discrim-
ination11 was the Court satisfied that the burden 
.:f) 17. 
should shift to the State. Ibid. 
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and 
Alexander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrep-
resentation of a population group on the grand jury lists 
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." 
Arlington Heights, supra, ______ u.s., at 
In this case, the following critical facts are 
beyond dispute: the judge who appointed the jury commissioners 
and later presided over respondent's trial was 
was Mexican-American; three of the five jury 
commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of the 20 
-............ 
members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American; 
five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indict-
ment, including the foreman, were Mexican-American; 
~merisant and seven of the 12 petit jurors who 
18. 
returned the verdict of guilt were Mexican-American. 
In addition, a majority of the elected officials in 
Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were a 
majority of the judges. That these positions of 
power and influence were so held is not surprising 
in a community where 80% of the population is 
Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District 
Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American jurist who 
presided over the habeas proceedings in the District 
Court, this case is unique. Every other jury -
discrimination case reaching this Court has involved 
Ml 
a situation where the governing majority, and the 
resulting power over the jury selection process, 
.!I 
was held by a white electorate and white officials. 
The most significant fact in this case, 
all but ignored in the Court's opinion, is that 
a majority of the jury commissioners were Mexican-
American. The jury commission is the body vested 
by Texas law with the authority to select grand 
jurors. Under the Texas selection system, as 
noted by the Court, ~)at ____ , the jury commission 
has the opportunity to identify in advance those 
potential jurors who have Spanish surnames. This 
means that a majority of the commission are in a 
position -- if they so choose to exercise their 
power -- to place only Mexican-Americans on grand 
jury panels. That they have exercised their power 
with greater restrai~arcely justifies an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent. To the contrary, 
rational inferences from the most basic facts in 
a democratic society render wholly improbable 
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate 
against him and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge 
Garza observed, "If people in charge can choose 
19. 
whom they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate 
{ 
1~) 
against themselves." 384 F. Supp. ~~· 
That individuals are more likely to 
discriminate in favor of, than against, those who 
1 share their own identifiable attributes is the 
premise that under lies the cases recognizing ..__ 
that the criminal defendant has a personal right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to have members 
20. 
of his own class excluded from jury service. 
Discriminatory exclusion of members of the defendant's 
class has been viewed as unfairly excluding persons 
having a natural inclination to favor the defendant. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.s. , at 
309. Were it not for that natural inclination, 
in 
and for its general recognition/the community, 
there would be no reason to suppose that a jury 
selection process that systematically a&a=Bslikczstely 
excluded persons of a certain race would be the 
basis of any legitimate complaint by criminal defend-
ants of that race. Only the individuals excluded 
from jury service would have a personal right to 
~ 
complain. 
---The likelihood that 
commission 
against 
explain the established 
respondent. 
I 
are to show the 
intent. 
tolerated here selection syste 
allows the jury 
to favor their group 
384 F. Supp., at 
apparently no Negro was on the jury commission and 
only one of 16 was on the jury panel, the Court 
emphasized the high threshold of proof required 
to brand officers of the court with discriminatory 
intent: 
"An allegation of discriminatory 
practice in selecting a grand jury 
panel challenges an essential element 
of proper judicial procedure - the 
~ requirement of fairness on the part of 
the judicial arm of the government in 
dealing with persons charged with 
criminal offenses. It cannot lightly 
be concluded that officers of the 






~ With all respect, I am compelled to say that ~ 
Rl:f vielil the Court today has "lightly" concluded 
that the grand jury commissioners of this county 
have disregarded not only their duty but also 
what must be their natural inclination to assure 
fairness to Mexican-Americans. 
It matters little in this case whether such 
judicially noticeable facts as the composition of 
the grand jury commission are viewed as defeating 
respondent's prima facie case at the outset or as 
rebutting it after it was extablished by statistical 
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case 
is limited to its effect in shifting the burden of 
07
~forward to the State. Once the State has 
"' produced evidence -- either by presenting proof 
or by calling attention to facts subject to judicial 
notice -- the only question is whether the evidence 
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate 
and systematic discrimination in the jury selection 
process. 
23. 
Here, the State responded to respondent's 
statistical showing by presenting the testimony 
of the judge who appointed the grand jury commissioners. 
Other facts, 5vc~ as the presence of Mexican-Americans 
in a majority of the elective positions of the county, 
entered the record through judicial notice. The 
testimony, together with the facts noted by the 
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's 
burden of production-- even assuming that respondent's 
evidence was sufficient to give rise to such a 
burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence, 
the question for the District Court was whether 
respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately 
and systematically den[ied] to members of 
[respondent's class] the right to participate as 
jurors in the administration of justice." Alexander, 
supra, 405 U.S., at 628. In my view the District 
Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination 
insufficient. 
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that 
24. 
"the state introduced only the testimony of the 
.....,-. # J 
state trial judge. Ante) at ~ Perhaps the state 
fairly may be faulted for taking this case so 
lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt 
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, 
would have thought that respondent's statistics, 
under the circumstances of this case and prevailing 
establish deliberate and systematic discrimination. 
There is for me a sense of unreality when 
l ~A. k" t 
Justices here in Washington dec ide~on t e asis of 
inferences from statistics that Mexican-Americans in 
this remote border county who control the levers of 
power are manipulating them to discriminate "against 
themselves". In contrast, the judges on the scene, 
the state •••ew•t judge who appointed the jury 
c.....~J, 
commissioners ,... ta• s&a&• j !J1• uht> presided over 
respondent's trial~and the United States District 
.,,"ft.. 
Judge ~Mexican-Americans and familiar with 
the community - perceived no basis for finding 
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I 
25. 
share that perception, I would reinstate the 
judgment of the District Court. 
flltJI ~ "It is clear, not only from the language of [42 u.s.c.] 
§§ 224l(c)(3) and 2254(a), but also~ from the 
common law history of the writ, that the essence 
of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 
custody upon the legality of that custody, and 
that the traditional function of the writ is to 
secure release from illegal custody. II 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 
... 
~ ~/ In no case cited ~ the Court's opinion did 
the Court have before it a federal habeas corpus 
petitioner who, lik~spondent here, complained 
only of discrimination in the selection of the 
grand jury which indicted him. Indeed, the only 
habeas case cited by the Court is Peters v. Kif£, 
~- rz%1 tH 
supra, 407 U.S. 493. Peters involved claims of discrimination 
in the selection of the petit as well as the grand jury.~ 
-
--Y Although Bite lwleliags in Davis and Arlington - --Heights 
~IIQili 11 I .I 
makef clear that proof of discriminatory intent is required 
L~ 
and that proof of impact or effect~s not sufficient, we 
did recogniz@in Arlington Heigh~a ogmauloa£ lesser 
burden may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. 
"Because of the nature of the jury selection task 
we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation 
even when the statistical pattern does not approach the 
extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion". Id. , at - ( n :....,..13. 
"C.. 
As one illustration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 
cr 
396 U.S. 346 (1970). In Turner the statistical 
Q. 
evidence showed that Negro~ constituted 60 % of the 
general population and 37 % of those included in the 
grand jury list~ The court found that the disparity -
between those figures was not so "insubstantial" as 
to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. 
Id., at 350. 
lUl'li \Ti:8ueti in isolation. Turner was not a criminal 
case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of 
xeieExiHgx appointing the county board of education. 
The circuit judge appointed jury commissioners, who 
iPr 't!l!l"i'iil i8lected the ~1!808 j&l!j , oohich , f!aally, s e l ected 1 
in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury, in 
turn, selected the board of education. At every layer 
of this system white citizens were in total control. 
~11 •f tk4 s+vd~~ ~ 't£.1 ~ni'f Sc.~ol:s w.t)'(. Ntft"OJ ~ 
Even though tfieFe lii'as ~ot a ~ai~Slil wbitae seltel&Rt in. 
J I h fi\QAS 1•rtJ ~ lsewJ.\ere J 
-tv-(t-J w~oe f"'fi clVI, r a of the members of the-
board of education were 
white as were all of the members of the jury commission. 
The District Court had found tha1 until the suit was 
instituted, "Negroes had been systematically excluded 
from the grand juries through token inclusion." Id., 
at 352. It was against this background of pervasive 
discrimination that the Court found that even a new grand 
. , ., #.f or?'.Jv n ~' f,-r .{, :rei! .... -r. ... •:,; 
The Court's rel~ance on ~~spe~ e£ 
~cf.tJ ~ ~-~ tl 
xander ante at laced The "sub]" ectivity" =~.;;;;;.' _ , __ , • 
of the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, 
as here, those who control the selection process are 
members of the same class as the person claiming discrimination. 
See text infra. 
~ I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact 
that Mexican-Americans constitute a majority in Hildago 
County is dispositive. There are many communities in 
which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, a majority 
of the population may not be able at a particular time to 
control or significantly influence political decisions or 
Sc.t. "r~r v. hwc.LL 1 1" -the way the system operates. can 
conten that Hildago County is such a community. Ae "e 
hBiliil aeeee.....QMJili¥RM~ --r;:: classic situation in which a 
• 
~~~·f44:~ 
"minority group" may suffer s5a&e discrimination is where 
A. 
it is "relegated to~a position of political powerless -
ness:' ae ~& .. ~-~t"ft£d6Bolitll•li!' prQtMr;...,. f£<>w the 
~~ . . . 1. . J LllJ Ul!Lt!"J:] ?A pD 1 tl G8 San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez, ~ U.S. _J_, Jg (1973). Here 
the Mexican-Americans are not politically "powerless"; 
they ~ the majoritarian political element of the community, 




~The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled 
jury commission would not discriminate against Mexican-
Americans does not,in itself, explain the statistical 
disparity shown by respondent. The record is essentially 
silent as 
\ M.AoM.Ilt,. ~ wkct!.L 'tl4 ~ CIW\,.. tsri~ J 
to thel•~•sefts ,... pW&8 '1!1RI:ilily 1 ?;gay i·+ j ~~ tiii:U~ ;. ~ --
s.t.i.u..fi·,.. S' tAM.J .i fs- YWJ-/ tl}t:ifi M '~ ~/t.t.h c f. tllf tfS • ii ckJ. 
t;aat lft8tioB:t:CEl ta~ commj &Si8ft in m:B:ldag it:s SeleetiOirs. 
But the composition of the commission, in light of the 
overall political control in the county by Mexican-Americans, 
prompted the 
think - that 
district judge to conclude - correctly, I ..-,... -;: - ~ ~ 
the statistics ~ ~nsuffient to show the 
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broader range of 
variation should be tolerated here because the Texas 
selection system allows the governing majority [of grand 
jury commissioners] to favor their group when selecting 
grand jurors'!\~ 384 F. Supp., at 9~ . 
